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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the usefulness of voluntary health insurance (VHI) as a lever 
for improving health system performance. It posits that VHI may further health 
policy goals if it addresses gaps in statutory coverage, if it does not make those who 
rely on statutory coverage worse off, and if those who need VHI have access to it. 
The thesis presents four studies that analyse markets for VHI in the European Union; 
developments in public policy towards VHI, including the implications of the EU-
level regulatory framework for VHI; the impact of VHI on health system 
performance; the effects of allowing people to choose between statutory and 
voluntary health insurance; and VHI’s influence on consumer mobility where 
insurers compete to offer statutory benefits. The thesis finds that while VHI is critical 
to financial protection in some countries, it does not always address key gaps in 
statutory coverage or reach those who need it, and the depth of its coverage has 
declined over time, even in heavily regulated markets. VHI has a regressive effect on 
equity in health financing, lowers equity in the use of health services and does not 
seem to have a positive effect on efficiency, partly because insurers in many 
countries lack appropriate incentives. What is more, a failure to align incentives 
across VHI and statutory health insurance can undermine the efficiency of public 
spending on health. Many of VHI’s negative effects can be attributed to poor policy 
design. Policy makers can try and ensure VHI contributes to rather than undermines 
health system performance through the following mechanisms: better understanding 
of VHI’s interaction with the health system; stronger policy design, focusing on 
aligning incentives in pursuit of health policy goals and ensuring efficiency in the use 
of public resources; willingness and capacity to regulate the market to secure 
financial and consumer protection; and regular monitoring and evaluation. 
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Note on the structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis follows the publishable paper format, in which a series of three or four 
papers are submitted as a thesis. The papers must be thematically linked and tied 
together with an introduction and a conclusion. 
 
Study 1 
The first paper in the thesis is solely the work of the PhD author (ST). It draws on a 
survey of experts in 26 EU member states (Imre Boncz, Ăirts Briăis, Karine 
Chevreul, Joan Costa-i-Font, Martin Dlouhy, Charalambos Economou, Stefanie 
Ettelt, Thomas Foubister, Margherita Giannoni-Mazzi, Gabriel Gulis, Triin Habicht, 
Galina Kanazireva, Adam Kozierkiewicz, Joy Ladurner, Hans Maarse, Anja 
Milenkovic Kramer, Ljudmila Mincheva, Natasha Muscat, Mónica Oliveira, Victor 
Olsavsky, Willy Palm, Marc Perronnin, Sofia Silva, Caj Skoglund, Skirmante 
Starkuviene, Mamas Theodorou, Svetla Tsolova, Brian Turner, Karsten Vrangbaek 
and Lauri Vuorenkoski) and a study visit to Luxembourg by a research assistant at 
the LSE (Jessica Hohman). The survey responses were also used to prepare a report 
for the European Commission (grant VT/2007/064), which is available as:  
 
Thomson, S. and E. Mossialos (2009). Private health insurance in the European Union. 
Brussels, European Commission (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion). 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=754&langId=en  
 
ST devised the survey questionnaire, the 2009 report and the paper. ST collated the 
responses to the questionnaire with the assistance of Jessica Hohman. ST drafted the 
2009 report and the paper and both were critically reviewed by Elias Mossialos (EM; 
Brian Abel-Smith Professor of Health Policy in the Department of Social Policy at 
the LSE). 
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Study 2 
The second paper is primarily the work of the PhD author. In 2007 it was published 
as: 
 
Thomson, S. and E. Mossialos (2007). Regulating private health insurance in the European 
Union: the implications of single market legislation and competition policy. Journal of 
European Integration 29(1): 89-107. 
 
Prior to publication in the journal it was subject to double-blind peer review by two 
referees. An extended and updated version of the journal article was subsequently 
included in an edited book published by Cambridge University Press in 2010: 
 
Thomson, S. and E. Mossialos (2010). Private health insurance and the internal market. 
Health systems governance in Europe: the role of EU law and policy. E. Mossialos, G. 
Permanand, R. Baeten and T. Hervey. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 419-460. 
 
It is the book chapter that is presented in the thesis. The book chapter was reviewed 
by two of the book’s editors (Rita Baeten, Senior Policy Analyst at the OSE, 
European Social Observatory, Brussels and Tamara K. Hervey, Professor of Law at 
the University of Sheffield) and an expert in EU law (Willy Palm, formerly the 
Managing Director of AIM, the International Association of Mutual benefit 
societies). It also benefited from comments from Wolf Sauter (Professor of 
Healthcare Regulation, Tilburg Law and Economics Center). 
 
ST and EM devised the paper and the book chapter. ST reviewed the literature and 
drafted the paper and the book chapter. EM commented on drafts of the paper and 
the book chapter. 
 
Study 3 
The third paper is primarily the work of the PhD author. In 2006 it was published as: 
 
Thomson, S. and E. Mossialos (2006). Choice of public or private health insurance: 
learning from the experience of Germany and the Netherlands. Journal of European Social 
Policy 16(4): 315-327. 
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Prior to publication in the journal it was subject to double-blind peer review by two 
referees. In 2011 it was reprinted in: 
 
Marmor, T. and C. Wendt, Eds. (2011). Reforming Healthcare Systems. Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar. 
 
ST and EM devised the paper. ST reviewed the literature and drafted the paper. EM 
commented on drafts. 
 
Study 4 
The fourth paper is primarily the work of the PhD author. It draws on responses to a 
questionnaire by a researcher in each of the four countries it reviews. The researchers 
are listed as co-authors of the paper: Reinhard Busse, Professor of Health Care 
Management at Berlin University of Technology; Luca Crivelli, Professor of 
Economics at Università della Svizzera italiana; Wynand van de Ven, Professor of 
Health Insurance at Erasmus University Rotterdam; and Carine Van de Voorde, 
Department of Economics, Catholic University Leuven. 
 
ST devised the paper and the questionnaire, collated responses to the questionnaire, 
reviewed the literature and drafted the paper. The four researchers provided 
additional references and commented on drafts. The paper has been critically 
reviewed by EM and also benefited from comments made by participants at the 
Commonwealth Fund’s International Health Policy Symposium in Washington DC 
in November 2010. Financial support for the paper came from the Commonwealth 
Fund (grant 20100091). 
 
The paper is currently under review for publication in a peer-reviewed journal.
  13 
Overview of the thesis 
 
 
The focus of the thesis 
 
This thesis is about the usefulness of voluntary health insurance (VHI)1 as a policy 
lever for improving health system performance – that is, the health system’s ability 
to meet its goals (2000). A key argument in favour of VHI is that, in the context of 
limited public resources for health care, it can further health policy goals by relieving 
fiscal pressure in the health sector. The thesis posits that VHI may be able to do this 
if it addresses gaps in statutory coverage and does not undermine health system 
performance. In order for VHI not to undermine health system performance, two 
further conditions must hold: those who rely on statutory coverage should not be 
made worse off by the introduction or expansion of VHI, and those who need VHI 
should have access to it. If all of the above conditions hold, VHI may be a useful 
policy lever for improving health system performance. 
 
Policy makers can ensure VHI is useful through the following mechanisms: 
 better understanding of the way in which VHI interacts with the rest of the health 
system 
 stronger policy design, which should be underpinned by a focus on 
- health policy goals 
- aligning incentives in pursuit of these goals 
- ensuring efficiency in the use of public resources for health 
 willingness and capacity to regulate the market to secure financial and consumer 
protection 
 regular monitoring and evaluation of the VHI market and its interactions with 
and impact on the health system 
 
                                                 
1
 The thesis distinguishes between public and private health insurance by considering whether or not 
the financing occurs on a voluntary or compulsory basis. With one or two exceptions, what is 
commonly referred to as private health insurance is, in the European Union, taken up voluntarily and 
paid for privately by individuals or employers on behalf of individuals (Mossialos and Thomson 
2002). In contrast, statutory health coverage is financed through taxes or mandated contributions. 
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Of course there may be other reasons for promoting VHI, such as advancing 
stakeholder interests or satisfying ideological beliefs, which may contribute to the 
relief of political pressure. However, these other objectives should not be confused 
with health policy goals. If policy makers need to balance health policy goals with 
other objectives for VHI, they should understand and be explicit about the trade-offs 
involved. 
 
 
Why focus on VHI and health system performance? 
 
Voluntary health insurance has a long history in European health systems. Over the 
course of the 20th century its role diminished as universal statutory health insurance 
spread. Internationally, no country now relies exclusively on VHI to finance health 
care and in the vast majority of cases the contribution of VHI to total spending on 
health is modest (well under 10%). As a result, VHI has typically not been subject to 
much research outside the United States (US). However, the last 15 years have been 
marked by a growing body of academic publications on VHI in non-US settings, 
including studies commissioned by key international agencies. There are two 
possible reasons for this: greater awareness of the problems associated with VHI, and 
interest in its potential to further a range of health policy goals, particularly at a time 
of sustained fiscal pressure. Interest in VHI has also coincided with a commitment on 
the part of European governments to improving health system performance. It is 
therefore an opportune moment to ask how and whether VHI can contribute to 
strengthening health systems. 
 
The thesis presents four studies, two of which have been published in peer review 
journals (Thomson and Mossialos 2006; Thomson and Mossialos 2007b). Taken 
together, the studies aim to shed light on different aspects of the relationship between 
VHI and health system performance in the European Union (EU). In this section I 
elaborate on each of the points made in the paragraph above. The next section 
summarises the contribution of the thesis. Subsequent sections present the aims, 
methods, findings, conclusions and limitations of each of the studies in turn. A final 
section highlights the conclusions of the thesis as a whole. 
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A brief history of VHI in Europe 
VHI’s European origins can be linked to the guilds formed by skilled workers in the 
Middle Ages (Abel-Smith 1988). Out of this tradition emerged the protagonist of 
modern VHI, the occupation-based mutual aid society or association. Mutual 
associations played an important role in the lives of workers during the Industrial 
Revolution, providing them with cash benefits in case of ill health and laying the 
foundation for contemporary welfare states. In many countries VHI was supported 
by the emerging trade union movement and increasingly grew to benefit from the 
support of the medical profession (Abel-Smith 1988). The benefits it provided were 
extended as medical care progressed, but usually had to be complemented by means-
tested access to hospital care funded by charitable organisations. Even at its height, 
however, VHI never covered more than a minority of the population, partly due to its 
roots in employment and partly due to the fact that the middle classes could afford to 
pay out of pocket for the limited medical care then available. 
 
The establishment and successful expansion of statutory health insurance, beginning 
with Germany in 1883, greatly reduced the need for VHI. While VHI retained a 
residual presence in most countries, its role was, and still is, marginal. In the second 
half of the 20th century mutual associations in several countries were joined by and 
competed with new entrants to the VHI market – commercial insurance companies – 
creating a dynamic which would occasionally lead to tension and, in the 21st century, 
legal action at national and international levels (Thomson and Mossialos 2010). 
 
The limited contribution of VHI to total spending on health 
Statutory systems of health insurance2 arose largely in response to the inherent 
limitations of voluntary coverage, including the information and other failures 
associated with health insurance markets. No country has found a way of fully 
addressing these limitations. As a result, no country relies exclusively on VHI to 
provide financial protection in the health sector. Internationally, the country with the 
highest share of total spending on health achieved through VHI is South Africa, 
closely followed by the United States (WHO 2011a). There are only twelve other 
                                                 
2
 The thesis refers to publicly financed health coverage as statutory health insurance or statutory 
coverage, regardless of whether it is organised in the form of a national health service or on the basis 
of membership of statutory health insurance funds. 
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countries in which VHI accounts for more than 10% of total spending on health, and 
of these only two are in Europe (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 VHI accounts for at least 10% of total spending on health, 2009 
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VHI accounts for more than 5% of total spending on health in only a quarter of EU 
countries (Figure 2). Markets for VHI are particularly small in the newer member 
states of central and eastern Europe (CEE). Between 2000 and 2009 VHI grew as a 
share of total spending on health in about half of all EU countries. Growth was 
generally concentrated among the newer member states (albeit from a very low base 
in 2000 in CEE countries). The most significant growth was seen in Hungary, Malta 
and Cyprus. There was also growth in two of the largest markets: a very small 
increase in France and a larger one, of 9%, in Germany. However, four of the ten 
largest markets experienced a decline (Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia). The decline was particularly steep in the Netherlands (68%). 
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Figure 2 VHI as a percentage of total spending on health, EU, 2000 and 2009 
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Growing research interest in VHI 
One outcome of its generally marginal contribution to health spending is that VHI 
has been relatively under-researched outside the United States3. The lack of attention 
paid to VHI outside the US began to change in the 1990s. In 1992 the European 
Commission (EC) held a two-day seminar on the subject, leading to one of the first 
comparative efforts to analyse EU markets for VHI (Schneider 1995). Following 
debates about VHI at the European Parliament in the late 1990s, the European 
Commission published a more comprehensive study (Mossialos and Thomson 
2002c). Other international organisations subsequently carried out their own studies, 
with reports published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2005 and 
the World Bank in 2006 (the last two focusing on VHI in low- and middle-income 
countries) (OECD 2004b; Preker et al 2006; Sekhri and Savedoff 2005). In 2009 the 
European Commission published a third study (Thomson and Mossialos 2009). 
 
                                                 
3
 The other country in which there is a significant amount of research on VHI is Australia. 
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The interest of international organisations in VHI has been matched by a spate of 
academic publications4 analysing VHI internationally (Gechert 2010; Jost 2000; 
Maynard and Dixon 2002; Paolucci et al 2007), VHI in the European Union 
(Mossialos and Thomson 2002b; Mossialos and Thomson 2004; Wasem et al 2004), 
VHI in transition economies (Thomson 2010), VHI in low-income countries 
(Drechsler and Jütting 2007), national VHI markets in high-income countries (Besley 
et al 1999; Buchmueller et al 2003; Foubister et al 2006; Hall et al 1999; Harmon 
and Nolan 2001; Jones et al 2006; King and Mossialos 2005; Moorin and Holman 
2006; Nolan 2006; Rajmil et al 2000; Roach et al 2005; Rodríguez and Stoyanova 
2004; Roos and Schut 2011; Saliba and Ventelou 2007; Schokkaert et al 2010; 
Shmueli 2001; Willcox 2001; Willcox 2003), national VHI markets in low- and 
middle-income countries (Jowett et al 2003; Murray 2000; Sapelli 2004; Sapelli and 
Vial 2003) and the influence of EU law on national regulation of VHI (den Exter 
2005; Palm 2002; Thomson and Mossialos 2007a; Thomson and Mossialos 2010). 
 
What explains this proliferation of research interest in VHI in the last 15 years? 
Market expansion may be a factor, although the research does not emerge 
exclusively from countries that have experienced significant growth, and in many 
countries VHI has not grown as a share of total spending on health. There are two 
other possible factors worth considering: greater awareness of the problems 
associated with VHI, and interest in its potential to further a range of health policy 
goals, particularly at a time of sustained fiscal pressure. 
 
Awareness of the problems associated with VHI 
The presence of market failures in health insurance are well established (Barr 1992). 
Economic theory posits that VHI will only result in an optimally efficient allocation 
of health care resources if certain assumptions hold: there are no major problems 
with adverse selection, moral hazard and monopoly, and the probabilities of 
becoming ill are less than one (no pre-existing conditions), independent of each other 
(no endemic communicable diseases), and known or estimable (insurers are able to 
estimate future claims and adjust premiums for risk) (Barr 2002; Barr 2004). 
 
                                                 
4
 This list is limited to published literature in English and is not intended to be exhaustive. 
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Moral hazard and monopoly issues can be problematic for both statutory and 
voluntary health insurance, although researchers have questioned the extent to which 
moral hazard is inefficient (Nyman 2004). The main problems specific to VHI stem 
from information asymmetry between insurers and individuals wanting insurance 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Insurers’ efforts to avoid adverse selection (people 
concealing information about their risk of ill health) can lead to risk selection and 
market segmentation. Consequently, some people will not be able to obtain any 
voluntary cover or cover at a price that they are willing to pay, while insurers will try 
to maintain or increase their margins by selecting risks rather than by focusing on 
enhancing efficiency (Evans 1984; Rice 2001; Rice 2003). Public policy can address 
these and other issues through direct intervention in the market (regulation) and 
indirect means involving tax policy (Hsiao 1995b). 
 
Outside the United States research has not generally focused on concerns 
traditionally associated with the effects of market failures in VHI: lack of access to 
affordable cover and the need for the government to organise cover for poorer, older 
or disabled people. Instead (and not surprisingly, given VHI’s more marginal role), 
research focusing on EU countries has tended to concentrate on some aspects of the 
interaction between VHI and the dominant institution of statutory health insurance. 
These include the relationship between demand for VHI and waiting lists for publicly 
financed treatment (Besley et al 1999; King and Mossialos 2005), the impact of VHI 
on equity in the use of health services (Jones et al 2006), particularly the use of 
specialist care, and the potential for VHI to be employed by statutory insurers as a 
risk selection tool (Paolucci et al 2007). 
 
VHI’s potential to further health policy goals 
Arguments in favour of VHI can be divided into two schools of thought. There are 
those who regard private insurance as inherently superior to public insurance; their 
premise is that incentives created by the pursuit of profit in a competitive 
environment will result in administrative efficiency, innovation and better quality 
care (Chollet and Lewis 1997; Gilbert and Tang 1995; Johnson 1995). Others see 
VHI as second best: statutory coverage is preferable, but given its limitations, VHI 
can step in to fill gaps (Chollet and Lewis 1997; Sekhri and Savedoff 2005). Both 
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schools are united in taking the weaknesses of public institutions as their point of 
departure, highlighting the inefficiency created by bureaucracy, the absence of 
appropriate incentives and government failure to raise sufficient revenue for health 
care. 
 
Policy interest in VHI may have a foot in both camps. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s many of its former satellites eagerly embraced 
market mechanisms, including in the health sector, and all introduced legislation to 
allow VHI (Kornai and Eggleston 2001; Kutzin et al 2010; Thomson 2010). The grey 
literature from think tanks across Europe is awash with often ideologically driven 
advocacy of private health insurance (and its variant, medical savings accounts) 
(Booth 2011; Bramley-Harker et al 2006; Hrobon et al 2005). But whether or not 
private institutions are more efficient than public institutions is an empirical 
question, and one that should be considered in the light of market failures in health 
insurance. Most academic interest in VHI therefore falls under the second category, 
with researchers seeking to identify ways in which VHI can address existing gaps in 
statutory coverage or relieve fiscal pressure by compensating for reductions in non-
clinical aspects of health care quality and reductions in the breadth, scope and depth 
of statutory coverage (Chollet and Lewis 1997). 
 
Table 1 illustrates how VHI can in theory be used to achieve these objectives. First, 
where there is public dissatisfaction with non-clinical aspects of the quality of 
publicly financed care, supplementary VHI could enhance choice of provider and 
amenities. It could also contribute to shorter waiting times for treatment, both for 
those with VHI (who can jump the queue) and those who rely on statutory coverage 
(if VHI-financed care takes place in the private sector, releasing capacity in the 
public sector). Second, a complementary VHI market could cover health services that 
are excluded or not fully covered by the statutory benefits package. This would be 
particularly attractive, from a policy perspective, if statutory coverage were to focus 
on essential, cost-effective health services – so-called high-value care – leaving VHI 
to cover the rest. Third, a complementary VHI market could cover statutory user 
charges, allowing the government to shift costs onto households in the knowledge 
that people would have access to financial protection through voluntary coverage. 
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Finally, the government could oblige or encourage wealthier people to pay for their 
own health care, creating a role for substitutive VHI.  
 
Table 1 Functional classification of VHI markets 
Market role Driver of market 
development 
Nature of cover EU examples 
Supplementary Consumer satisfaction: 
perceptions about the quality 
of publicly financed care 
Offers faster access and 
enhanced choice of 
provider 
Ireland, Poland, 
Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
Complementary 
(services) 
Scope of statutory coverage: 
the range of benefits covered 
Covers services 
excluded from or only 
partially covered by the 
statutory benefits 
package 
Denmark, 
Hungary, 
Netherlands 
Complementary 
(user charges) 
Depth of statutory coverage: 
the proportion of the benefit 
cost met 
Covers statutory user 
charges 
France, Slovenia 
Substitutive Breadth of statutory coverage: 
proportion of the population 
eligible for statutory cover 
Covers people excluded 
from or allowed to opt 
out of the statutory 
system 
Germany 
Source: Adapted from Mossialos and Thomson (2004) and Foubister et al (2006) 
 
One of the assumptions underlying the use of VHI to address gaps in statutory 
coverage is that if VHI covers less ‘essential’ aspects of health care or richer groups 
of people, public resources can be better targeted towards high-value health services 
or poorer households, resulting in a net gain for the health system. This assumption is 
most likely to be problematic where substitutive VHI is concerned, due to the 
negative effects of risk segmentation. Excluding wealthier people from statutory 
coverage might help to address short-term fiscal pressure if coverage is 
predominantly financed through general tax revenues, entitlement is based on 
residence and tax subsidies to make substitutive VHI more affordable are self 
financing. In the medium to longer term, the government would also need to ensure 
that those excluded from statutory coverage had adequate financial protection, both 
to avoid having to pick up the costs of poor health caused by lack of coverage and to 
prevent worsening health outcomes from undermining economic growth (Moreno-
Serra et al 2011 in press; Suhrcke et al 2005; Suhrcke et al 2006; Suhrcke et al 2008). 
Where statutory coverage is mainly financed through contributions, however, 
excluding the rich is likely to exacerbate fiscal pressure. The only short-term 
advantage in this approach would be to place some health spending ‘off budget’ for 
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accounting purposes, which might be useful in a situation where reducing 
government deficits is a political priority. 
 
A commitment to improving health system performance 
Interest in VHI in Europe must be seen in the context of two recent developments. 
On 15 September 2008 WHO’s Regional Committee for Europe convened to endorse 
the Tallinn Charter on health systems for health and wealth on behalf of 53 countries 
and several international agencies (including WHO, the World Bank and the 
European Investment Bank) (WHO 2008). In doing so they were agreeing on the 
need for health systems to demonstrate good performance and committing 
themselves to improving people’s health by strengthening health systems. On the 
same day Lehman Brothers, one of the world’s largest investment banks, filed for 
bankruptcy, triggering a global financial crisis (Clark 2009). The severe economic 
recession that followed has exacerbated fiscal constraints in many European 
countries, and one effect of this may be to weaken government investment in 
strengthening health systems. Another effect may be to galvanise policy interest in 
VHI, giving renewed impetus to the idea of VHI as a means of addressing gaps in 
statutory coverage. 
 
The signing of the Tallinn Charter reflects in part a broader preoccupation with 
measuring health system performance both within and across countries, a 
phenomenon invigorated by the publication of WHO’s World Health Report on 
health systems in 2000 (Smith et al 2010; WHO 2000). Against this background, and 
in the context of fiscal constraints, it is important to consider the usefulness of VHI 
as a lever or tool for attaining health policy goals. Countries in which VHI already 
plays a role may be interested in developing a better understanding of VHI’s impact 
on health system performance, while those interested in introducing or expanding a 
market for VHI may want to know what they can learn from the experience of others. 
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The contribution of the thesis 
 
The focus of the thesis is on VHI and health system performance in the European 
Union. Its main purpose is to consider the usefulness of VHI as a means of furthering 
health policy goals, particularly in terms of VHI’s ability to relieve fiscal pressure in 
the health sector by addressing gaps in statutory coverage. The thesis does this by 
analysing different aspects of VHI’s interaction with statutory health insurance, 
assessing the effects of VHI on key dimensions of health system performance and 
identifying the mechanisms through which these effects are achieved. 
 
Key propositions underpinning the thesis 
The thesis is underpinned by four propositions: 
 
1. VHI cannot be considered in isolation. As a result of well-established market 
failures in health insurance, exclusive reliance on VHI does not serve health 
policy goals. Statutory health insurance has developed in response to market 
failures and VHI generally operates alongside some form of statutory coverage. 
Discussion of VHI and its usefulness as a policy lever should not focus on VHI 
alone, but should always consider its relationship to and interaction with the rest 
of the health system, particularly statutory health insurance. The guiding 
principle, for policy, should be to think about how best to combine voluntary and 
statutory coverage to achieve health policy goals. 
 
2. VHI should not weaken the health system’s capacity to achieve its goals. The 
economic concept of Pareto efficiency or optimality may be helpful when 
thinking of VHI’s potential to address gaps in statutory coverage or relieve fiscal 
pressure in the health sector (Begg et al 1997; McPake et al 2002). A Pareto-
based approach to introducing or expanding VHI would note (for example) that 
while VHI may only be within reach of richer groups of people, this is acceptable 
so long as those who rely on statutory coverage are not made worse off. In 
principle it is possible to determine if VHI makes those who rely on statutory 
coverage worse off. If VHI undermines the performance of the statutory health 
insurance scheme or the health system as a whole, it cannot be said to contribute 
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to the attainment of health policy goals. In practice this can be difficult to 
establish due to lack of data. It is also possible that empirical evidence will be 
overruled by political considerations, particularly if VHI is seen as a means of 
relieving political pressure by satisfying stakeholder interests, or if cutting public 
spending on health is a political imperative. In spite of these challenges, the 
proposition should be central to any consideration of the usefulness of VHI. 
 
3. Before considering the advantages and disadvantages of any policy lever (not 
just VHI), policy makers should be clear about what it is the health system is 
trying to achieve. Since health system performance is inextricably linked to 
health system goals, clarity about the latter is a prerequisite to any discussion of a 
policy lever’s impact on the former. In its analysis the thesis adopts the health 
system and health financing policy goals identified by WHO (Table 2) and 
considers the impact of VHI on financial protection, equity in financing and use 
of health care, incentives for efficiency and quality in care delivery, and 
administrative costs (Kutzin 2008; WHO 2000). 
 
Policy levers may be chosen for their potential to contain health care costs, limit 
public spending on health or contribute to fiscal sustainability. However, to 
regard any of these as valid health policy goals would be to follow a misguided 
logic (Thomson et al 2009a). Cost containment should not be confused with 
efficiency. Indeed, a narrow focus on containing public spending on health – for 
example, by making cuts across the board – would be likely to undermine 
efficiency. Fiscal sustainability is a constraint that needs to be respected, but it 
cannot be seen as a goal in its own right, on a par with or even overriding other 
goals. Ultimately, how much a country or government spends on health is an 
essentially political choice which should be informed by awareness of the 
opportunity cost of spending (or not spending) on health. 
 
4. The nature of VHI’s impact on health system performance is heavily influenced 
by public policy. In the thesis I distinguish between two types of public policy 
action: policy design and regulation of the market. Policy design sets out how 
VHI relates to and interacts with the health system. It determines the role VHI 
plays, establishes the rules of the game and puts in place the incentives facing 
  25 
insurers, health care providers and the public (including tax incentives). 
Regulation of the market refers to rules about how the VHI market operates. Of 
course regulation creates its own incentives and in practice it may not be possible 
or even necessary to say whether an action falls under the category of policy 
design or regulation of the market. I simply want to draw attention to a frequently 
overlooked aspect of public policy towards VHI, which is the broader 
institutional framework in which VHI markets operate. In many respects the 
quality of VHI policy design may be a more important determinant of VHI’s 
impact on health system performance than regulation of the VHI market, and yet 
regulation is often the main focus of scrutiny in the literature. 
 
Table 2 Summary of health system and health financing policy goals 
Health system goals 
 Improving the health of the population (overall level and distribution) 
 Responding to people’s legitimate non-medical expectations (overall level and distribution) 
 Providing financial protection against the costs of ill health 
Health financing policy goals 
 Financial protection: ensuring people do not face financial hardship when using needed health 
services 
 Equity in financing: distributing the burden of financing the health system relative to individual 
capacity to contribute 
 Equity in use: distributing health services (by distributing health system resources) in relation to 
need 
 Promoting efficiency (in organisation, service delivery, administrative arrangements) and quality 
(in service delivery) 
 Promoting transparency and accountability 
Source: Kutzin (2008), WHO (2000) and WHO (2010) 
 
The contribution of each study 
Study 1 lays the groundwork for the thesis. It provides a comprehensive but succinct 
review of markets for VHI in the European Union, describing the role VHI plays 
across 27 countries, analysing the structure, conduct and performance of different 
markets, summarising the key features of the five most significant markets (France, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovenia) and setting out public policy 
towards VHI at national and EU level. The study gives the reader a snapshot of how 
markets currently function and are regulated, as well as a sense of different types of 
potential interaction with statutory health insurance and important developments that 
have taken place in the last ten years. A key aim of providing this overview is to 
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prepare the reader for the more detailed analysis that follows, both in the study itself 
and in the other studies. The first study’s review of public policy and assessment of 
the impact of VHI on health system performance identify the main challenges 
presented by large substitutive, complementary and supplementary markets. 
However, because the study is intended for a general audience, some of the major 
issues it highlights are analysed more closely in the other studies, as set out below. 
 
The second study expands in some detail on the first study’s discussion of public 
policy towards VHI. In the early 1990s the legislative institutions of the European 
Union established an EU-level regulatory framework for VHI through the Third 
Non-Life Insurance Directive (from here on referred to as ‘the Directive’). The 
Directive’s underlying premise was that most health insurance markets need not be 
regarded as substantively different from other non-life insurance markets and should 
therefore be subject to EU internal market rules. The study analyses the impact of the 
Directive and other aspects of EU law on national public policy towards VHI and 
considers the capacity of the EU framework to promote financial and consumer 
protection in health insurance markets. In doing so it attempts to increase 
understanding of the constraints the EU framework places on national regulators and 
the tensions the Directive has created since its introduction. The analysis of case law 
aims to inform health and wider regulatory policy by distinguishing areas where 
there is clarity from those in which significant legal uncertainty persists. 
 
The third and fourth studies focus on important aspects of the interaction between 
VHI and statutory health insurance. Study 3 elaborates on perhaps the most 
substantial area of interaction by examining what happens when people are allowed 
to choose between statutory and voluntary coverage. The study’s analysis of 
competition between these two forms of cover provides an empirical test of 
economic theory regarding health insurance markets. In exploring a key policy issue 
– whether or not statutory health insurance should extend to richer households and do 
so on a mandatory basis – the study also provides an evidence base for contemporary 
debate. This issue was seriously considered in a number of European countries 
during the 1990s, but with no conclusive results, and in the first years of the 21st 
Century the policy focus shifted to thinking about universal health coverage (at least 
in western Europe). However, interest in the issue remained in parts of eastern 
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Europe and, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it may find its way onto the 
policy agenda in other countries. 
 
Detailed analysis of substitutive VHI in Germany and the Netherlands highlights the 
challenges VHI presents in the European Union’s two largest markets (as measured 
in terms of contribution to total spending on health prior to the abolition of the 
substitutive market in the Netherlands in 2006). Not only are these markets large in 
size, they are the most significant in terms of their potential impact on statutory 
health insurance and on health system performance more broadly. The thesis does 
not devote a whole study to the issue of complementary and supplementary VHI but 
it covers them in some detail in the first study – particularly markets for 
complementary VHI covering user charges in France and Slovenia, which are now 
the largest markets in Europe. 
 
Study 4 considers the role of VHI in undermining the potential for competition 
among statutory insurers to improve health system performance. In the last 15 years 
policy in a handful of European countries has tried to create incentives to encourage 
competing statutory insurers to enhance efficiency through better purchasing5. 
Consumer choice of statutory insurer combined with greater financial risk for 
insurers is, in these countries, a key strategy for improving health system 
performance. However, many statutory insurers also sell VHI. Because of regulatory 
differences in the sale of statutory and voluntary benefits, linking sales of the two – 
so-called conditional sale – may create a barrier to switching from one statutory 
insurer to another for older people and people with pre-existing conditions. If people 
in general (and less healthy people in particular) cannot choose and switch insurer 
easily, without incurring significant costs, the instrumental value of insurer 
competition is weakened. As a result, the use of competition among statutory 
insurers may fail to achieve its goal of enhancing efficiency and strengthening health 
system performance. 
 
                                                 
5
 Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Switzerland. Because VHI 
plays such a marginal role in the Czech Republic and Slovakia these countries were excluded from the 
analysis. 
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Conditional sale is identified as an issue in the first study and taken up in much 
greater detail here. Previous research has noted it is a key area of interaction between 
statutory and voluntary health insurance but has focused on its use as a tool to enable 
insurers to select risks in statutory health insurance, without considering the wider 
implications for health system performance (Paolucci et al 2007). This study goes 
further by examining the issue in the context of broader policy expectations about 
insurer competition. For insurer competition to achieve expected outcomes, three 
assumptions must hold: people must have free choice of insurer, insurers must have 
incentives to compete on price and quality rather than through risk selection, and 
insurers must have (and use) tools to influence health care costs and quality. The 
study assesses the extent to which these assumptions hold in four countries with 
significant markets for VHI. It is important to look at all three assumptions in order 
to be able to assess the relative importance of conditional sale of VHI as an obstacle 
to improved performance in statutory health insurance. 
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Summary of study 1 
 
How does voluntary health insurance affect health system performance? 
Evidence from the European Union 
 
Background 
The last ten years have been marked by greater scrutiny of VHI by international 
organisations and in the academic literature. They have also seen growing interest in 
measuring comparative health system performance, a phenomenon both reflected in 
and stimulated by the publication of the World Health Report on health systems in 
2000 (WHO 2000). It is therefore an opportune moment not only to review 
developments in VHI markets, but also to consider the effects of VHI on health 
system performance. The purpose of measuring health system performance, defined 
as the health system’s ability to achieve its goals (WHO 2000), is to generate reliable 
information for policy development and to foster accountability by enabling 
stakeholders to make informed decisions (Smith et al 2010). 
 
Aims 
This paper has three aims: to review the way in which markets for VHI currently 
operate across the European Union and identify important changes that have taken 
place since 2000; to review developments in public policy towards VHI; and to 
examine the impact of VHI on the following dimensions of health system 
performance: financial protection, the distribution of health financing and health care 
use (equity), incentives for efficiency and quality in health care delivery, and 
administrative costs (Kutzin 2008; WHO 2000; WHO 2010). 
 
Methods 
Data presented in the paper come from three sources: a survey of experts in 26 
member states based on a detailed questionnaire (included in the Appendix) and a 
study visit to Luxembourg by a research assistant; a review of published and grey 
literature identified through searches of academic databases (ISI Web of Knowledge 
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and PubMed) and the Internet (Google and Google Scholar); and international 
statistical databases (WHO National Health Accounts). The survey was carried out in 
2008 and data from the completed questionnaires were collated in 2009. 
 
Contribution to the literature 
The paper fills a gap in the literature by updating and building on earlier analyses of 
markets for VHI in the European Union (Mossialos and Thomson 2002a; Mossialos 
and Thomson 2002b; Mossialos and Thomson 2002c). 
 
Findings 
How have markets for VHI developed since 2000? 
VHI market growth has been mixed. No ‘new’ markets have emerged since 2000, but 
some old ones have disappeared and others have grown. Following the demise of 
substitutive VHI in the Netherlands (in 2006) and Belgium (in 2008), Germany now 
has the only significant substitutive market. Complementary VHI covering user 
charges has grown in France due to the introduction of government vouchers and 
other subsidies targeted at low-income households, but had already reached 
saturation point in Slovenia by the mid 1990s. Although Hungary’s market for 
complementary VHI covering excluded services has grown as a result of generous 
(but highly regressive) tax subsidies, it remains marginal. Some supplementary 
markets have experienced rapid growth, mainly due to favourable tax incentives 
(Denmark, Ireland), an increase in the purchase of VHI as an employee benefit 
(Belgium, Denmark, Sweden) or lack of confidence in the public system due to 
waiting times for elective surgery (Denmark, Ireland, Sweden). 
 
Commercial insurers now have a larger share of the VHI market than in 2000 and 
often play a dominant role in supplementary markets. Non-profit insurers continue to 
enjoy a dominant market position in a handful of countries, particularly those in 
which complementary VHI plays a significant role. In some countries risk selection 
by commercial insurers has triggered greater regulation (Slovenia), while 
competition between commercial and non-profit insurers has led to legal challenges 
at national and EU levels (Belgium, Ireland, France and Slovenia). VHI markets are 
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highly concentrated in many countries and some markets have become more 
concentrated in the last ten years. The effect of market concentration on competition 
is not clear. Buyer characteristics have not changed much since 2000. People with 
higher socio-economic status are still generally more likely to have VHI than people 
with lower socio-economic status. The role of groups in purchasing VHI has grown 
in some countries and declined in others but is still significant overall. 
 
VHI continues to be a generally profitable business in which insurers bear minimal 
financial risk. The price of VHI to consumers is lowered by tax subsidies in many 
countries and insurers in all except some of the largest markets are free to reject 
applications for cover, charge premiums based on age and health status, charge 
additional premiums for covering dependants, exclude cover of pre-existing 
conditions, terminate policies, differentiate products, set limits to the benefits they 
provide and impose both waiting periods before benefits can be claimed and cost 
sharing. As a result, insurers in most VHI markets have limited incentives to enhance 
efficiency in organisation, administration or health care delivery. Many simply 
reimburse policy holders, often paying providers fees that are higher than the fees 
paid in statutory health insurance, and few make use of the purchasing tools at their 
disposal. 
 
How has public policy towards VHI changed since 2000? 
Measured along a single dimension (the use of tax incentives to encourage take up of 
VHI), there was a public policy trend away from supporting VHI in the 1990s. Since 
then this trend has been reversed, with 19 out of 27 countries offering some form of 
tax incentive for VHI. However, looking at a wider range of factors influencing 
demand for VHI reveals a more complex picture. 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s many of its former 
satellites embraced market mechanisms in the health sector and all introduced 
legislation to allow VHI (Kornai and Eggleston 2001; Kutzin et al 2010; Thomson 
2010). In spite of VHI’s lacklustre performance in these countries (Slovenia 
excepted), public debate has continued to focus on encouraging the development of 
VHI and, in some cases, on involving voluntary insurers in the provision of statutory 
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health insurance. This stands in contrast to the expansion of statutory coverage in 
other (mainly western European) countries. Increases in the breadth of statutory 
coverage have diminished the role of substitutive VHI in Belgium and the 
Netherlands and, to a much lesser degree, in Germany, while proposed increases in 
the scope and depth of statutory coverage are intended to diminish VHI’s role in 
Ireland and Slovenia. 
 
What seems, at first glance, to be an east-west divide in public policy towards VHI 
may actually be a division between smaller and larger VHI markets. With the 
exception of Belgium, expansions in statutory coverage have taken place in countries 
with the largest markets for VHI (in terms of contribution to total spending on 
health) and government intervention has intensified in these markets since 2000. 
Policy developments in Belgium were heavily influenced by EU infringement 
proceedings (Palm 2009; Van de Voorde 2011). In the other countries, however, 
policy developments arose in response to the acknowledged limitations of VHI and 
concerns about its negative impact on health system performance. It is plausible to 
speculate that as these already large VHI markets grew in size, the problems 
associated with them became more visible, putting pressure on the government to 
take action. Growing fiscal constraints may have added to this pressure, allowing 
policy makers to weigh the costs of further intervention in the VHI market against 
the benefits of expanding statutory coverage. 
 
Since 2000 EU law-related tensions have increased, affecting VHI markets in 
Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovenia. Legal action has usually 
been prompted by insurer rivalry (often rivalry between commercial and non-profit 
insurers). The EU-level framework for VHI restricts material regulation to 
substitutive markets. However, analysis suggests that on one hand the framework 
fundamentally underestimates the contribution VHI makes to financial protection in 
non-substitutive markets, resulting in inappropriate legal action, but that on the other 
hand, this may not be such an issue since the European Court of Justice seems 
reluctant to challenge national sovereignty with respect to general good measures for 
services declared to be of general economic interest (Thomson and Mossialos 2010). 
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Analysis also suggests that the European Commission’s original premise about the 
effectiveness of deregulation in the VHI sector was misguided. There is no evidence 
of VHI market deregulation and competitive pressures resulting in lower prices for 
consumers. Rather, the price of VHI has continued to rise and in some cases higher 
premiums have been accompanied by a decline in the quality of VHI coverage; in 
other words, VHI seems to have become worse not better value for money. At the 
same time it is important to note that greater accessibility to VHI has almost 
exclusively arisen through government intervention and not as a result of market 
forces. Thus, while relying on financial regulation may suffice for supplementary 
VHI, it is not appropriate for substitutive VHI and complementary VHI covering user 
charges. In future public policy should focus more on transparency and consumer 
protection issues and, in non-supplementary VHI markets, on the quality of VHI 
coverage. 
 
How does VHI affect health system performance? 
VHI appears to be critical to financial protection in France, Slovenia and Germany. It 
is difficult to estimate the extent to which VHI in these three countries provides 
adequate financial protection, but there is some evidence to show that the quality of 
VHI coverage (the generosity of benefits) has declined in France and Germany in the 
last five years. Policy makers in all three countries have been sufficiently concerned 
about financial protection to introduce extensive regulation of VHI (Germany) and 
significant means-tested tax subsidies (France), or to propose major reform of 
statutory user charges (Slovenia). In other countries VHI has not developed to fill 
significant gaps in statutory coverage or is too expensive for many of those who are 
likely to need it (since levels of population coverage are low) and is therefore unable 
to address financial protection problems. 
 
VHI is likely to be regressive in substitutive markets and where it covers a 
substantial proportion of the population. Research confirms it is regressive in France 
and Ireland. VHI markets of all types are found to skew the distribution of health 
care away from need, largely as a result of rules allowing those with VHI to bypass 
waiting lists for publicly provided care and the incentives facing providers, which 
encourage them to prioritise VHI-financed patients. Clear differences in patterns and 
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frequency of use and waiting times between those with and without VHI are not 
justified by greater need among those with VHI, and are therefore a cause for 
concern about efficiency in the use of health resources. 
 
As already noted, EU markets for VHI do not seem likely to have a positive effect on 
efficiency in the health system due to the absence of appropriate incentives for 
insurers. Of more concern for public policy is the way in which failing to align 
incentives across VHI and statutory health insurance can undermine the efficiency of 
public spending on health – for example, by undermining value-based benefit design, 
through direct and indirect tax subsidies for VHI, and through conditional sale of 
VHI and statutory health insurance.  
 
Growing government regulation to promote access to VHI in the largest markets has 
not allayed concerns about financial protection for those without VHI or declining 
financial protection for those with VHI. Affordability is a persistent problem even 
where VHI is heavily regulated or subsidised. Concerns about the impact of VHI on 
equity in the use of health care, and the potential for VHI to undermine efficiency in 
public spending on health, have also grown in the largest markets. What is striking, 
however, is just how many of VHI’s negative effects on health system performance 
can be attributed to the quality of public policy towards VHI. Poor policy design 
enables and exacerbates risk segmentation, permits public resource allocation to be 
skewed in favour of those with VHI, and fails to ensure that incentives are aligned 
across VHI and statutory health insurance. Policy makers must accept some of the 
responsibility for failing to create an environment in which insurers have incentives 
to enhance efficiency and for allowing public resources to subsidise VHI (directly or 
indirectly) when such subsidies are of questionable value. 
 
Conclusions 
Measured in terms of contribution to total spending on health, VHI’s role in EU 
health systems has grown in many countries in the last ten years (sometimes from a 
very low base), but there has been no clear trend and some significant markets have 
disappeared as governments have expanded statutory coverage. In the next few years 
other markets may decline in significance if proposed reforms in Ireland and 
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Slovenia are implemented. Over time VHI markets have become more commercial 
and more concentrated and voluntary cover continues to favour wealthier and better 
educated households. 
 
VHI has a mixed impact on health system performance. Although it provides critical 
financial protection in a handful of countries, its protective quality has declined over 
time, and in many other countries it has completely failed to address significant gaps 
in statutory coverage. Some of VHI’s negative effects on other dimensions of 
performance – for example, its propensity to make health financing more regressive 
and to skew the distribution of health care away from need, its potential to undermine 
efficiency in public spending on health and its high administrative costs – are 
particularly visible in the larger markets. Growth in these markets has been 
accompanied by increasing government intervention to alleviate fiscal pressures 
caused by risk segmentation, to secure access to VHI, and to redress VHI’s effect on 
efficiency in public spending on health. 
 
Many of the problems associated with VHI are caused or exacerbated by poor policy 
design. This may stem from limited understanding of or lack of attention to the 
interaction between statutory and voluntary health insurance and often results in a 
failure to establish appropriate institutional arrangements. Better understanding of 
how VHI interacts with and affects the rest of the health system will enable policy 
makers to identify the appropriate role for VHI and should contribute to stronger 
policy design. Stronger policy design can also be achieved if policy makers have 
clarity about health policy goals and are able to align incentives in pursuit of these 
goals. 
 
Finally, policy makers must demonstrate the political and technical capacity to 
regulate VHI to secure both financial and consumer protection. A good starting point 
would be to ensure that the regulator has a grasp of the specificities of health 
insurance markets or, if necessary, to establish a dedicated health insurance 
regulator. This also applies to those responsible for determining the EU-level 
regulatory framework. The current framework reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of markets for VHI. It is therefore no surprise that the 
European Commission’s expectations for deregulation – competitive pressure 
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enhancing choice and lowering prices – have not been fulfilled. Oversight should 
also include systematic monitoring and evaluation of the VHI market and its 
interactions with and impact on the health system. Regular data collection and 
analysis of VHI are the exception rather than the norm and there are only a handful 
of countries in which there is a good evidence base for policy development. 
 
Limitations 
The degree of information about VHI presented in the paper varies across countries. 
This variation mainly reflects differences in the size and significance of markets and 
the availability of research on VHI. In many countries research is extremely limited, 
which means that the evidence base for an assessment of VHI’s impact on health 
system performance is small. Much of the evidence in the paper comes from the 
largest VHI markets; in smaller markets, the effects of VHI may be more muted. 
 
Because published information on VHI is scarce in many countries, the paper has 
made extensive use of the survey of experts in 26 countries. Although I took steps to 
ensure that the survey responses were of a consistently high standard (for example, 
by carefully selecting the experts, using a detailed questionnaire and giving the 
experts an opportunity to clarify and strengthen their responses), the quality of 
response may vary across countries and there is always some risk in relying on a 
single expert per country6. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 More than one expert responded to the survey in Bulgaria, France and Portugal. 
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Summary of study 2 
 
VHI and the internal market 
 
Background 
In 1992 the legislative institutions of the European Union adopted regulatory 
measures in the field of health insurance. The mechanism affirming the free 
movement of health insurance services, the Third Non-life Insurance Directive, does 
not apply to health insurance that forms part of a social security system (European 
Commission 1992). But all other forms of health insurance, which the paper refers to 
as ‘private health insurance’ (PHI)7, fall within the Directive’s scope. The EU-level 
regulatory framework created by the Directive imposes restrictions on government 
intervention in health insurance markets. There are areas of uncertainty in 
interpreting the Directive, particularly with regard to when and how governments can 
intervene to promote public interests. 
 
Aims 
The paper’s main aim is to examine how the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive and 
some aspects of EU competition law affect national public policy towards PHI. It 
also considers the capacity of the EU-level regulatory framework established by the 
Directive to promote financial and consumer protection in health insurance markets. 
 
Methods 
The paper’s analysis is based on a review of PHI-related case law dating from the 
introduction of the Directive in 1992 (with effect from 1994) to June 2009. The 
‘cases’ involve instances in which national public policy towards PHI has been 
challenged as potentially contravening EU law. These include decisions issued by the 
European Commission, official infringement proceedings against a member state, 
and legal challenges brought before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The cases 
                                                 
7
 For the purposes of this study it is more appropriate to refer to private than to voluntary health 
insurance because the Directive could apply to statutory health insurance operated by private insurers 
(as in the Netherlands). 
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were identified through searches of EUR-lex (the EU law portal available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm), Internet searches (Google and Google 
Scholar) and informal discussions with EC officials from DG Internal Market. Where 
actual examples are lacking, the paper’s analysis is, inevitably, more speculative. The 
paper benefited from the comments of two anonymous journal referees and four 
experts in health law (Rita Baeten, Tamara Hervey, Willy Palm and Wolf Sauter). 
 
Contribution to the literature 
A handful of academic studies have examined the impact of EU law on national 
public policy towards PHI, some based on analysis of a range of EU case law 
relating to PHI (Jost et al 2006; Palm 2002; Thomson and Mossialos 2007b); some 
based more on speculative examination of specific aspects of the EU legal 
framework (its application to risk equalisation schemes) (Paolucci et al 2006); and 
some focusing on effects in a single country (den Exter 2005). The paper adds to this 
small body of work by including developments covering the period from 2007 to the 
middle of 2009. 
 
In this summary I also refer to case law covering the period from July 2009 to 
September 2011 and have added a table showing case law from 1994 (when the 
Directive came into force) to September 2011 (Table 3). The main developments 
since the book chapter was published are: the Belgian government’s decision to bring 
VHI sold by sickness funds in line with the Directive, requiring sickness funds to 
establish separate non-profit societies of mutual assistance with effect from 2012; the 
European Commission’s finding that contrats solidaires and contrats responsables in 
France contravene EU law (European Commission 2011b); the European 
Commission’s decision to pursue infringement proceedings against Slovenia 
(European Commission 2011a); and an ECJ ruling against the Irish government 
(European Court of Justice 2011). 
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Findings 
How has the Directive affected regulation of PHI? 
The Directive brought about two key changes for PHI. First, the requirement for 
governments to abolish existing product and price controls (Articles 6(3), 29 and 39) 
rendered material regulation redundant. Second, it required governments to open 
markets for PHI to competition at national and EU levels (Article 3). Most member 
states amended existing laws or passed new laws to comply with the Directive. 
Legislative changes generally involved the introduction of tighter solvency controls. 
Some also resulted in the loosening or abolition of prior approval and systematic 
notification. However, a handful of countries have experienced difficulty in adapting 
national regulation to the requirements of the Directive and EU competition rules.  
  
Table 3 EU case law relating to private health insurance, 1994-2011 
Date Country Case Status Issue and area of EU law 
1998 France Case C-239/98 Concluded 1999 Differential treatment (solvency), 
freedom to provide services 
1998 France Case C-296/98 Concluded 2000 Systematic prior notification, 
freedom to provide services 
2000 France Infringement 
proceedings 
Resolved 2000 Failure to comply with two ECJ 
rulings, freedom to provide services 
2001 France Infringement 
proceedings 
Resolved 2001 Differential treatment (tax), state 
aid 
2001 Germany Case C-298/01 Resolved and 
removed from the 
register 2003 
Specialist insurers, freedom to 
provide services 
2003 Ireland Case T-289/03 Concluded 2008 Risk equalisation scheme, state aid 
2006 Netherlands Case T-84/06 Withdrawn 2008 Risk equalisation scheme, state aid 
2006 Belgium Infringement 
proceedings 
Resolved 2010 Differential treatment (solvency), 
freedom to provide services 
2007 Ireland Case C-82/10 Concluded 2011 Differential treatment (solvency), 
freedom to provide services 
2007 France Formal 
investigation 
EC rules against 
France 2011 
Differential treatment (tax), state 
aid 
2007 Slovenia Infringement 
proceedings 
Referred to the ECJ 
2011 
Appointment of local representative 
and systematic prior notification, 
freedom to provide services 
2007 Slovenia Infringement 
proceedings 
Ongoing Risk equalisation scheme, state aid 
Source: Author’s research 
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When can governments intervene in health insurance markets? 
Member states retain some power to protect PHI policy holders. They can impose 
material regulation in the interest of the ‘general good’ where contracts covering 
health risks ‘may serve as a partial or complete alternative to health cover provided 
by the statutory social security system’ (Article 54(1)). General good measures must 
be shown to be necessary and proportionate, not unduly restrict the right of 
establishment or the freedom to provide services, and apply in an identical manner to 
all insurers operating within a country. 
 
The paper argues that the Directive is not sufficiently clear about when governments 
can justify material regulation, mainly because there is no explicit consensus about 
the meaning of ‘partial or complete alternative’, leading to uncertainty and confusion 
among policy makers, regulators and insurers. Where the European Commission and 
the ECJ (in BUPA) have had opportunity to clarify this aspect of the Directive, they 
have sidestepped the issue, relying instead on rules about services of general 
economic interest (SGEI) to authorise or prohibit government intervention (European 
Commission 2003; European Court of Justice 2008). In 2008 the European 
Commission missed an opportunity to clarify the wording of the Directive when the 
Directive was amended under the Solvency II framework (European Commission 
2007c). 
 
Two factors lead the paper to conclude that partial or complete alternative refers 
exclusively to PHI playing a substitutive role. First, a description of the Directive on 
the Commission’s web site refers to ‘specific rules for health cover serving as a 
substitute for that provided by statutory social security systems’ (European 
Commission 2011c). Second, in a letter to the Dutch government the (then) 
Commissioner for the Internal Market argues that Article 54(1) of the Directive 
should not to be used to justify material regulation of complementary PHI 
(Bolkestein 2003). This suggests that general good measures can only be applied to 
substitutive PHI. 
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How can governments intervene in health insurance markets? 
Article 54(2) and recitals to the Directive list the types of measures that may be 
introduced if PHI provides a partial or complete alternative to statutory cover: open 
enrolment, community rating, lifetime cover, policies standardised in line with the 
cover provided by the statutory health insurance scheme at a premium rate at or 
below a prescribed maximum, participation in risk equalisation schemes, and the 
operation of PHI on a technical basis similar to life insurance. Case law clearly 
indicates that general good measures that differ in their treatment of insurers based 
on an insurer’s legal status are not compatible with the Directive. 
 
There is less clarity about the compatibility (with the Directive) of the measures 
themselves. Here, case law has mainly focused on the legality of risk equalisation 
schemes in non-substitutive markets (Ireland and Slovenia). (A case challenging risk 
equalisation among statutory insurers in the Netherlands, brought by a Dutch insurer 
in 2006, was withdrawn when the insurer was taken over by a larger company in 
2008.) The European Commission has contributed to uncertainty by supporting the 
risk equalisation scheme in Ireland, but initiating infringement proceedings against 
the Slovenian government for its risk equalisation scheme. The paper argues that a 
stronger case could be made for risk equalisation in Slovenia’s complementary VHI 
market covering statutory user charges than in Ireland’s mainly supplementary VHI 
market (see below). It also argues that the ECJ’s landmark ruling in BUPA, which 
indicated that governments have relative freedom to define PHI as being a service of 
general economic interest and can therefore apply general good measures (subject to 
the proportionality test), provides the Slovenian government with a relatively solid 
legal basis on which to defend risk equalisation. 
 
To what extent does the Directive promote financial and consumer protection? 
The paper argues that the logic underlying Article 54(1) is to permit material 
regulation where PHI contributes to financial protection (‘social protection’ in the 
language of the European Commission). Official interpretations of the Directive and 
interpretations of the Directive by EC officials specify that material regulation is 
permissible for substitutive PHI but not for complementary PHI. This, the paper 
argues, goes against the logic underlying Article 54(1), because substitutive PHI is 
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not the only type of PHI that provides financial protection. Complementary PHI can 
also contribute to financial protection, especially where it covers statutory user 
charges (as in France and Slovenia). General good measures should be permitted in 
complementary markets and not limited to substitutive markets. In the BUPA ruling 
the ECJ did not acknowledge this point. However, its defence of government 
freedom to define PHI as being a service of general economic interest does appear to 
recognise the right of governments to introduce material regulation if they feel it is 
necessary (subject to the proportionality test). 
 
The Directive implies that financial regulation is sufficient to protect consumers in 
non-substitutive VHI markets. However, this fails to account for consumer detriment 
arising from product differentiation, which lowers transparency, increases transaction 
costs for consumers and may therefore undermine price competition and consumer 
mobility (switching). The paper notes that information asymmetry exacerbated by 
product differentiation has been a problem in PHI markets, but the European 
Commission has not yet put in place mechanisms for monitoring anti-competitive 
behaviour by insurers. 
 
Policy implications 
In BUPA the ECJ suggested that whether or not PHI requires material regulation to 
protect the general good should be a matter for national governments. The paper 
supports this view. It has argued that the logic underlying Article 54(1) is to ensure 
access to PHI where it contributes to financial protection. As definitions of financial 
protection may vary from one country to another (and even within a country, over 
time), deciding what does or does not contribute to financial protection may be 
construed as a political issue and a matter best left to the discretion of national 
political processes. 
 
When intervening in any type of PHI market, regulators should avoid applying rules 
differentially to insurers based on legal status. Differentiating between insurers on 
other grounds (insurer conduct, for example) may also breach EU rules if it is 
deemed not to be necessary and proportional to securing the general good. 
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Governments regulating substitutive PHI should feel confident in applying material 
regulation if it is applied equally to all insurers. Although they will not be immune 
from legal action, the BUPA ruling suggests that the European Court of Justice will 
allow them considerable freedom to introduce general good measures if VHI is 
declared as being a service of general economic interest. 
 
When applying material regulation to other types of PHI market, governments run 
greater risk of being subject to infringement proceedings by the European 
Commission for breach of the Directive or competition rules. However, following the 
BUPA ruling, in which the ECJ permitted risk equalisation in an essentially 
supplementary market that could not be regarded as providing significant financial 
protection, it is difficult to predict how legal action would end. If PHI has been 
defined by the government as a service of general economic interest, the arguments 
employed by the ECJ in BUPA suggest material regulation may be applied without 
sanction if deemed to be necessary and proportionate, particularly if the PHI market 
in question covers a significant proportion of the population. 
 
Conclusions 
The EU-level regulatory framework established by the Directive places limits on 
national competence in the area of PHI. It relies on financial regulation to protect 
consumers, prohibiting material regulation except where PHI is substitutive and so 
long as any intervention is necessary, proportionate and non-discriminatory. 
Unfortunately, neither the Directive nor its interpretation in case law are sufficiently 
clear about when governments can justify material regulation of PHI. This is also 
true of the question of what types of intervention are permitted, although case law 
clearly indicates that differential treatment of insurers is not acceptable. The absence 
of clarity has led to uncertainty and confusion among policy makers, regulators and 
insurers, and inconsistent responses by the European Commission to national public 
policy towards PHI. 
 
The European Commission’s expectations about deregulation in insurance markets 
have not been fulfilled in markets for VHI. Although some consumers may 
experience more choice, it is not clear that this has led to increased competition and 
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there is no evidence of lower prices. In addition to providing clarification about when 
and how governments can intervene in health insurance markets, the European 
Commission should pay more attention to monitoring anti-competitive behaviour by 
insurers. 
 
Limitations 
Because the relevant case law is limited, some aspects of the paper’s analysis are 
inevitably speculative. Publicly available documentation regarding infringement 
proceedings is also limited. As a result, it has not always been possible to ascertain 
the European Commission’s rationale for action in a particular area and it is possible 
that some cases have been missed. 
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Summary of study 3 
 
Choice of statutory or voluntary health insurance: the experience of Germany 
and the Netherlands 
 
Background 
Until recently Germany and the Netherlands were the only European countries 
without universal statutory health insurance. Prior to 2006 about a third of the Dutch 
population was not eligible for statutory coverage and instead relied on substitutive 
VHI. In Germany employees with earnings over a threshold and their dependants are 
allowed to choose between statutory and voluntary coverage. In the last 15 years a 
range of European countries have considered emulating the German model. Debates 
about choice of statutory or voluntary coverage tend to be framed in terms of 
offering some or all of the population the possibility of ‘opting out’ of the statutory 
health insurance scheme. Arguments in favour of opting out, generally derived from 
economic theory, presuppose that enhancing consumer choice and stimulating 
competition between insurers will be beneficial for health policy goals such as equity 
and efficiency. But economic theory also suggests that, as a result of market failures 
in health insurance, choice of statutory or voluntary coverage may adversely affect 
equity and efficiency and could, in the longer term, restrict consumer choice (Barr 
1998). This apparent contradiction merits investigation. 
 
Aims 
The paper examines the European experience of choice of statutory or voluntary 
health insurance to establish whether there is empirical support for economic theory 
regarding choice in health insurance markets; to review and assess real policy 
outcomes and regulatory responses to these outcomes; and to analyse the impact of 
this form of choice on equity in financing health care and efficiency in production. 
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Methods 
The information presented in the paper is based on a review of the literature. 
Relevant literature was identified through searches of academic databases (PubMed 
and EconLit) and the Internet (Google). The paper also benefited from informal 
discussions with health policy experts in Germany (Reinhard Busse, Professor of 
Health Care Management at Berlin University of Technology) and the Netherlands 
(Hans Maarse, Professor of Health Care Policy Analysis, University of Maastricht), 
feedback from participants at the UK Social Policy Association conference in 2006 
and the comments of two anonymous journal referees. 
 
The paper’s analytical framework derives from economic theory regarding consumer 
choice. A key argument in favour of opting out assumes that the threat of voluntary 
exit from the statutory health insurance scheme will be sufficient to stimulate 
competition between statutory and voluntary insurers, leading to greater 
responsiveness and increased efficiency (Hirschman 1970). However, markets for 
health insurance suffer from failures relating (mainly) to information. The failure of 
most relevance to this paper concerns adverse selection, which arises when those 
seeking insurance are able to conceal information about their risk of ill health from 
insurers (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Where there is choice of more than one type 
of health insurance ‘plan’, plans offering a more generous level of benefits or a lower 
level of cost sharing will attract individuals with a higher risk of ill health. Insurer 
and consumer responses to the ensuing risk segmentation can further destabilise the 
market and exacerbate barriers to health insurance for high-risk individuals. 
 
Giving consumers a choice of statutory or voluntary health insurance is similar in 
effect to offering a choice of plan and is likely to result in two main outcomes: a 
market segmented by degree of health (and financial) risk and barriers to VHI for 
high-risk individuals. The paper examines whether these outcomes have emerged in 
Germany and the Netherlands and considers the effectiveness of any regulatory 
responses. It then assesses the impact of choice of statutory or voluntary coverage on 
equity in financing health care and efficiency in production. 
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Contribution to the literature 
This paper is the first comparative study of choice of statutory or voluntary health 
insurance in Europe. To my knowledge it is also the only comparative study. 
 
Findings 
Risk segmentation 
In both countries choice of statutory or voluntary health insurance resulted in risk 
segmentation, with systematic differences in the characteristics of those covered by 
the statutory scheme and VHI, and the former covering a disproportionate number of 
high-risk individuals and dependants. Risk segmentation contributed to financial 
pressure in the statutory scheme, and this was augmented by the loss of contributions 
from richer people and by people being able to return to the statutory scheme after 
opting out of it. Risk segmentation can be attributed to important differences in the 
rules governing statutory and voluntary insurers, creating opportunities for risk 
selection by the latter. 
 
Growing financial pressure led to a series of reforms in both countries. In 1986 the 
Netherlands abolished choice and instead excluded higher earners from statutory 
coverage. During the 1990s Germany introduced measures to restrict voluntary exit 
from and return to the statutory scheme. The reforms in both countries failed to 
tackle risk segmentation. Arguably, they entrenched risk segmentation, particularly 
in the Netherlands. Recognising this, the Dutch government imposed a levy on all 
those with substitutive VHI to compensate the statutory scheme for covering a 
concentration of high-risk individuals. 
 
Barriers to VHI for high-risk individuals 
In both countries measures introduced to restrict voluntary exit with a view to 
protecting the finances of the statutory scheme had the unintended effect of lowering 
financial protection for specific groups of people who relied on substitutive VHI, 
particularly older people and people with pre-existing conditions. Some of those who 
were no longer eligible for statutory coverage faced financial and other barriers to 
obtaining VHI for themselves and their dependants. This precipitated further reforms 
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aimed at enhancing financial protection for those who relied on substitutive VHI. 
The reforms involved mandatory pooling in VHI, VHI product and premium 
controls, changes to the threshold for eligibility for substitutive VHI in Germany, and 
changes to eligibility for statutory coverage in the Netherlands (to allow older people 
to remain in the statutory scheme).  
 
Equity in financing health care 
Because statutory coverage in both countries (but particularly in the Netherlands) 
was predominantly financed by the contributions of lower-earning employees and 
covered a concentration of high risks, the burden of paying for health care largely fell 
on those with statutory cover (even accounting for the levy imposed on substitutive 
VHI policy holders in the Netherlands). Research confirms that the financing of the 
statutory scheme was regressive in both countries and considerably more so than 
financing from all sources together due to the voluntary exit or exclusion of richer 
people (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1997; Wagstaff et al 1999). 
 
Efficiency in production 
In both countries the substitutive VHI market was characterised by weak incentives 
for private insurers to compete on the basis of efficiency in production. Rather, 
private insurers had strong incentives to avoid financial risk and could do so through 
risk selection or by shifting risk to the statutory scheme in Germany and the WTZ 
scheme in the Netherlands (the latter was established in the VHI market to pool the 
risks of older people; as a result, Dutch voluntary insurers did not bear any financial 
risk for older policy holders). There was very little consumer mobility in the 
substitutive market in either country, particularly in Germany where ageing reserves 
were not transferable, which meant that there was almost no switching. Competitive 
efforts mainly focused on attracting new entrants to the market (in Germany) and 
sales to groups (in the Netherlands). Voluntary insurers also had high administrative 
costs in comparison to their statutory counterparts. Finally, in both countries 
voluntary insurers were slow to adopt strategies to enhance efficiency and quality in 
health care delivery, such as vertical integration, selective contracting or monitoring 
of providers’ behaviour. Cost inflation tended to be much higher in the voluntary 
than the statutory sector. 
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Conclusions 
The paper’s review of policy outcomes in Germany and the Netherlands provides 
empirical support for economic theory regarding market failures in health insurance. 
As predicted by economic theory, choice of statutory or voluntary coverage results in 
risk segmentation, heightens the degree of financial risk borne by the statutory 
scheme, lowers equity in financing health care and fails to create incentives for 
private insurers to enhance efficiency. Risk segmentation can be attributed to 
weaknesses in policy design and regulation, which created strong incentives for 
voluntary insurers to select risks, allowed risk selection to occur unchecked and 
permitted high-risk individuals to return to the statutory pool with relative ease.  
 
Regulatory responses in the two countries have differed in form and effectiveness. 
The Netherlands has usually been one step ahead of Germany. Excluding higher 
earners from statutory coverage (as the Netherlands did in 1986) presents slightly 
fewer challenges than allowing people to choose between statutory and voluntary 
health insurance, but its effects are similar. The Dutch government’s decision to 
address financial pressures by abolishing choice and introducing a cross-subsidy 
from voluntary to statutory coverage did not fully address the issue of risk 
segmentation and created new problems concerning financial protection for those 
reliant on substitutive VHI.  
 
Germany has not abolished choice of statutory or voluntary coverage, preferring 
gradually to make the decision to opt out all but irreversible. Some debate about 
universal statutory coverage took place prior to the most recent reforms introduced in 
2009, but the current system looks set to remain, with many underlying issues 
unresolved. Indeed, a measure introduced in 2009 to further restrict exit from the 
statutory scheme was overturned by a new government in 2011. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to examine why governments prefer some measures to others, but 
stakeholder interests are likely to have had considerable influence on the policy 
making process in both countries. 
 
Giving people the ability to choose between statutory and voluntary health insurance 
may seem attractive for various reasons. However, the experience of Germany and 
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the Netherlands suggests it is unlikely to be an effective means of relieving fiscal 
pressure or improving key dimensions of health system performance such as equity 
in financing or efficiency in production. Also, advocates of choice or exclusion 
should be explicit about the financial and distributional implications. The policy 
intention may be to lower public spending on health by shifting costs to (generally 
richer) households. But in practice, risk and costs tend to be shifted in the opposite 
direction, from voluntary to statutory coverage, as the statutory scheme finds itself 
paying for a disproportionate amount of high-risk individuals with a lower level of 
contributions. 
 
The most effective method of dealing with the risk segmentation and financial 
pressure associated with both choice and exclusion is to introduce universal statutory 
coverage, as the Dutch did in 2006. If policy makers feel people value choice in 
health insurance, it can be organised within the statutory scheme, where it is likely to 
be better regulated and may therefore be more effective. 
 
Limitations 
It would be useful to have a better understanding of the politics of regulatory 
responses, but a detailed analysis of institutional arrangements and stakeholder views 
was beyond the scope of the paper. 
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Summary of study 4 
 
Can insurer competition improve health system performance? Evidence from 
western Europe 
 
Background 
Choice of and competition among insurers in statutory health insurance has gained 
prominence in Europe in the last 15 years and is now an integral feature of health 
financing policy in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Slovakia (Thomson et al 2009b). Although not yet widespread, the 
idea that third-party payers (whether health insurers or other entities) should compete 
for clients is an option debated with growing frequency in countries as diverse as 
England and Estonia (Bevan and van de Ven 2010; Thomson et al 2010b). A key 
argument in favour of insurer competition is that it can be used to improve health 
system performance by creating incentives to strengthen purchasing. 
 
Aims 
The paper examines the potential for insurer competition to improve health system 
performance in western Europe. Economic theory suggests insurer competition will 
enhance efficiency if people have free choice of insurer, insurers have incentives to 
compete on price and quality rather than through risk selection, and insurers have 
(and use) tools to influence health care costs and quality. The paper assesses the 
extent to which these assumptions hold in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. If the assumptions do not hold, it may be difficult for insurer 
competition to succeed in improving health system performance. The paper discusses 
why the assumptions do not always hold in the four countries and tries to identify 
barriers to successful implementation. 
 
Methods 
Information presented in the paper comes from two sources: responses to a 
questionnaire by an expert in each of the four countries (see the Appendix for a copy 
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of the questionnaire) and a review of literature identified through searches of 
academic databases (IBSS) and the Internet (Google and Google Scholar). 
 
The paper’s analytical framework derives from economic theory regarding consumer 
choice. If people can buy the same good or service from more than one firm, the 
possibility of a person buying from a rival firm – the threat of exit (Hirschman 1970) 
– will encourage all firms to improve the price-quality ratio of their products or lose 
clients and, eventually, face bankruptcy. Competition between insurers is intended to 
secure efficiency (enhanced value) through two mechanisms: making insurers bear 
financial risk and giving people choice of insurer (Enthoven 1988). The ultimate aim 
of insurer competition is to improve the performance of the health system (WHO 
2000). For this to happen, these mechanisms must be in place and at least three 
further assumptions must hold: 
 People should be able to choose and switch insurer with ease and without 
incurring significant transaction costs. This implies that people are able to make 
an informed choice of insurer and do not face barriers to switching. If non-
switchers are mainly people with predictably high health care costs, insurers may 
not have enough incentive to make statutory cover attractive to them, which 
would severely weaken the instrumental effect of exit. 
 Insurer competition must be based on price and quality rather than risk selection, 
otherwise it will not create incentives for efficiency (van de Ven and Ellis 1999).  
 Insurers must have access to tools that allow them to enhance value, and be 
willing to use them. 
 
Contribution to the literature 
Previous studies have analysed insurer competition in single countries, particularly in 
the Netherlands (Helderman et al 2005; Rosenau and Lako 2008; van de Ven and 
Schut 2008); compared performance in two or three countries (most often the 
Netherlands and Switzerland) (Bevan and van de Ven 2010; Greß 2006; Leu et al 
2009; Schneider 2009); or compared specific aspects of insurer competition, such as 
risk equalisation, across a wider range of countries (van de Ven et al 2007). This 
paper provides the first comprehensive comparison of health insurance choice and 
competition across four countries. The inclusion of Belgium and Germany, whose 
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more recent experiences are less well documented internationally, adds to the 
literature. Previous research has also focused on the issue of conditional sale, but has 
focused on its use as a tool to enable insurers to select risks in statutory health 
insurance, without considering the wider implications for health system performance 
(Paolucci et al 2007). This study goes further by examining the issue in the context 
of broader policy expectations about insurer competition. 
 
Findings 
In the last 15 years policy makers in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland have introduced insurance market reforms that have involved making 
insurers bear financial risk and giving people choice of insurer to stimulate insurer 
competition. The range of policy goals underlying these reforms varies across the 
four countries, but there is common ground. While Germany was unique in 
expanding choice of insurer to address equity concerns, all four countries expected 
this form of choice, combined with greater financial risk for payers, to enhance 
efficiency and quality in health care administration and delivery and to keep health 
care costs under control. Belgium is the only one of the four countries in which 
public policy has not emphasised insurer competition to improve health system 
performance. It is included in the analysis because the 1995 reform shifting some 
financial risk to sickness funds aimed to stimulate greater cost control, one of the 
main goals of insurer competition in the other countries. Following this reform, 
consumer choice of sickness fund (which dates to 1945) became an integral part of 
the incentive structure facing insurers, even though it was not originally intended to 
have such an effect. 
 
Free choice of insurer 
All four countries employ multiple strategies to ensure that the whole population is 
able to switch from one insurer to another, for statutory benefits, with relative ease 
and at low cost. As a result the financial and administrative costs of switching are 
likely to be low. Other transaction costs may be high, however, particularly for older 
or chronically ill people. 
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Switching rates vary across the four countries, with the lowest rates in Belgium and 
the highest rates in Switzerland. Reasons for switching differ in importance across 
the four countries, with price playing no role in Belgium, a significant role in the 
Netherlands and Switzerland and, probably to a lesser degree, a role in Germany. 
Consumer perceptions of differences in quality seem to play some role in all four 
countries. Switchers are more likely to be younger and healthier in two out of the 
three countries for which data are available (Germany and the Netherlands). In 
Switzerland switchers are also likely to be younger, but health status only seems to 
be a factor among those with VHI.  
 
Low rates of switching appear to reflect satisfaction with the status quo for many 
people. But there is evidence of barriers to consumer mobility, particularly among 
older and less healthy people. Close links between the sale of statutory and voluntary 
cover are a cause for concern in all four countries. Recent research suggests that 
consumer beliefs about risk selection by insurers in the VHI market may be a barrier 
to switching in the statutory market and that regulators have not done enough to allay 
consumers’ fears about the potential for switching to jeopardise their access to VHI. 
Swiss research showing lower switching rates in areas with more insurers (Frank and 
Lamiraud 2009) highlights the importance of monitoring the degree of choice 
available to people. Too much choice of product or insurer lowers transparency, 
which increases the transaction costs of switching. 
 
Competition based on price and quality rather than risk selection 
Prior to the introduction of insurer competition many insurers did not bear any 
financial risk. The degree of financial risk borne by insurers has increased over time 
in all four countries and is particularly high in Germany and Switzerland, but 
remains low in Belgium. Each country has also focused on developing a risk 
adjustment formula to allocate resources to health insurers, although there are 
significant differences both in the design of the formula and the degree of insurer 
revenue subject to the formula. None of the four countries has managed to eliminate 
incentives for risk selection through risk equalisation, even though the formula has 
been significantly strengthened in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. In all four 
  55 
countries there is circumstantial evidence indicating risk selection through targeted 
advertising, reminders and discounts, and through product differentiation in VHI. 
 
Availability and use of tools to influence health care costs and quality 
Insurers in Belgium have very limited recourse to purchasing tools, reflecting the 
absence of national policy emphasis on competition as a mechanism for improved 
purchasing, as well as a preference for sickness funds to operate collectively. In 
Germany and Switzerland (as in Belgium) collective negotiation between insurers 
and providers is the normal method of setting prices, which limits the ability of 
individual insurers to influence the cost and quality of most health services. 
However, insurers have a degree of leeway in the contracting process. Since 2006 
insurers in the Netherlands have had more freedom in contracting than their 
counterparts in the other countries. Selective contracting is now permitted for all 
forms of care and, while the government continues to set the prices of two-thirds of 
all hospital care, as well as maximum prices for GP (general practitioner) services, 
there is slow movement towards greater price liberalisation. 
 
Although Belgian insurers are at a disadvantage when it comes to strategic 
purchasing, insurers in the other countries do not make full use of the greater range 
of tools they have for several reasons. These include wariness on the part of insurers 
about alienating existing or potential enrolees by curbing choice of provider; 
intervention by national competition authorities to block the use of legitimate tools 
such as vertical integration in cases where they are seen to be anti-competitive; the 
technical challenges and high transaction costs associated with the use of some tools 
(particularly selective contracting and price negotiation); and the difficulty of 
engaging in systematic benchmarking, which in turn precludes fully informed 
decision making by insurers and consumers. 
 
Policy outcomes 
The introduction of financial responsibility for sickness funds in Belgium in 1995 
was not intended to promote competition, but it has succeeded in its primary aim of 
ensuring a more level playing field for the sickness funds. A secondary aim was to 
encourage sickness funds to contain health care costs, and while there has been some 
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progress in this area, there is little evidence of significant improvement. The German 
reforms had some success in tackling equity concerns and streamlining the sickness 
funds’ administrative costs, but there is little evidence to suggest insurer competition 
has led to lower rates of health care expenditure growth or achieved substantial and 
lasting efficiency gains. Reforms in the Netherlands have expanded choice for 
consumers and put quality of care at the top of the political agenda, while market 
pressures have led to significant mergers and strong premium competition. With the 
exception of the pharmaceutical sector, however, there is little evidence of improved 
expenditure control or efficiency gains. In Switzerland the effects of insurer 
competition on efficiency and cost control have been equally modest and premiums 
have continued to grow at a much faster rate than wages. 
 
Conclusions 
Health insurance market reforms intended to stimulate efficiency gains through 
improved purchasing have had mixed results in the four western European countries 
reviewed in the paper. Each country has put in place measures to enable insurer 
competition to achieve its goals, including extensive regulation to secure consumer 
mobility, lower insurers’ incentives to select risks and provide insurers with tools to 
enhance value. However, some of these measures have not been sufficiently 
effective.  
 
Introducing risk equalisation schemes has been a priority for policy makers – for 
good reason, since risk selection erodes insurers’ incentives to operate efficiently. 
But in spite of the energy devoted to fine-tuning schemes and finding a balance 
between risk adjustment and risk sharing, no country has eliminated incentives to 
select risks. There is room for improvement, even in the countries with the most 
sophisticated formulas and especially in Switzerland, where incentives to select risks 
remain strong. The Swiss formula will be strengthened in 2012, but why Swiss 
policy on risk equalisation should consistently lag behind policy in other countries 
warrants further investigation. 
 
Consumer mobility has not received as much policy attention as risk equalisation. 
Extensive regulation to facilitate mobility (much of it predating the introduction of 
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insurer competition) means that the cost of changing insurer is likely to be negligible 
for most people. As a result, policy makers may have interpreted relatively low 
switching rates as indicating consumer satisfaction. However, a small but growing 
body of evidence suggests consumer mobility is limited among older and less healthy 
individuals (that is, those likely to use health services on a regular basis). This ought 
to be a cause for concern because if insurers feel that these enrolees are unlikely to 
switch they may not have sufficient incentive to provide them with high-quality care. 
 
Research identifies two obstacles to greater consumer mobility: increasingly close 
links between the sale of statutory and voluntary cover and choice overload. The 
growing importance of VHI as an obstacle to consumer mobility, particularly in the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, requires some form of policy action. Better risk 
adjustment may help, alongside better information for consumers and closer scrutiny 
of the sales process. Policy attention should also focus on the potential for choice 
overload in the context of a trend towards growing product differentiation. It is well 
established that product differentiation, even at the margin, lowers transparency 
(Office of Fair Trading 1997). This in turn increases transaction costs for consumers, 
particularly those who rely on regular access to health care, and can therefore 
undermine competition. 
 
Making sure insurers have and use tools to influence health care quality and costs is 
essential if competition is to improve health system performance. Insurers in 
Belgium do not have these tools, insurers in Germany and Switzerland have access to 
some tools, and insurers in the Netherlands have access to a wider range of tools but 
do not always use them. An essential assumption underpinning insurer competition is 
therefore absent or only partially upheld in all four countries. Many of these tools 
restrict consumer choice, affect provider autonomy and require data that are not 
readily available. Thus, cross-country variation in the availability and take-up of 
tools may be explained by differing degrees of willingness to curb the choices of 
important stakeholders. It may also reflect a broader uncertainty on the part of policy 
makers (including national competition authorities and courts) about the appropriate 
locus of competition – among insurers or among providers? – and about who is best 
placed to influence provider behaviour – insurers or health care users? In all four 
countries, commentators have argued for better information about health care quality 
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and costs to facilitate systematic benchmarking. While there is no doubt that better 
information and benchmarking would bring benefits, they would not in themselves 
be sufficient to foster strategic purchasing. 
 
Developments in the four countries suggest that the instrumental value of insurer 
competition as a means of improving health system performance rests on multiple 
assumptions that can only be upheld through frequently complex interventions often 
requiring elusive data. Making it work therefore requires action on many fronts, 
particularly to ensure incentives are aligned across the health system, and greater 
awareness of the political nature of some barriers to success. 
 
Limitations 
The paper has not attempted to assess the impact of insurer competition on health 
system performance, which would in any case be difficult to do due to noise from 
other reforms and the absence of knowledge about the counterfactual (what might 
have happened without insurer competition). Instead, it has tried to assess the extent 
to which assumptions hold in three key areas. In the absence of specific metrics, 
weighing up the relative contribution of the different assumptions to performance is 
largely a matter of judgement. 
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Conclusions 
 
The purpose of the thesis has been to consider the usefulness of VHI as a policy lever 
for improving health system performance. To do this the thesis has presented four 
studies. Taken together, the studies provide an analysis of: 
 
 the role, structure, conduct and performance of VHI markets in the European 
Union, including important changes since 2000 
 
 public policy towards VHI and changes since 2000, including the impact of the 
EU-level regulatory framework for VHI on national regulatory efforts and its 
implications for financial and consumer protection in VHI markets 
 
 the impact of VHI on key dimensions of health system performance 
 
 the effects of allowing people to choose between statutory and voluntary health 
insurance 
 
 VHI’s influence on insurers’ incentives to enhance efficiency where insurers who 
compete to offer statutory benefits also sell VHI 
 
A key argument in favour of VHI is that, in the context of limited public resources 
for health care, VHI can further health policy goals by relieving fiscal pressure in the 
health sector. The thesis posits that VHI may be able to do this if it is able to address 
gaps in statutory coverage and if it does not undermine health system performance. 
VHI might undermine health system performance by making those who rely on 
statutory coverage worse off or by not being accessible to those who need it. 
 
In this section I address the question of whether or not VHI is a useful policy lever 
based on the analysis presented in the four studies. I also discuss ways in which 
policy makers can ensure VHI contributes to rather than undermines health system 
performance. Finally, I suggest areas for further research. 
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Does VHI address gaps in statutory coverage? 
One way of answering this question is to look at VHI’s contribution to private 
spending on health. The purpose of any form of health insurance is to provide 
financial protection through risk pooling and pre-payment. Lack of adequate 
coverage results in out-of-pocket spending and high levels of out-of-pocket payment 
for health care are associated with low levels of financial protection in countries at 
all stages of economic development (Moreno-Serra et al 2011 in press). If VHI does 
not make a significant contribution to private spending, in a given health system, 
then it is plausible to assume that VHI is not doing well in addressing gaps in 
statutory coverage. 
 
VHI only accounts for more than 25% of private spending on health in a handful of 
countries (substitutive VHI in Germany, complementary VHI covering statutory user 
charges in France and Slovenia, supplementary VHI in Ireland and complementary 
cover of excluded services in the Netherlands) (Figure 3). Where out-of-pocket 
payments account for over 75% of private spending, it is clear that VHI is only 
partially addressing gaps (particularly if private spending is high as a proportion of 
total spending). 
 
There is also the issue of what sort of VHI market will develop and which gaps will 
be filled. VHI most commonly plays a supplementary role, but non-clinical aspects 
of health care quality are not usually the most important source of gaps in statutory 
coverage. Gaps generated by poor depth or scope of statutory coverage are often of 
greater concern. For example, outpatient prescription drugs are a common driver of 
catastrophic or impoverishing spending on health (Võrk et al 2009), and yet 
voluntary insurers have rarely developed policies to cover them (Thomson et al 
2009b). Finally, where the ‘right’ sort of VHI is available, there is the issue of 
whether it (adequately) covers those who need it most. Research provides evidence 
of financial and other barriers to access to VHI in countries where VHI provides 
critical financial protection (France and Germany), and of reductions in the quality of 
VHI coverage (the generosity of benefits) over time (Grabka 2006; IRDES 2011a). 
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VHI clearly can and does address gaps in statutory coverage, but it is not always 
effective in this respect. A conclusion to be drawn from this is that while gaps in 
statutory coverage are a necessary prerequisite for VHI market development, they are 
not sufficient. The countries in which it contributes to more than 25% of private 
spending on health are generally the ones with the most accessible markets, an 
accessibility achieved through government intervention in the form of regulation 
(Germany, Ireland, Slovenia) and means-tested vouchers (France) or through 
collective agreements among voluntary insurers to offer open enrolment (the 
Netherlands). It was beyond the scope of the thesis to investigate why markets fail to 
develop in some settings, but other analysis has suggested a range of explanatory 
supply and demand factors, including lack of insurer capacity to develop appropriate 
products, insurer concerns about low profitability due to adverse selection, the 
presence of informal payments, and affordability (Thomson 2010). Affordability is a 
key issue in existing markets too, and a persistent problem even where VHI is 
heavily regulated or subsidised. 
 
Does VHI undermine health system performance? 
The thesis has assessed the impact of VHI on financial protection, equity in financing 
and use of health care, incentives for efficiency and quality in health care delivery, 
and administrative costs. VHI appears to be critical to financial protection in France, 
Slovenia and Germany. It is difficult to estimate the extent to which VHI in these 
three countries provides adequate financial protection since there is limited research 
directly analysing financial hardship among those with VHI and those who need VHI 
but do not have it. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to show that the quality of 
VHI coverage (the generosity of benefits) has declined in France and Germany in the 
last five years and policy makers in the three countries have been sufficiently 
concerned about financial protection to introduce extensive regulation of VHI 
(Germany) and significant means-tested tax subsidies (France), or to propose major 
reform of statutory user charges (Slovenia) (Chevreul et al 2010; Grabka 2006). In 
several other countries VHI has not developed to fill significant gaps in statutory 
coverage or is too expensive for many of those who are likely to need it (since levels 
of population coverage are low) and is therefore unable to address financial 
protection problems. 
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Although there is no recent comparative research on equity in financing health care, 
the thesis has shown how VHI has had a regressive effect on health system financing 
in France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands (in the latter prior to 2006). The 
larger the proportion of the population covered by VHI, the more regressive the 
effect is likely to be. Tax subsidies that are not targeted at poorer households are 
regressive in general, because take-up of VHI is generally higher among wealthier 
people, and highly regressive if they are provided at the marginal rate of taxation, 
which means that higher-rate tax payers receive larger subsidies (Sheils and Haught 
2004). 
 
VHI markets of all types are found to skew the distribution of health care away from 
need, lowering equity in the use of health services. Research has demonstrated clear 
differences in the frequency of using health services, in waiting times for treatment, 
and in patterns of use, between those with and without VHI (Jones et al 2006; 
Lüngen et al 2008; Perronnin et al 2011; Schellhorn 2007; Statistik Austria 2007; 
Tussing and Wren 2006). These differences are not justified by greater need among 
those with VHI and are therefore a cause for concern about efficiency in the use of 
health resources. 
 
Markets for VHI do not in general seem likely to have a positive effect on efficiency 
in the health system. Voluntary insurers in many countries lack incentives to enhance 
efficiency due to their freedom to select risks and limited consumer mobility. As a 
result, it is not surprising that so few insurers use tools to enhance value, even though 
they have access to them. The majority simply reimburse policy holders and often 
pay providers fees that are higher than statutory fees. There is little evidence to 
support the idea that voluntary insurers are actively engaged in trying to enhance 
efficiency and quality in health care delivery, particularly in the largest markets. 
 
Of more concern for public policy is the way in which failing to align incentives 
across VHI and statutory health insurance can undermine the efficiency of public 
spending on health. The thesis has highlighted three areas in which incentives are 
often not aligned: value-based benefit design, direct and indirect tax subsidies for 
VHI, and conditional sale of VHI and statutory health insurance. VHI often allows 
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people to bypass gatekeeping and access specialists without referral and, in some 
cases, to undermine value-based user charges. Tax subsidies for VHI can be 
substantial, but policy makers do not seem interested in assessing their worth. The 
only recent research on this subject (from Ireland) clearly shows how tax subsidies 
are not only very far from being self financing, but can also exacerbate inequalities in 
access to health care. Finally, evidence from the Netherlands and Switzerland 
suggests that allowing insurers to sell statutory and voluntary cover may limit 
consumer mobility in the statutory part of the market, potentially lowering statutory 
insurers’ incentives to enhance efficiency, and thereby undermining a key tenet of 
competition among statutory insurers. 
 
Many of VHI’s negative effects on health system performance can be attributed to 
the quality of public policy towards VHI. Poor policy design enables and exacerbates 
risk segmentation, permits public resource allocation to be skewed in favour of those 
with VHI, and fails to ensure that incentives are aligned across VHI and statutory 
health insurance. Policy makers must accept some of the responsibility for failing to 
create an environment in which insurers have incentives to enhance efficiency and 
for allowing public resources to subsidise VHI (directly or indirectly) when such 
subsidies are of questionable value. 
 
Does VHI relieve fiscal pressure in the health sector? 
In many countries VHI does not do well in addressing gaps in statutory coverage and 
has been shown to undermine health system performance. It is therefore difficult to 
conclude that it relieves fiscal pressure in the health sector. Substitutive VHI has 
been shown to increase fiscal pressure due to risk segmentation, the loss of 
contributions from those who have opted out or been excluded from statutory 
coverage, and the ability of those who have opted out to return to the statutory 
scheme when they are older, have more dependants or are in poorer health. 
 
Complementary VHI has the most potential to relieve fiscal pressure if the 
government can shift costs onto households (by reducing the scope or depth of 
coverage) without losing contributions to the statutory scheme and without undue 
effect on health system performance. However, there is only one large VHI market 
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covering excluded services (the Netherlands), and the factors that contribute to the 
size of the Dutch market are unlikely to be easily replicated in other settings. The 
Hungarian market, which is very small but has experienced rapid growth since 2000, 
has been fuelled by highly regressive tax subsidies, calling into question its ability to 
relieve fiscal pressure. 
 
The European Union’s largest VHI markets, in terms of contribution to total 
spending on health, contribution to private spending on health and population 
coverage, are those covering statutory user charges in France and Slovenia. Because 
these two markets account for a relatively high proportion of total spending on 
health, they seem capable of providing genuine fiscal relief. However, the main 
reason they are able to make such a significant contribution to total spending is 
because they cover almost the whole population, an achievement that has been 
helped by tax subsidies (both countries) and heavy regulation to promote access to 
VHI (Slovenia), but that has not been replicated in other countries. In France and 
Slovenia there have also been concerns about VHI distorting incentives and priorities 
in the statutory scheme, which may undermine fiscal relief in the longer term. 
 
Supplementary VHI can relieve fiscal pressure if it releases capacity and lowers 
waiting times for publicly financed treatment, but there is no evidence of this 
occurring in EU countries. Reductions in waiting times have usually been achieved 
through the introduction of targets and guarantees (Bevan and Hood 2006). 
 
In any type of VHI market there is a real risk that direct public subsidies for VHI will 
not be self financing. Where this is the case, the government needs to consider 
whether tax subsidies represent an efficient use of public resources. There is also a 
risk that VHI will benefit from indirect public subsidies – for example, if public 
doctors are able to treat VHI-financed patients in public hospitals, if VHI subscribers 
can choose to be treated in public hospitals, and if public hospitals fail to charge 
voluntary insurers the full economic cost of treating these patients. There is good 
evidence from Ireland to show how the government makes a significant contribution 
to the cost of VHI-financed treatment at the expense of longer waiting times for 
those who rely on statutory coverage (Smith 2008; Smith 2010; Smith and Normand 
2009; Tussing and Wren 2006). 
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The experience of the largest VHI markets in Europe belies the idea that VHI is 
capable of providing fiscal relief in the short or longer term. However, by enhancing 
consumer choice, boosting provider incomes, keeping private insurers in business 
and satisfying ideological beliefs, VHI can of course relieve political pressure, which 
may explain why policy makers are sometimes willing to pursue gains for generally 
richer groups of people at the risk of losses for those who rely on statutory coverage. 
As I noted in the introduction, these other objectives for VHI should not be confused 
with health policy goals. If policy makers need to balance health policy goals with 
other objectives, they should understand the trade-offs involved. 
 
Developments in public policy in the last five years – the introduction of universal 
statutory coverage and the abolition of substitutive VHI in the Netherlands in 2006, 
the extension of statutory coverage to self-employed people in Belgium in 2008, the 
reinforcing of the border between statutory and voluntary coverage and increased 
regulation of substitutive VHI in Germany in 2009, proposals to introduce universal 
statutory coverage in Ireland announced in 2011, and proposals to increase the depth 
of statutory coverage in Slovenia, also announced in 2011 – suggest that some of the 
trade-offs are not as politically acceptable as they once were. 
 
What factors might make VHI more useful to policy makers? 
There are ways in which policy makers can decrease the likelihood of VHI 
undermining health system performance and increase the likelihood of VHI 
furthering health policy goals. Here I highlight four important mechanisms. 
 
 Poor policy design in many VHI markets may reflect a lack of awareness among 
policy makers of how VHI interacts with the rest of the health system. Better 
understanding of this crucial dynamic will enable policy makers to identify the 
appropriate role for VHI and should contribute to stronger policy design. 
 
 Stronger policy design can be achieved through clarity about health policy goals. 
In turn, focusing on health policy goals should enable policy makers to align 
incentives in pursuit of these goals, paying attention to all aspects of VHI-health 
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system interaction. An important principle should be to preserve and, if possible, 
enhance efficiency in the use of public resources for health. 
 
 Policy makers must demonstrate the political will and technical capacity to 
regulate VHI to secure both financial and consumer protection. A good starting 
point would be to ensure that the regulator has a grasp of the specificities of 
health insurance markets or, if necessary, to establish a dedicated health 
insurance regulator. This also applies to those responsible for determining the 
EU-level regulatory framework. The current framework reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of markets for VHI. It is therefore no surprise that 
the European Commission’s expectations for deregulation – competitive pressure 
enhancing choice and lowering prices – have not been fulfilled in this sector. 
 
 Oversight must include systematic monitoring and evaluation of the VHI market 
and its interactions with and impact on the health system. Regular data collection 
and analysis of VHI is the exception rather than the norm and there are very few 
countries in which there is a good evidence base for policy development. 
 
Further research 
In spite of growing policy and academic interest in VHI, there is very little research 
on which to base an assessment of VHI’s impact on health system performance. 
Much of the research comes from the largest VHI markets; in smaller markets, 
effects may be more muted. Several issues warrant further investigation. First, it 
would be useful to consider why VHI fails to develop or address gaps in statutory 
coverage in some settings. Thomson (2010) discussed this in the context of transition 
economies, but a more systematic analysis would be welcome. Second, there is good 
research on the distributional implications of financial flows between publicly and 
VHI-financed health care in Ireland (Smith 2010; Smith and Normand 2009). This 
type of analysis should be carried out in other countries. Third, given the widespread 
and apparently increasing use of tax subsidies to promote VHI, it is surprising that 
there are so few analyses of whether or not these subsidies are self financing. 
Analysis should not be limited to direct subsidies in the form of tax relief, but also 
focus on indirect transfers of resources from the public budget to VHI-financed care. 
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Finally, there does not seem to be any published research in English examining the 
politics of public policy towards VHI. Why is VHI favoured in some countries? Why 
is policy design stronger in some markets? Why are some markets more regulated? 
Why do governments prefer some interventions to others? What is the role of 
stakeholder interests and how do they influence the policy process? All of these 
questions are worth trying to answer, especially if VHI is to contribute to rather than 
undermine health system performance in future. 
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Study 1: How does voluntary health insurance 
affect health system performance? Evidence 
from the European Union 
 
 
 
Paper provenance and peer review 
 
 
This paper is solely the work of the PhD author (ST). It draws on a survey of experts 
in 26 EU member states (Imre Boncz, Ăirts Briăis, Karine Chevreul, Joan Costa-i-
Font, Martin Dlouhy, Charalambos Economou, Stefanie Ettelt, Thomas Foubister, 
Margherita Giannoni-Mazzi, Gabriel Gulis, Triin Habicht, Galina Kanazireva, Adam 
Kozierkiewicz, Joy Ladurner, Hans Maarse, Anja Milenkovic Kramer, Ljudmila 
Mincheva, Natasha Muscat, Mónica Oliveira, Victor Olsavsky, Willy Palm, Marc 
Perronnin, Sofia Silva, Caj Skoglund, Skirmante Starkuviene, Mamas Theodorou, 
Svetla Tsolova, Brian Turner, Karsten Vrangbaek and Lauri Vuorenkoski) and a 
study visit to Luxembourg by a research assistant at the LSE (Jessica Hohman). The 
survey responses were also used to prepare a report for the European Commission 
(grant VT/2007/064), which is available as:  
 
Thomson, S. and E. Mossialos (2009). Private health insurance in the European Union. 
Brussels, European Commission (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion). 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=754&langId=en  
 
ST devised the survey questionnaire, the 2009 report and the paper. ST collated the 
responses to the questionnaire with the assistance of Jessica Hohman. ST drafted the 
2009 report and the paper and both were critically reviewed by EM. 
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Introduction: VHI and health system performance 
 
The last ten years have been marked by greater scrutiny of VHI by international 
organisations and in the academic literature. They have also seen growing interest in 
measuring comparative health system performance, a phenomenon both reflected in 
and stimulated by the publication of the World Health Report on health systems 
(WHO 2000). It is therefore an opportune moment not only to review developments 
in VHI markets, but also to consider the effects of VHI on health system 
performance. The purpose of measuring health system performance, defined as the 
health system’s ability to achieve its goals (WHO 2000), is to generate reliable 
information for policy development and to foster accountability by enabling 
stakeholders to make informed decisions (Smith et al 2010). 
 
This paper has three aims: to review the way in which markets for VHI currently 
operate across the European Union and identify important changes that have taken 
place since 2000; to review developments in public policy towards VHI; and to 
examine the impact of VHI on the following dimensions of health system 
performance: financial protection, the distribution of health financing and health care 
use (equity), incentives for efficiency and quality in health care delivery, and 
administrative costs (Kutzin 2008; WHO 2000; WHO 2010). It fills a gap in the 
literature by updating an earlier analysis of VHI markets in the European Union 
(Mossialos and Thomson 2002b). 
 
Data presented in the paper come from three sources: a survey of experts in 26 
member states based on a questionnaire (included in the Appendix) and a study visit 
to Luxembourg by a research assistant; a review of published and grey literature 
identified through searches of academic databases (ISI Web of Knowledge and 
PubMed) and the Internet (Google and Google Scholar); and international statistical 
databases (WHO National Health Accounts). The survey and the study visit took 
place in 2008 and data from the completed questionnaires were collated in 2009. In 
the paper information from the survey is either attributed to the experts involved or 
marked with an asterisk (*) if referring to more than one or two countries. 
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There are two important caveats concerning data sources. First, research on which to 
base an assessment of VHI’s impact on health system performance is extremely 
limited in most countries. Much of the evidence presented here comes from the 
largest VHI markets; in smaller markets, the effects of VHI may be more muted. 
Second, while I have taken steps to ensure that the survey responses were of a 
consistently high standard (for example, by carefully selecting the experts, using a 
detailed questionnaire and giving the experts an opportunity to clarify and strengthen 
their responses), the quality of response may vary across countries and there is 
always some risk in relying on a single expert per country8. 
 
The next section discusses ways in which VHI interacts with statutory health 
insurance. It uses the market structure-conduct-performance framework commonly 
applied in industrial organisation (Bain 1956)9 to review key aspects of VHI markets, 
providing the descriptive information necessary for readers to understand how the 
most significant VHI markets work. It also identifies important changes since 2000. 
Subsequent sections review developments in public policy towards VHI at national 
and EU levels, analyse the impact of VHI on dimensions of health system 
performance, and discuss policy implications. 
 
 
Markets for VHI 
 
Market role: interaction with statutory health insurance 
It is difficult to think of VHI in isolation from statutory health insurance, since there 
are no countries in which VHI is the only source of coverage. Almost every EU 
country provides universal health coverage on a statutory basis as part of a wider 
system of social protection. As a result, markets for VHI are heavily shaped by 
statutory institutions and usually play a modest role, although there are crucial 
exceptions. 
 
                                                 
8
 More than one expert completed the survey in Bulgaria, France and Portugal. 
9
 Here, the structure-conduct-performance framework is employed for descriptive rather than 
explanatory purposes. 
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Many member states have a market for VHI that supplements statutory coverage. A 
supplementary market offers access to health care that is covered by statutory health 
insurance, but gives subscribers greater choice of provider and level of amenity 
(usually including access to private providers) and may enable them to bypass 
waiting lists for publicly financed treatment. It tends to be purchased by employers 
on behalf of better-educated, higher-skilled and wealthier people living in larger 
cities and, because it covers people and services already covered by the statutory 
health system, its contribution to financial protection is minimal10. Complementary 
VHI covers services excluded from or only partially covered by the statutory benefits 
package. It contributes to financial protection where it lowers or removes financial 
barriers to accessing essential health services. Complementary VHI can be 
understood as ‘completing’ coverage where there are gaps in the scope and depth of 
statutory coverage. VHI can also provide substitutive cover for people excluded 
from significant aspects of statutory coverage or for those who are not required to be 
statutorily covered, thereby ensuring ‘completeness’ in terms of coverage breadth. 
 
The role VHI plays in a given health system is largely determined by public policy 
regarding statutory health insurance arrangements and the regulatory environment for 
VHI. This in turn may reflect historical developments, political ideology, the relative 
power and interests of different stakeholders (particularly providers and insurers, but 
sometimes including employers, civil servants and higher earners) and government 
capacity to shape and develop the market. Understanding differences in market role 
is important for several reasons. First, market role may provide some indication of 
the rationale for VHI in a given context. Table 1 shows how VHI can in theory 
respond to gaps in statutory coverage. Second, the role a VHI market plays is closely 
correlated to its size, notably in terms of its contribution to spending on health (see 
below). Third, a market’s role often determines the way in which it is regulated, 
which has implications with respect to EU internal market and competition rules. 
Finally, market role may tell us a great deal about VHI’s interaction with statutory 
health insurance and its likely impact on health system performance. Table 4 shows 
the main role or roles VHI plays in EU countries. 
                                                 
10
 The OECD (2004) classifies this type of market as ‘duplicate’ because it covers health services that 
the statutory scheme already covers. However, the OECD’s classification fails to capture the extra 
benefits VHI offers in this role: choice of provider, faster access to care and access to superior 
amenities. 
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Table 4 Overview of VHI market role and size, 2011 
Country Market role(s)11 Eligibility12* Examples of benefits covered* % population covered 
(latest available year) 
% TEH 
(2009) 
Austria Complementary (S) & 
Supplementary 
 
 
Substitutive 
Whole population 
 
 
 
Self-employed occupational 
groups opting out of the 
statutory scheme, individuals 
not eligible for statutory cover 
Dental and eye care, physiotherapy, home visits, psychotherapy, 
health resorts, rehabilitation, CAM; private care, choice of hospital 
doctor, faster access (elective care), per diem cash benefits for 
inpatient care 
 
Similar to statutory cover 
(2066) 33.0 
 
 
 
(2006) ≈0.1 
4.4 
Belgium Complementary (S) & 
Supplementary 
Whole population CAM, dental and eye care, vaccines, prostheses and implants; better 
facilities in hospital (single room) 
(2008) 49.5 4.1 
Bulgaria Supplementary & 
Complementary (S) 
Whole population Superior amenities in hospital, private room, faster access to care; 
dental care, medical devices, outpatient pharmaceuticals 
(2006) 132.0-4.6 0.4 
Cyprus Supplementary Whole population Inpatient care, outpatient care, diagnostic procedures, ambulance 
transport, psychiatry, routine maternity care, physiotherapy, cash 
benefits, CAM, treatment abroad 
(2009) 21.5 5.5 
Czech 
Republic 
Supplementary 
 
Substitutive 
Whole population 
 
Individuals not eligible for 
statutory cover 
Private room 
 
Similar to statutory cover, but excludes treatment of some chronic 
conditions eg HIV/AIDS, drug addiction, mental health, spa 
treatment etc 
n/a 
 
(2008) <1.0 
0.1 
Denmark Complementary (S/UC) 
 
 
Supplementary 
Whole population Eye and dental care, physiotherapy, psychiatric care, chiropractic, 
medical aids, chiropody; outpatient prescription drug costs 
 
Choice of doctor, private hospital and diagnostic care, faster access 
(2011) ≈38.0 
 
 
(2011) ≈18.0 
1.4 
Estonia Substitutive Individuals not entitled to 
statutory cover 
Similar to statutory cover, but commercial cover offers different 
levels of benefit 
 (2010) <0.01 0.2 
Finland Complementary (UC) &  
Supplementary 
Whole population Reimburses statutory user charges for outpatient prescription drugs; 
private care, faster access 
(2005) ≈12.0  1.9 
                                                 
11
 The dominant role is listed first. 
12
 Reference to the whole population implies that anyone can in theory purchase this form of cover, but many insurers limit the sale of VHI to people below the age of 65. 
13
 There are two different estimates for population coverage. The Financial Supervision Commission estimates 4.6%, a patient rights group estimates 2.0%. 
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Country Market role(s) Eligibility* Examples of benefits covered* % population covered 
(latest available year) 
% TEH 
(2009) 
France Complementary (UC),  
Supplementary & 
Complementary (S) 
Whole population Reimburses statutory user charges; superior amenities in hospital, 
private room; eye and dental care, elective procedures (eg eye 
correction surgery) 
(2008) 94.0 12.9 
Germany Substitutive 
 
 
 
Complementary (UC) 
 
Complementary (S/UC) 
& Supplementary 
Households with higher 
earnings, self-employed 
excluded from statutory cover 
 
Civil servants 
 
Whole population 
Similar benefits to statutory cover 
 
 
 
Reimburses health care costs not fully covered by the government 
 
Dental care; reimburses statutory user charges for outpatient care; 
private hospitals, choice of specialist, per diem cash benefits for 
hospitalisation 
 
 
 (2010) ≈10.0 
 
 
 
 (2010) ≈20.0 
9.1 
Greece Supplementary Whole population Consumer choice, better quality of services, faster access (2002) 12.0  2.1 
Hungary Complementary (S) & 
Supplementary 
Whole population Physiotherapy, home care, preventive care, therapeutic spa services, 
sports/recreation, medical devices, CAM; superior amenities in 
hospital 
 (2006) Commercial: 2.1  
 (2006) Mutual: 6.2 
2.1 
Ireland Supplementary & 
Complementary (UC/S) 
Whole population Semi-private/private rooms in public/private hospitals, faster access; 
reimburses statutory user charges; GP visits, physiotherapy, eye and 
dental care, CAM 
(2008) ≈50.0 7.0 
Italy Complementary (S/UC) 
& Supplementary 
Whole population Eye and dental care, home care, cosmetic treatment, prostheses, 
rehabilitation, transplants, inpatient and outpatient care, CAM; 
reimburses statutory user charges for outpatient drugs; private care 
 (2006) 6.1 1.0 
Latvia Complementary (UC/S) 
& Supplementary 
Whole population Reimburses statutory user charges; eye and dental care, 
physiotherapy and massage, rehabilitation, vaccines, hearing aids, 
prostheses, plastic surgery, IVF, CAM; direct access to specialists, 
access to non-contracted providers, faster access (consultations and 
clinical examinations) 
(2003) 15.6  1.0 
Lithuania Supplementary & 
Complementary (S) 
Whole population Outpatient care including surgery, consultations, diagnostics, 
prevention, prenatal care, home visits, physiotherapy, eye and dental 
care, rehabilitation, inpatient care 
 (2006) 0.2 0.5 
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Country Market role(s) Eligibility* Examples of benefits covered* % population covered 
(latest available year) 
% TEH 
(2009) 
Luxembourg Complementary (UC) 
 
Complementary (S) & 
Supplementary 
Whole population Reimburses statutory user charges 
 
Eye and dental care, treatment abroad, CAM, sickness cash benefits; 
superior amenities in hospital, private care 
 (2006) Commercial: 25.0 
 (2006) Mutual: 66.0 
3.1 
Netherlands Complementary (S) & 
Supplementary 
Whole population Eye and dental care, physiotherapy, speech therapy, cross-border 
care, some preventive care, some forms of cosmetic surgery, CAM; 
single room in hospital 
(2009) 91.0 5.1 
Malta Supplementary Whole population Treatment abroad, inpatient and outpatient care (2006) 20.0 2.6 
Poland Supplementary Whole population Private care, faster access (2006) 3.1-3.9 0.0 
Portugal Supplementary & 
Complementary (S/UC) 
Whole population Choice of provider, faster access, direct access to specialist care; 
dental care; reimburses statutory user charges for outpatient drugs 
(2010) ≈20.0 3.6 
Romania Supplementary Whole population Superior accommodation, choice of provider, private care  (2006) 0.1 0.0 
Slovenia Complementary (UC) 
 
 
Complementary (S) & 
Supplementary 
 
Substitutive 
Whole population 
 
 
 
 
 
Individuals not entitled to 
statutory cover 
Reimburses statutory user charges (covering about 98% of those 
who contribute to statutory health insurance) 
 
CAM, superior dental care, elective care (eg cosmetic surgery); 
superior amenities in hospitals and health spas, superior medical 
devices, drugs not on positive and intermediate lists, faster access 
(2008) ≈85.0 
 
 (2004) <1.0 
 
 
n/a 
11.9 
Slovakia Substitutive Individuals not entitled to 
statutory cover 
n/a n/a 0.0 
Spain Supplementary & 
Complementary (S) 
Whole population Private care, faster access; dental care for adults, chiropody, CAM (2006) ≈15.0 5.1 
Sweden Supplementary &  
Complementary (UC) 
Whole population Faster access, private elective care; reimburses statutory user 
charges for outpatient prescription drugs 
(2007) 3.0-3.3 0.2 
United 
Kingdom 
Supplementary & 
Complementary (S) 
Whole population Acute care (elective surgery), screening, ‘employee health 
management’ processes; dental care, CAM 
(2008) 12.3 1.1 
Source: Survey responses, Albreht et al (2009), Boyle (2011), García-Armesto et al (2010), Gerkens and Merkur (2010), IRDES (2011b), Krasnik and Hernandez-Quevedo (2012 
forthcoming), Theodorou and Cylus (2012 forthcoming), Schäfer et al (2010); expenditure data from WHO (2011b) 
Note: CAM: complementary and alternative medicine; n/a = information not available; TEH: total expenditure on health.
 75 
Supplementary VHI 
Almost every country has a market for supplementary VHI, often sold in 
combination with some form of complementary cover*. These supplementary or 
mixed markets tend to be small in terms of contribution to health expenditure 
(usually well under 5% of total spending on health) and generally do not cover more 
than 20% of the population. The exception is Ireland (Box 1), which has a significant 
supplementary market covering half the population, but still only accounting for 7% 
of total health care expenditure (in 2009) (WHO 2011b). 
 
Box 1 Supplementary VHI in Ireland 
Access to some elements of statutory coverage in Ireland is means tested (McDaid and Wiley 2009). 
Richer groups must pay out of pocket for primary care and are subject to statutory user charges for 
inpatient care (up to an annual ceiling). VHI mainly provides faster access to elective inpatient 
treatment in private hospitals and private beds in public hospitals. In 1994 the market was opened to 
competition, to comply with EU law, and the dominant quasi-public insurer Vhi Healthcare was 
joined by two commercial insurance companies in subsequent years. In 1996 the Health Insurance Act 
established a regulatory framework for VHI including open enrolment, community-rated premiums, 
minimum benefits and risk equalisation (Mossialos and Thomson 2002b). The risk equalisation 
scheme has been the subject of legal action at national and EU levels (Thomson and Mossialos 2010). 
VHI currently covers about half of the population and benefits from tax relief equal to 20% of the cost 
of the premium (Turner 2009). Following a general election in 2011, the Irish government announced 
proposals to extend statutory coverage to the whole population and prohibit VHI from covering 
services in the statutory benefits package (Government of Ireland 2011; Ministry of Health 2011). If 
implemented, both measures seem likely to diminish the role of VHI in future. 
 
Ireland and Denmark are the only countries in which supplementary markets have 
grown substantially since 2000, albeit it from a very low base in Denmark’s case. In 
both countries growth has been fuelled by favourable tax incentives and the critical 
tone of public debate about the adequacy of publicly financed health care, including 
perceived problems with quality and waiting times (McDaid and Wiley 2009; 
Vrangbaek 2009). 
 
In the absence of a clear government strategy for VHI, the type of market most likely 
to emerge is a supplementary one offering faster access to care, often through private 
providers. This has been the experience of many of the newer member states of 
central and eastern Europe (CEE). These countries passed legislation permitting VHI 
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in the 1990s, but in many there was no concerted effort to shape VHI; consequently, 
markets have either not developed or play a marginal, supplementary role (Thomson 
2010). The exceptions are Slovenia, Latvia and Hungary (see below). 
 
Complementary VHI covering excluded services 
Complementary VHI for excluded services is widespread and often sold in 
combination with supplementary VHI*. The benefits it provides are generally limited 
to eye and dental care, physiotherapy and complementary and alternative medicine 
(CAM) and this type of market does not usually cover a large proportion of the 
population or make a significant contribution to health expenditure. A key exception 
is the Netherlands (Box 2), where about 90% of the population has this form of cover 
and VHI therefore makes a modest but significant contribution to total and private 
spending on health (5% and 33% respectively in 2009) (Schäfer et al 2010; WHO 
2011b). Denmark has the next largest complementary market in terms of population 
coverage (38% in 2011), but VHI’s contribution to total and private spending on 
health is small (1.4% and 10.5% respectively in 2009) (Krasnik and Hernández-
Quevedo 2012 forthcoming; WHO 2011b). Hungary has tried to stimulate a 
complementary market since the early 1990s, with limited success, in spite of 
substantial tax subsidies (30% of the premium) (Boncz 2009). In 2009 its market 
accounted for 2.1% of total spending on health and only 7.4% of private spending 
(WHO 2011b). Reasons for slow market development may include the relatively 
broad scope of statutory coverage and the presence of informal payments. VHI is 
mainly purchased by people in employment, is more likely to be purchased by those 
working for larger companies and is often financed by employers (Boncz 2009). 
 
Complementary VHI would be particularly attractive, from a policy perspective, if it 
allowed policy makers to systematically exclude non-cost-effective services from 
statutory cover. This would have the dual advantage of streamlining the statutory 
benefits package and removing concerns about access to VHI. In practice, however, 
such an approach presents both technical and political challenges (Jost 2005; 
Robinson 1999; Sorenson et al 2008). As a result, policy makers generally find it 
easier to exclude whole areas of less politically visible services (for example, eye and 
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dental care and physiotherapy)14 than to systematically de-list interventions of low 
value. 
 
Box 2 Complementary VHI covering excluded services in the Netherlands 
VHI in the Netherlands covers about 90% of the population (Schäfer et al 2010). High take-up may 
reflect various factors: voluntary cover is sold alongside statutory cover, often by the same entities 
(even if they may be separate for accounting purposes); the market has been in place for many years, 
so people are familiar with it and understand its purpose; it covers services that are valued by a well-
educated and relatively affluent society (eye care, dental care for adults and physiotherapy); and it is 
increasingly purchased on a group basis and paid for by employers, enhancing its accessibility and 
affordability. Factors like these may be difficult to replicate in other settings. Also, between 2006 and 
2008 insurers voluntarily agreed to offer open enrolment and community-rated premiums for VHI, 
which made the market easily accessible, even to older people and people in poor health (Maarse 
2009). The period of agreement has now concluded and some insurers are beginning to introduce an 
element of risk rating, which may lower levels of take-up (Roos and Schut 2011).  
 
Complementary VHI covering statutory user charges 
Complementary cover of statutory user charges is the dominant role VHI plays in 
France, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia. The presence of statutory user charges in 
the form of co-insurance15 appears to be a key determinant of demand for this form 
of VHI. All of the health systems in which complementary VHI policies have 
developed require co-insurance for ambulatory or outpatient care (although Latvia 
changed from co-insurance to co-payments (Tragakes et al 2008)). France (Box 3) 
and Slovenia (Box 4) are the only EU countries that also apply co-insurance to 
inpatient care16. Where co-insurance is applied to essential health services (without 
exemptions for low-income people or regular users of health services and without a 
cap on out-of-pocket spending), paying for publicly financed health care at the point 
of use is likely to be at once unavoidable, unpredictable (especially for inpatient care, 
where the volume and price of services used may be difficult to estimate in advance) 
and expensive. These three factors may explain the high level of demand for VHI 
                                                 
14
 Although this is not always easy either. Governments in several member states have tried to exclude 
some of these services and then re-introduced them following adverse media coverage – for example, 
dental care in Germany in the 1990s and cover of spectacles in France in 2008 (Busse 2001; Chevreul 
and Perronnin 2009). 
15
 Co-insurance is a form of user charge in which the user pays a set percentage of the service price. 
16
 The rates are 20% in France (Chevreul et al 2010) and range from 5% to 25% in Slovenia, with 
exemptions for low-income households (France) and people aged under 26 (Slovenia) (Albreht et al 
2009). 
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covering statutory user charges in France and Slovenia. The corollary is that insurers 
must be willing to supply the appropriate cover and they may be more likely to do so 
if demand is high across a broad spectrum of the population, so as to avoid adverse 
selection problems17. Covering a large share of the population also spreads risk, 
enabling lower premiums. 
 
Box 3 Complementary VHI covering statutory user charges in France 
The French market pre-dates the establishment of national health insurance in 1945 and is dominated 
by non-profit mutual associations. Coverage has grown from about 30% of the population in 1950 to 
86% in 2000 and 94% in 2008 (Couffinhal and Franc 2012 forthcoming; IRDES 2011b). VHI’s 
contribution to total health spending has also grown, from 5% in 1960 to just under 13% in 2009, and 
it makes a significant contribution to private health spending (61.9% in 2009) (WHO 2011b). Worried 
about low take-up of VHI among poorer households, in 2000 the government introduced vouchers for 
low-income people to purchase VHI (Couverture maladie universelle complémentaire; CMU-C), 
followed by subsidies (from 2005) for those just above the threshold for CMU-C (l’Aide à la 
complémentaire santé) (Chevreul et al 2010; Perronnin et al 2011). 
 
Box 4 Complementary VHI covering statutory user charges in Slovenia 
The Slovenian market was established in 1993 and covered 74% of the population by 2005 and 85% 
in 2008 (Albreht et al 2009; Milenkovic Kramer 2009). Its contribution to total and private spending 
on health is significant (11.9% and 47.5% respectively in 2009) (WHO 2011b). VHI is sold by a 
mutual association (initially part of the statutory health insurance fund) and two commercial insurers. 
In 2000 complementary VHI was defined as being in the public interest and risk equalisation was 
permitted but not implemented. In 2004 risk rating was permitted but, following risk selection by a 
commercial insurer, new regulations were put in place in 2005 (open enrolment, community-rated 
premiums and systematic notification of premium increases) and risk equalisation was implemented 
(Thomson 2010). The risk equalisation scheme has been subject to an unsuccessful national legal 
challenge and is currently subject to legal challenge at EU level (Thomson and Mossialos 2010). 
 
Substitutive VHI 
Substitutive markets are rare and generally small in terms of population coverage. 
Germany has by far the largest in terms of contribution to total and private spending 
on health (9.1% and 42.7% respectively in 2009) (Box 5). Cover is usually only 
available to selected groups determined by occupation (Austria), level of earnings 
and age (Germany) or (non)eligibility for statutory coverage (the Czech Republic, 
                                                 
17
 That is, to avoid a situation in which only those who knew they were going to be using health care 
on a regular basis would purchase VHI. 
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Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia)*. The role of substitutive VHI has declined since the 
1970s following significant expansions of statutory coverage. Ireland extended 
statutory coverage of inpatient care to the whole population in 1970, effectively 
transforming its VHI market from a substitutive to a mainly supplementary one; in 
2006 the Netherlands extended statutory coverage to the third of the population who 
had previously been excluded on the basis of having higher earnings; and Belgium 
extended statutory coverage of ambulatory care to self-employed people in 2008 
(Gerkens and Merkur 2010; McDaid and Wiley 2009; Schäfer et al 2010). In 
Germany failed attempts to abolish substitutive coverage in the mid 2000s were 
followed by efforts to limit the market’s expansion (Ettelt and Roman 2012 
forthcoming). 
 
Box 5 Substitutive VHI in Germany 
In Germany people with earnings over a threshold (€44,550 in 2011) can choose to be covered by 
private insurance (Privaten Krankenversicherung; PKV) rather than the public scheme (Gesetzliche 
Krankenversicherung; GKV); if they opt for private cover, the GKV no longer benefits from their 
contributions, but nor does it subsidise their care (Busse 2011 in press). Those who have opted for 
private cover can only return to the GKV if their earnings fall below the threshold and they are under 
55 years of age. Since 2009 it has been compulsory to have some form of health insurance (Federal 
Constitutional Court 2009), so anyone who opts to leave the GKV must buy private cover (including 
paying separate premiums for dependants). However, private cover still benefits from employer 
financing equal to half of what the employee and employer would have paid for GKV cover up to 
50% of the cost of the premium. Only about a quarter of those who have the option of being privately 
insured actually choose to leave the GKV (Busse 2011 in press). 
Risk segmentation is a key issue where substitutive VHI is concerned. In Germany it has 
contributed (with other factors) to deficits in the GKV (Wasem 1995). Fiscal pressure attributable to 
risk segmentation is accentuated by the voluntary nature of the decision to leave the GKV, the 
regulatory framework for VHI and people’s ability to return to the GKV if they no longer find it 
beneficial to be privately insured. The regulatory framework for substitutive VHI allows private 
insurers to reject applications for cover, risk-rate premiums, exclude cover of pre-existing conditions, 
charge separate premiums for dependants and offer discounted premiums in exchange for high 
deductibles. VHI is therefore more attractive and more accessible to younger and healthier individuals 
with smaller families. There are clear differences in health status and use of health services between 
those compulsorily covered by the GKV and those voluntarily covered by private insurance (Table 8) 
and, due to the income eligibility criterion, the average earnings of the privately insured are about 
60% higher than those of contributing GKV members (€38,109 compared to €22,658) (Leinert 
2006a). 
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Risk segmentation has contributed to steady rises in GKV contribution rates (Wasem 1995), 
which in turn encourages more younger people with higher earnings to opt for substitutive VHI. 
Research estimates that the GKV loses about €750 million a year as a result of people changing from 
public to private cover or from private to public cover. Between 2000 and 2004, more than half of 
those leaving the GKV were ‘low risks’ in terms of age and family status, while most of those joining 
the GKV were ‘high risks’: older people with dependants (Ettelt and Roman 2012 forthcoming). 
Extending statutory coverage to the whole population would alleviate fiscal pressure by lowering the 
GKV’s average risk profile and at the same time increasing the average amount it has to spend per 
person. 
The government has taken numerous steps to mitigate the porosity of the border between 
public and private cover. In 1995 people aged 65 and over lost the right to return to the GKV, even if 
their earnings fell below the income threshold. In 2000 the age limit for returning to the GKV was 
lowered to include people aged 55 and over. The income threshold for opting out rose in 2003 by a 
higher than usual amount (11%) and in 2009 the government extended the waiting period for 
eligibility to opt out of the GKV to three years. Although the latter reform was estimated to have 
lowered the financial loss to the GKV by 15-20% a year (Albrecht et al 2007), it was reversed in 2011 
by the Christian Democrat-Liberal Democrat coalition, reflecting the new government’s commitment 
to maintaining the market for substitutive VHI. 
The Netherlands faced similar risk segmentation issues in its substitutive market (Thomson 
and Mossialos 2006). In 2006 the Dutch government effectively abolished substitutive VHI by 
extending statutory coverage to the whole population. The continued existence of substitutive cover in 
Germany has created tension in recent years, resulting in increasingly stringent regulation and efforts 
to introduce universal statutory coverage (Ettelt and Roman 2012 forthcoming). However, current 
arrangements favour specific groups in the population – the highest-earning employees (who can 
choose between statutory and private cover), civil servants (who do not have to pay GKV 
contributions), physicians (who benefit from higher fees for treating privately insured patients) and 
private insurers – which may explain their longevity. 
 
Market performance: size and profitability 
The size of a VHI market can be measured in three ways: in terms of the contribution 
VHI makes to spending on health, in terms of population coverage (that is, the 
proportion of people covered by VHI in a given population) and in terms of VHI 
premium income. 
 
Contribution to spending on health 
Levels of spending on health care vary widely across EU countries. In 2009, the 
latest year for which international data are available, health care expenditure as a 
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share of national wealth (gross domestic product; GDP) ranged from 5.4% in 
Romania to 11.8% in Belgium, with an average of 8.9% (WHO 2011b). Each 
country uses a range of public and private mechanisms to finance health care, but 
public spending accounts for over two-thirds of all health care spending in all but 
four countries (the exceptions being Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Latvia). Since 
2000 the public share of total spending on health care has fallen in about half of the 
countries. However, the only countries in which the public share declined 
significantly between 2000 and 2009 (by more than 10%) are the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia. 
 
Health spending channelled through VHI is low in most countries, ranging in 2009 
from 0.0% in Poland, Romania and Slovakia to 12.9% in Slovenia (Figure 2). In 
2009 VHI accounted for over 5% of total health spending in only six countries 
(France, Slovenia, Germany, Ireland, Cyprus and the Netherlands). Between 2000 
and 2009, VHI grew as a share of total health spending in about half of the countries. 
Some markets saw huge relative growth, but from a very low base (Hungary, Malta, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg). During the same period the Netherlands experienced the most 
significant decline in VHI’s share of total health spending (a contraction of two-
thirds) due to the abolition of its substitutive market in 2006. Other VHI markets also 
experienced a decline (of around or over 25% in Poland, the United Kingdom (UK), 
Latvia and Finland). In the United Kingdom the decline probably reflects increased 
levels of public spending on health from 2000, as well as improvements in timely 
access to publicly financed elective care and rises in the cost of VHI (mainly for 
individuals, as opposed to employers) (Boyle 2011). 
 
VHI is also relatively low as a proportion of private spending on health, accounting 
for less than 20% in 2009 in most countries (Figure 3). Between 2000 and 2009 
VHI’s share of private spending grew in about two-thirds of the countries, with 
significant growth (of around or over 25%) in Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
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Figure 3 VHI as a percentage of private expenditure on health, EU, 2000 and 
2009 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Fr
an
ce
Sl
ov
en
ia
G
er
m
an
y
Ire
la
nd
Ne
th
er
la
n
ds
Lu
x
em
bo
u
rg
Au
st
ria
Sp
ai
n
Be
lg
iu
m
Po
rtu
ga
l
De
n
m
ar
k
M
al
ta
Cy
pr
u
s
Fi
nl
an
d
Hu
n
ga
ry
Un
ite
d 
Ki
n
gd
om
G
re
ec
e
Ita
ly
La
tv
ia
Li
th
ua
n
ia
Sw
ed
en
Es
to
n
ia
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Po
la
n
d
Ro
m
an
ia
Sl
ov
ak
ia
2000 2009
 
Source: WHO (2011b) 
 
Population coverage 
The proportion of the population covered by VHI in different countries varies widely 
(Table 4). The largest markets are those covering statutory user charges in France 
(95% population coverage), Luxembourg (91%) and Slovenia (85%) and the Dutch 
market covering excluded services (91%). Denmark also has a significant 
complementary (services) market (38% population coverage). Among supplementary 
markets, Ireland and Belgium have the highest level of coverage (around 50% 
population coverage), followed by Austria (33%). The other significant markets in 
terms of population coverage include Cyprus, Denmark, Latvia, Malta, Portugal, 
Spain – all mainly supplementary markets covering 15-20% of the population. With 
the exception of Slovenia, the proportion of the population in CEE countries with 
any form of VHI is very small. 
 
Since the late 1990s, levels of population coverage have increased significantly in 
some countries, notably Belgium (growth in commercial supplementary VHI from 
about 33% to about 49% of the population, largely due to employers purchasing on 
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behalf of employees), Denmark (growth in supplementary VHI largely due to the 
introduction of tax incentives for group cover in 2002 and lack of confidence in the 
public system), France (from around 85% in 1998 to about 94% as a result of the 
introduction of government vouchers in 2000), Ireland (due to a combination of 
economic growth, generous tax relief and lack of confidence in the public system), 
Portugal (from about 12% to 20%), Sweden (from under 1% to around 3%) and 
Latvia (Barros et al 2011; Brigis 2009; Chevreul et al 2010; Gerkens and Merkur 
2010; Krasnik and Hernández-Quevedo 2012 forthcoming; Skoglund 2009; Turner 
and Smith 2012 forthcoming). 
 
Premium income 
The German market for VHI is by far the largest measured in terms of premium 
income, with around 30% of total VHI premium income in the European Union in 
2009, followed by France (9%), Spain (6%) and the United Kingdom (4%) (CEA 
2010). On a per capita basis substitutive VHI (Germany) will be more expensive than 
complementary or supplementary cover because it covers the full range of health 
services. 
 
Profitability 
VHI is a profitable business in many countries. Although voluntary insurers often 
incur administrative costs that are much higher as a proportion of total revenue than 
those found in the statutory health system (see below), they are still able to maintain 
healthy margins. Claims expenditure as a proportion of premium income is well 
under 75% in about half of the countries*. 
 
Market structure: sellers, buyers and concentration 
Who sells VHI? 
Entities providing VHI include non-profit mutual and provident associations, 
commercial companies, statutory health insurance funds and employers. Mutual and 
provident associations have dominated the VHI market in many western and northern 
European countries, including Belgium, Denmark, France (mutuals currently have 
59% of the market and provident institutions a further 17%), Ireland (73%), Malta, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the United Kingdom*. They also 
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play a significant role in Hungary. Nevertheless, their share of the VHI market has 
declined in several countries since the 1990s due to the entry of commercial insurers 
or the acquisition of mutual associations by commercial insurers, notably in Finland 
(where the mutuals’ share was already insignificant), Denmark, Malta, Ireland, 
Slovenia, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, France. 
 
In some countries, commercial insurers are the only source of VHI (Cyprus, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Spain and Sweden) or have a major share of the market (Austria, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Portugal and the United Kingdom)*. In 
others, employers organise their own health schemes (company ‘self-insurance’) for 
employees. Company schemes are a key feature of the Polish market and 
increasingly important in the UK market, where they have proved to be a cheaper 
alternative to VHI (Foubister 2009; Foubister et al 2006). 
 
Statutory health insurance funds compete with other entities to sell VHI in some of 
the newer member states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and 
Slovakia). In Romania the statutory health insurance fund dominates the VHI market. 
In the Netherlands statutory health insurance funds had been active in the VHI 
market, but were required to establish separate entities for voluntary coverage. In 
Slovenia the voluntary coverage arm of the statutory health insurance fund is now an 
independent mutual association with the dominant share of the complementary VHI 
market. 
 
A further distinction concerns an insurer’s degree of specialisation in health. Some 
insurers offer only health products, while others may sell a range of life and non-life 
products. Mutual associations generally specialise in health and are required by law 
to do so in Belgium, France, Hungary and Luxembourg*. Some commercial insurers 
in Belgium and Bulgaria also specialise in health. The German government used to 
prevent non-specialist domestic insurers from selling VHI in order to protect VHI 
subscribers from insolvency arising from an insurer’s other business 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen 2001). This practice was outlawed 
by EU internal market rules and Germany was forced to change its legislation 
following a European Court of Justice ruling (European Court of Justice 2001). 
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Who buys VHI? 
The extent and quality of statutory coverage are major determinants of demand for 
VHI. Socio-economic status is another important determinant. Data regarding the 
distribution of all types of VHI coverage in the European Union, whether individual 
or employer-paid, show that subscribers are more likely to come from higher socio-
economic groups*. In many countries the typical subscriber is aged 40-50 years old, 
relatively well off, better educated, employed as a white-collar worker (often at 
management level or higher) or self employed, working for larger companies, living 
in urban areas and male. This profile has not changed much over time. Among older 
people, survey data18 from 2004 suggest that VHI coverage is concentrated among 
those with higher educational levels and better cognitive functioning in many 
European countries (Paccagnella et al 2008) and that those with VHI are more likely 
to be at low risk of ill health (Bolin et al 2010). 
 
Group cover purchased (but not always paid for) by employers dominates in 11 out 
of 18 countries for which data are available and is particularly high (70% and above) 
in Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom*. In some countries, the rise of group policies has been attributed to 
strategic price discounting by insurers (Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom), often 
accompanied by less stringent policy conditions, and the changing attitude of 
employers, who increasingly recognise the potential costs of long absence from work 
due to accident or ill health (Lithuania, the United Kingdom) (Foubister et al 2006; 
Papworth 2000). In other countries, insurers mainly sell to groups (Latvia, Lithuania, 
Sweden). Group policies have gained market share in Sweden (where local 
governments (municipalities) have recently purchased VHI cover for all their 
employees) and Spain. 
 
VHI purchased by employers may be provided as an employee benefit, in which case 
the employer pays the full premium, or employees may pay some or all of the 
premium themselves. Information about who pays for group policies is hard to find*. 
However, in the United Kingdom the likelihood of insurance being paid for by an 
                                                 
18
 Data from the first wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The 
survey interviewed 28,000 people aged 50 and over in 11 European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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employer increases with income (Emmerson et al 2001). This potential source of 
inequity is exacerbated where group policies benefit from tax subsidies (see below). 
Most group policies are voluntary, although group policies provided as a compulsory 
component of an employee’s contract play a role in France (Sandier and Ulmann 
2001). 
 
Market concentration 
There is considerable variation in the number of insurers operating in each member 
state*. Some national markets have five or fewer insurers (Estonia, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Slovenia), others have around 50 or more (Belgium, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg). France is the outlier with almost 1000 
insurers. The VHI market is highly concentrated in many countries: in 2006 the three 
largest insurers in most countries had a market share of over 50%*. The main 
exceptions were France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Spain. 
 
The last two decades have seen a clear trend towards increasing concentration in the 
VHI market in many countries, mainly through mergers (Austria, France, Finland, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain)*. In some countries this has 
reflected increased concentration in the banking and insurance sectors as a whole 
(Portugal). In others it reflects changes in EU legislation concerning solvency 
margins, which has particularly affected the mutual market in France. Between 2000 
and 2006 the number of insurers in the VHI market in France fell by 40%, although 
the high level of competition among insurers in a saturated market was probably 
partly responsible for some of the mergers that took place (Chevreul and Perronnin 
2009). Conversely, the VHI market has become less concentrated in some countries, 
as the number of insurers has increased (Bulgaria, Ireland, Malta and Sweden). 
 
Economic theory generally suggests that market concentration reflects the degree of 
competition in the market, with a higher degree of market concentration usually 
associated with higher prices, to the detriment of consumers (Tirole 1988). However, 
unpublished European Commission research into the effects of VHI market 
concentration on prices suggests that higher levels of market concentration may 
actually be associated with lower prices for diagnostic tests (Schmitt 2008). While 
this may reflect the stronger purchasing power of insurers where the market is 
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dominated by a small number of insurance companies, there is no evidence to 
suggest insurers pass on these savings to consumers. 
 
Market conduct: premiums, benefit design and relations with providers 
Premiums and policy conditions 
Take up of VHI is usually restricted to people aged under 65, cover is most 
commonly provided as a short-term (annual) contract and insurers are generally free 
to reject applications, exclude or charge higher premiums for pre-existing conditions, 
rate premiums on the basis of individual health risk, set limits to benefits and impose 
waiting periods19 and cost sharing*. Age is almost universally used to set premiums. 
Health status is also used in more than half of the countries. Dependants almost 
always have to be covered separately at additional cost. Group cover often benefits 
from community-rated premiums and less stringent policy conditions. There are very 
few countries in which VHI premiums and policy conditions are regulated beyond 
the usual rules governing non-life insurance contracts (see below).  
 
Benefit design 
Consumers in VHI markets usually have some choice of insurer, plan and provider*. 
Individuals may be able to choose from a wide selection of packages with differences 
in coverage levels, reimbursement (in kind or cash), the extent of cost sharing and 
benefit ceilings. Benefit ceilings in the form of maximum annual levels of VHI 
reimbursement apply in several countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, Greece and Portugal). Insurers impose cost sharing in over half of 
the countries. Only two countries regulate the quality of VHI benefits. Ireland 
requires insurers to offer minimum benefits, while Germany requires substitutive 
VHI policies to cover both ambulatory and inpatient care and caps the level of cost 
sharing in VHI. 
 
The lack of standardised benefits and extensive product differentiation may benefit 
some consumers. However, product differentiation lowers transparency by making it 
difficult for consumers to make price comparisons, which increases transaction costs 
                                                 
19
 That is, a period of time before which benefits will not be paid. A classic example is benefits 
relating to childbirth, which some insurers will not cover if the birth occurs within nine months of 
taking out a policy. 
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and may undermine price competition (Office of Fair Trading 1997). Consumer 
choice is also circumscribed by eligibility criteria (people aged 60 and over are not 
usually allowed to buy VHI), health status (many insurers can reject applications) 
and ability to pay (VHI is only available to those who can afford the premium). In 
addition, the extent of choice (of insurer and provider) available to those with 
statutory coverage has increased in many countries in recent years (Thomson and 
Dixon 2006). Thus, while it is broadly true to say that VHI enhances consumer 
choice, the gap between the level of choice available to those with statutory and 
voluntary coverage has narrowed over time. 
 
Relations with providers 
Voluntary insurers purchase from a wide range of public and private providers*. 
Vertical integration (insurers owning their own facilities) is the exception rather than 
the norm (Table 5), although there has been a move towards greater integration (in 
some countries) and increased effort to engage in selective contracting. Insurers may 
be cautious about adopting purchasing tools that restrict consumer choice of 
provider. In about half of the countries insurers simply reimburse policy holders (in 
other words, they do not ‘purchase’ care at all). The dominant provider payment 
mechanism is retrospective fee-for-service reimbursement and insurers frequently 
pay providers fees that are higher than the fees paid by statutory health insurance. 
 
Private beds in public hospitals (beds reserved for the use of privately financed 
patients) are used by insurers in Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Romania 
and the United Kingdom*. In Austria and Ireland the proportion of public beds that 
may be reserved for private use is capped at 25% and 20% respectively. In the 
United Kingdom there is full economic costing for the use of private beds in public 
hospitals, but this is not the case in Ireland. A handful of countries prohibit doctors 
from working in both the private and the public sector (Greece, Cyprus, 
Luxembourg), but doctors work in both sectors in most other countries. Some 
countries impose limits on the extent to which doctors can do this (Denmark, Italy 
the United Kingdom). 
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Table 5 Voluntary insurers’ relations with providers, 2008 
Country Purchasing from 
providers or 
reimbursement of 
patients? 
Insurers free to 
contract selectively? 
Vertically integrated 
with providers? 
Provider 
payment? 
Who sets fees? Different from 
public fee-
setting? 
Austria Purchasing; 
reimbursement for 
doctor visits and non-
contracted hospitals 
Yes Some insurers part-own 
private facilities, but 
subscribers not obliged 
to use them 
PD, FFS, lump 
sum 
Austrian Insurance Association negotiates fees 
with inpatient providers, hospital doctors and 
regional medical associations 
Yes (higher) 
Belgium Reimbursement Yes No FFS Fees are set in the context of statutory health 
insurance at national level by the health 
insurance funds and provider representatives 
No, but extra 
billing permitted 
in some cases 
Bulgaria Reimbursement Yes Some insurers have their 
own facilities, but 
subscribers not obliged 
to use them 
FFS Providers; but insurers set fees for their own 
facilities 
Varies 
Cyprus <25% purchasing  Yes, but only to a 
limited extent 
No FFS Insurers and providers negotiate fees 
individually 
No  
Czech 
Republic 
Reimbursement Yes, but not in practice No FFS Providers n/a 
Denmark Reimbursement and 
purchasing 
Yes, commonly occurs Some insurers have 
exclusive agreements 
with providers  
FFS Insurers typically negotiate lower fees based on 
volume and type of company being insured 
Yes (double for 
specialists)  
Estonia Commercial: 
reimbursement  
EHIF: purchasing 
Commercial: Yes 
EHIF: Yes, for up to 
20% of outpatient care  
No CAP, DRG, FFS, 
PD 
Commercial: fees 20% higher 
EHIF: fees government approved 
Yes (20% higher) 
Finland Reimbursement Yes, but not in practice No n/a Providers Yes 
France Reimbursement 
(usually), but some 
purchasing 
No No n/a Providers No, but some extra 
billing permitted 
Germany Reimbursement Yes, but only among 
providers treating PHI 
patients only 
Uncommon; insurers 
cannot own policlinics; 
some collectively own 
hospitals 
FFS 
(individuals), 
DRGs (hospitals) 
Providers are allowed to charge higher fees 
than statutory fees 
Yes (higher) 
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Country Purchasing from 
providers or 
reimbursement of 
patients? 
Insurers free to 
contract selectively? 
Vertically integrated 
with providers? 
Provider 
payment? 
Who sets fees? Different from 
public fee-
setting? 
Greece Trend towards 
purchasing 
Yes, typically occurs One insurer has own 
facilities; others 
encourage use of PPNs 
CAP (outpatient 
diagnostics), 
FFS, salary 
(managed care) 
Insurers negotiate fees with providers Yes (higher) 
Hungary Mutuals: 
reimbursement 
Yes Some commercial 
insurers use PPNs 
FFS Statutory fee schedule used for benefits covered 
by the statutory system; insurer-provider 
negotiation for other services 
Yes (higher) 
Ireland Purchasing Yes, but in practice each 
insurer covers most 
hospitals and 
consultants 
None traditionally; Vhi 
Healthcare recently set 
up SwiftCare Clinics 
and Hibernian AVIVA 
Health an Xpress Med 
Urgent Care Centre 
FFS (typically); 
trend from PD to 
fixed price 
procedures in 
hospital 
Vhi Healthcare leads pricing negotiations with 
providers; the other insurers follow and most 
providers accept the fees 
Yes (public pays 
salary)  
Italy Purchasing Yes (private sector) No FFS (typically) Accredited private providers working for the 
public sector regulated by fees set at 
regional/national level, but insurers can 
negotiate fees with private providers 
Yes (higher) 
Latvia Reimbursement Yes, always occurs No FFS Providers, but insurers may not pay 100% Yes (higher) 
Lithuania Reimbursement No Insurers offer PPNs, 
subscribers not obliged 
to use them  
n/a n/a n/a 
Luxembourg Commercial: 
Reimbursement  
n/a n/a FFS Social security and government negotiate with 
providers to determines user charges 
No 
Malta Reimbursement Yes, but only to a 
limited extent 
No FFS Insurers negotiate individually with hospitals, 
pay doctors what is reasonable 
Yes (public pays 
salary) 
Netherlands Reimbursement, but 
purchasing is in 
initial stages 
Yes, but occurs only to 
a limited extent  
Negligible, but one 
insurer is investing in 
primary care centres 
CAP, FFS, 
standard hourly 
tariffs 
n/a n/a 
Poland Reimbursement Yes No, but some insurers 
use networks 
CAP (networks), 
FFS 
Typically, insurers set their own fee, which is 
accepted or not 
Varies 
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Country Purchasing from 
providers or 
reimbursement of 
patients? 
Insurers free to 
contract selectively? 
Vertically integrated 
with providers? 
Provider 
payment? 
Who sets fees? Different from 
public fee-
setting? 
Portugal Reimbursement 
(primarily), some 
limited purchasing 
Yes, typically occurs Some larger insurers 
collectively integrated; 
insurers offer PPNs 
FFS Providers and insurers negotiate fees; but in 
practice, providers are often forced to accept 
the prices defined by insurers 
n/a 
Romania Purchasing and 
reimbursement 
Yes, frequently occurs  Some insurers have their 
own hospitals  
FFS, but salary if 
insurers own 
facilities 
Providers and insurers negotiate fees Yes (higher) 
Slovakia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Slovenia Purchasing Yes, frequently occurs No FFS Providers Varies 
Spain Purchasing Yes, commonly occurs Typically insurers own 
hospitals, use beds in 
other private hospitals 
FFS; some CAP Insurers and providers implicitly negotiate fees, 
but insurers have monopsony power 
Yes (higher public 
pays salary) 
Sweden Reimbursement Yes, typically occurs No FFS Price negotiations occur, but fees based on 
government-set fees for private providers 
offering care to the public sector 
Yes (higher, extra 
pay for handling 
PHI claims) 
UK Purchasing 
 
Yes, common with 
hospitals (less common 
with doctors) 
No (strict) vertical 
integration 
FFS Insurers and providers negotiate hospital fees; 
insurers typically stipulate a limit for doctor 
fees up to which they will pay 
Yes (higher) 
Source: Survey responses 
Note: n/a = information not available; CAP = capitation; DRG = diagnosis-related groups; FFS = fee for service; PD = per diem; PPN = preferred provider networks; PPO = preferred 
provider organisations
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Public policy towards VHI 
 
EU and national regulation 
Regulation of VHI has three main goals (Chollet and Lewis 1997): 
 maintaining market stability by setting financial and non-financial standards for 
insurer entry and operation, conditions for insurer exit, and requirements for 
financial reporting, scrutiny and oversight; this is known as financial or 
prudential regulation 
 protecting consumers by governing insurers’ marketing practices and their 
relations with health care providers 
 improving access to VHI through open enrolment (guaranteed issue), lifetime 
cover (guaranteed renewal), community rating, premium review, approval or 
caps, mandated (usually minimum) benefits and prohibition on exclusion of pre-
existing conditions from cover; these last two goals are known as material or 
contract regulation 
 
The European Union has a framework for regulation of non-life insurance (the Third 
Non-Life Insurance Directive established with effect from 1994) that precludes 
material regulation in non-substitutive VHI markets (Thomson and Mossialos 2010). 
All member states are expected to comply with minimum solvency standards 
(European Commission 1992). They are also expected to comply with EU rules on 
contracts and complaints procedures. Since 2000 there have been some minor 
changes to the EU-level regulatory framework, but nothing with any significance for 
VHI (European Commission 2007a; European Commission 2007c; European 
Commission 2008a; Thomson and Mossialos 2007b; Thomson and Mossialos 2010). 
 
In most of the countries VHI is regulated by some form of national financial market 
authority or supervisory commission under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Finance*. Health-specific regulation of commercial VHI is rare (Finland, Ireland, 
Spain; Italy and Slovenia for the complementary market covering statutory user 
charges only); it is more common for regulation of non-profit VHI (France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg). Non-profit insurers are sometimes regulated by a separate body 
(Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg). 
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Regulatory approaches vary across countries, with some governments favouring 
minimal financial regulation and others preferring heavier material regulation*. The 
nature, extent and effectiveness of national regulatory frameworks are affected by a 
range of factors including the role of VHI in the health system, aspects of market 
structure (for example, the number and type of insurers in operation), political 
ideology, government capacity and legal constraints. 
 
National regulations applied to VHI do not go beyond what is required at EU level in 
just under half of the countries*. Thus, VHI is regulated in the same way as any other 
financial service and the legislative framework does not include specific mention of 
VHI. This is more likely to be the case where commercial VHI is concerned and in 
predominantly supplementary markets. In a few countries the general insurance 
legislation includes sections relating exclusively to VHI (Austria and Finland). 
National regulation goes beyond general insurance requirements in VHI markets 
with a strong mutual or non-profit insurer presence (Belgium, France, Hungary, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Romania), where the market plays a 
substitutive role (Germany) or a complementary role covering statutory user charges 
(Italy, Slovenia), and in a handful of other countries (Bulgaria, Lithuania). Material 
regulation mainly aims to improve access to the market (Table 6). 
 
While VHI in Ireland has always been heavily regulated, government intervention in 
the market has intensified in other countries since 2000, mainly in Belgium, France, 
Germany and Slovenia (Table 7). Regulatory developments have overwhelmingly 
aimed to improve access to VHI and financial protection for those covered by VHI. 
In Germany they have also aimed to address risk segmentation in the health system 
(Box 5) and enhance consumer choice and consumer protection in VHI (for example, 
by making ageing reserves portable). 
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Table 6 Regulation to ensure access to affordable and good quality VHI, 2011 
Regulation Application 
Access to VHI  
Open enrolment and lifetime cover Belgium, Germany (for the basic substitutive policy only – see 
Table 7), Ireland, Slovenia20 
Prohibition of age limits n/a 
Affordability  
Community-rated premiums Non-profit VHI only: Belgium, Estonia, Hungary 
All VHI: Ireland, Slovenia 
Risk equalisation to support 
community rating 
Ireland, Slovenia 
Tax-financed vouchers for VHI France (for low-income households) 
Premium caps Germany (for the basic substitutive policy only): the premium 
is capped at the level of the maximum contribution for 
statutory health insurance 
Quality of coverage  
Cover of pre-existing conditions Non-profit VHI only: Belgium (mutual associations cannot 
charge higher premiums for pre-existing conditions) 
All VHI: Ireland (subject to maximum permissible waiting 
periods) 
Minimum or standard benefits Germany (for the basic substitutive policy only), Ireland 
Cost sharing caps Germany (for substitutive policies only): insurers cannot offer 
annual deductibles above €5,000 
Prohibition of benefit ceilings n/a 
Source: Survey responses and additional research 
 
Since 2000, national regulation of VHI has led to legal action at EU level in 
Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovenia (Thomson and Mossialos 
2010). It is no coincidence that these are the European Union’s most heavily 
regulated non-substitutive VHI markets. In 2008 the British private insurance 
company BUPA lost its case at the European Court of Justice in which it argued that 
risk equalisation in the Irish VHI market was a form of state aid and therefore 
contravened EU competition rules (European Court of Justice 2008). However, it 
won a national legal challenge on a technicality and the risk equalisation scheme was 
suspended. Following national parliamentary elections in Ireland in 2011 the new 
government has announced plans to introduce universal statutory coverage and to 
prevent VHI from covering services in the statutory benefits package, which may 
both diminish demand for VHI and lead to a change in the regulatory framework for 
VHI (Government of Ireland 2011). 
 
                                                 
20
 Open enrolment and community rating are not legal requirements in France but are encouraged 
through tax policy (exemptions from insurance premium tax for insurers who comply). 
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Risk equalisation has also sparked national and EU-level controversy in the 
Slovenian market for complementary VHI covering statutory user charges. In 2007 
the European Commission initiated infringement proceedings against the Slovenian 
government, partly on the grounds that risk equalisation contravened EU internal 
market rules (Thomson and Mossialos 2010). However, the Slovenian government’s 
recent proposal to revise the statutory benefits package (Ministry of Health 2011) 
and abolish many statutory user charges (Rupel 2011), which will largely eliminate 
the need for VHI, may make these proceedings defunct. 
 
Table 7 Developments in national regulation of VHI, 2000-2011 
Year Regulatory change 
2000 France: Introduction of vouchers for VHI for low-income households (CMU-C) 
Germany: Age limit for switching from VHI to statutory cover lowered from 65 to 55 
Slovenia: VHI defined as being in the public interest; risk equalisation permitted but not 
introduced 
2002 France: Introduction of contrats solidaires (exemptions from insurance premium tax for 
insurers who refrain from risk rating premiums) 
2004 Slovenia: Risk rating of premiums permitted 
2005 France: Introduction of tax subsidies for VHI for households just above the threshold for 
CMU-C 
Slovenia: risk rating of premiums prohibited; insurers must offer open enrolment and 
community-rated premiums; risk equalisation implemented; premium increases must be 
approved by the regulator 
2006 Ireland: Risk equalisation scheme triggered by the Health Insurance Authority 
2007 Belgium: Open enrolment for VHI (all insurers) and cover of pre-existing conditions 
(non-profit insurers only) 
2008 France: Introduction of contrats responsables (exemptions from insurance premium tax 
for insurers who refuse to cover new compulsory deductibles for statutory treatment) 
Ireland: Risk equalisation scheme suspended and to be amended following national legal 
challenge by BUPA 
2009 Germany: Having health insurance of some sort made compulsory for the whole 
population; substitutive VHI must cover both ambulatory and inpatient care; introduction 
of the ‘basic policy’ (replacing the ‘standard policy’) in substitutive VHI (open enrolment, 
cover of pre-existing conditions, benefits equivalent to the GKV at a price that cannot 
exceed the maximum GKV contribution); a cap on deductibles in VHI (of up to €5,000 
per year); VHI ageing reserves made portable; new ruling means people have to 
demonstrate earnings above the income threshold for three consecutive years before they 
can opt out of the statutory scheme 
2010 Belgium: From 2012 statutory local sickness funds can no longer offer VHI; these can 
only be offered by new independent ‘societies of mutual interest’ and (as before) 
commercial insurers, both now regulated by the insurance supervisory authority 
2011 Germany: Three year waiting period for eligibility for opting out of the statutory scheme 
abolished 
Source: Survey responses and additional research 
 
The only area in which EU law has successfully changed national legislation since 
2000 is where national regulators have directly or indirectly favoured mutual 
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associations over commercial insurers (Belgium, France and Ireland) (European 
Court of Justice 2011; Thomson and Mossialos 2010). In 2001 the European 
Commission asked France to abolish insurance premium tax exemptions favouring 
non-profit insurers (European Commission 2001c). The government replaced these 
with exemptions unrelated to legal status, but in 2011 the European Commission 
ruled that the French government’s contrats solidaires and contrats responsables 
were illegal because they indirectly favoured mutual associations and the benefit to 
the insurers did not seem to be passed on to consumers (European Commission 
2011b). In 2010 Belgium was required to place VHI sold by sickness funds on the 
same footing as VHI sold by commercial insurers (via newly created ‘societies of 
mutual interest’, which are to be independent of the sickness funds with effect from 
2012). In 2011 the European Court of Justice ruled that Ireland should apply the 
same financial regulations to all insurers, regardless of legal status (European Court 
of Justice 2011). 
 
Tax policy 
Most countries offer some form of tax incentive for VHI, usually tax relief that 
permits some or all of the cost of VHI premiums to be deducted from taxable 
personal or corporate income*. Tax incentives are aimed at individuals (France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Romania), groups (Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain, Sweden) or both (Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovenia). In Austria and Denmark tax subsidies for groups are only 
available to companies that purchase VHI for all their employees (as opposed to 
restricting group coverage to senior management, for example) (Ladurner 2009; 
Vrangbaek 2009). There are no tax incentives in a handful of countries (Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, the United Kingdom). In Romania 
capped tax relief applies to all insurance premiums, not just VHI, and therefore does 
not create an incentive to purchase VHI. This was the case in Germany until recently, 
but new legislation has introduced a specific tax relief for all health insurance 
(statutory and voluntary) (Ettelt and Roman 2012 forthcoming). France is the only 
country with means-tested tax subsidies. 
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Tax disincentives in the form of insurance premium tax and tax on employer-
provided benefits in kind apply to individuals in some countries (Estonia, Lithuania, 
Poland, the United Kingdom). In Ireland and Sweden there are tax disincentives for 
groups (for employer-paid cover only) and individuals respectively, but the size of 
the disincentive is very small. Mutual associations are exempt from premium tax in 
Hungary and Luxembourg. In Belgium and France exemptions for mutual 
associations were found to contravene EU law and have been abolished. 
 
During the 1990s tax subsidies were lowered in Austria, Greece, Italy, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom and expanded in Portugal (Mossialos and Thomson 2002b). 
Spain abolished them for individuals and introduced them for groups in 1999. Since 
2000 they have been expanded in Lithuania (2007) and Germany (2010); Denmark 
abolished them in 1986 and re-introduced them (for groups) in 2002*. While 
generous tax subsidies have succeeded in increasing demand for VHI in a few 
countries (notably Hungary and Ireland), they can be expensive, there is no evidence 
to suggest they are self financing and they are likely to be regressive because VHI 
tends to be purchased by richer people. In Ireland tax relief on VHI premiums cost 
the Irish government €321 million in 2008, roughly equivalent to 2.5% of public 
spending on health (Revenue Commissioners 2009; WHO 2011b). 
 
 
Impact on health system performance 
 
Financial protection 
A key tenet of universal health coverage is that access to treatment for illness or 
injury should not lead to financial hardship (WHO 2010). VHI contributes to 
financial protection by addressing gaps in the breadth, scope and depth of statutory 
coverage. In theory it can play a critical role in removing financial barriers to 
accessing health care where people are not eligible for statutory coverage (for 
example, those in Germany who have opted out of the GKV and are aged over 55), 
where statutory health insurance does not cover essential services, or where essential 
services are subject to statutory user charges (particularly in the form of co-
insurance) and there are no exemptions for low-income groups or regular service 
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users and no cap on out-of-pocket spending. Supplementary VHI does not contribute 
to financial protection since those who buy it are mainly benefiting from faster 
access to care that they could have obtained through their statutory entitlement. 
Whether or not VHI contributes to financial protection in practice depends on three 
factors: a market existing to cover gaps; those in need of financial protection having 
access to the market; and VHI offering good quality coverage (that is, good scope 
and depth of coverage). 
 
All EU health systems provide universal or near-universal statutory coverage, but 
there is evidence of coverage gaps. Although out-of-pocket payments declined as a 
share of total spending on health between 2000 and 2009 in two-thirds of countries 
(the exceptions were Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden), their share remains significant in some 
instances, accounting for around or over 20% in Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain (WHO 2011b). 
It is difficult to find recent comparative data on the distribution of out-of-pocket 
payments for health or the extent to which they have a ‘catastrophic’21 or 
‘impoverishing’ effect on households. However, past analysis has found them to be 
highly regressive (Wagstaff et al 1999) and survey data suggest that the incidence of 
catastrophic out-of-pocket spending in EU health systems in the 1990s ranged from 
0.0% to 2.75% (Xu et al 2003). 
 
Measuring financial protection in terms of spending incidence fails to account for 
those who forego using health services due to cost (that is, those who do not incur 
out-of-pocket payments because they cannot afford them). As a result, metrics 
regarding catastrophic or impoverishing spending levels need to be complemented by 
survey data on financial barriers to access. A 2007 survey identified people who had 
foregone care due to cost in the previous year in every EU health system, ranging 
from an average of 12% of respondents across countries for dental care to 4% for 
specialists and 3% for GPs and hospitals (Eurobarometer 2007). More recent survey 
data highlight substantial variation across countries, with the proportion reporting 
                                                 
21
 Most often measured as out-of-pocket spending on health that is greater than or equal to 40% of a 
household’s capacity to pay (income after basic subsistence needs have been met). 
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cost-related access problems22 ranging from a low of 5% in the UK and 6% in the 
Netherlands to 10% in Sweden, 13% in France and 25% in Germany 
(Commonwealth Fund 2010). 
 
These survey data do not tell us about the role of VHI in lowering or eliminating 
financial barriers to access. A study based on a 2004 survey of older adults in Europe 
found that the probability of foregoing care was lower among those with VHI 
coverage (1.3% vs 2.7%) (Paccagnella et al 2008). However, it is nevertheless the 
case that VHI does not always address gaps in statutory coverage. Voluntary insurers 
in Ireland have been slow to cover access to primary care, for which richer 
households must pay out of pocket. Since a GP visit can cost as much as €80 
(McDaid and Wiley 2009), this can leave a significant gap in financial protection. In 
some countries where statutory coverage of adult dental care is minimal (Estonia is 
one example), insurers have not developed policies to cover it (Habicht 2009; 
Thomson et al 2010b). Similarly, statutory user charges are widely applied to 
outpatient prescriptions (Thomson et al 2009b), and yet this is an area in which VHI 
does not play a role in many countries*. 
 
Nor do those who rely on VHI for financial protection always have access to the 
market or access to good quality voluntary cover. Some countries rely on the 
presence and dominance of non-profit insurers (particularly mutual associations) to 
guarantee access to VHI. Historically, mutual associations offered open enrolment 
with community-rated premiums and in some countries this continues to be the norm 
(Belgium, France and Luxembourg). In other countries, the government has resorted 
to regulation to ensure people have access to VHI and to VHI of good quality (open 
enrolment, community rating, cover of pre-existing conditions, lifetime cover, 
minimum benefits, premium and cost sharing caps and so on), but these types of 
regulation are limited to VHI in a handful of countries (Table 6). The vast majority 
of VHI markets are not subject to any regulation intended to promote financial 
protection. 
 
                                                 
22
 People who reported doing at least one of the following in the past year due to cost: not filling a 
prescription or skipping a dose of prescribed medicine; had a medical problem but did not visit the 
doctor; or skipped a test, treatment or follow-up appointment. The survey only included these five EU 
countries. 
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Markets for complementary VHI covering statutory user charges are among the most 
stringently regulated. Access to VHI is critical to ensuring financial protection in 
Slovenia and France, where user charges in the form of co-insurance apply to most 
health services and there are only limited exemptions and no cap on out-of-pocket 
spending. In Slovenia the maximum user charge limits set out in health insurance 
legislation in 1992 were reached in the space of four years; since then there has been 
a steady increase in the price of VHI premiums (Milenkovic Kramer 2009). Concerns 
about VHI affordability (and other issues, discussed below) prompted the 
government (in 2011) to propose a reform to expand the depth of statutory coverage, 
which would lead to the abolition of complementary VHI (Rupel 2011). 
 
France traditionally relied on its mutual associations to promote affordable access to 
VHI (Couffinhal and Franc 2012 forthcoming), but the non-profit share of the market 
has declined in recent years, while concerns about inadequate financial protection for 
those without VHI have grown. Means-tested vouchers (CMU-C) and subsidies 
introduced since 2000 have increased the uptake of VHI, but have not succeeded in 
reaching all those who might benefit from them. In 2008 nearly 4 million people did 
not have VHI (Perronnin et al 2011). The most commonly cited reason for not having 
VHI among those not eligible for CMU-C who would have liked voluntary cover 
was ‘lack of means’ (42% of respondents); among the general population the most 
commonly cited reasons for loss of voluntary cover were ‘financial problems’ and 
‘becoming unemployed’ (20% and 15% of respondents, respectively) (IRDES 
2011a). Rises in VHI premiums, partly reflecting steady increases in statutory user 
charges, have not been matched by a concomitant rise in the level of VHI benefits 
(Chevreul and Perronnin 2009). This suggests an aggregate reduction in the quality 
of VHI coverage in France and, therefore, in the degree of financial protection it 
provides. 
 
Substitutive VHI is heavily regulated in Germany and efforts to ensure access to this 
type of VHI have grown since the mid 1990s, when the government first began to 
make it more difficult for those who opt for substitutive VHI to return to the GKV 
and therefore needed to ensure that those reliant on VHI had access to affordable 
cover of good quality. The earlier regulation was limited in achieving its goals. VHI 
premiums more than tripled between 1986 and 2006, rising almost twice as fast as 
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increases in statutory contributions (Grabka 2006). Cost sharing in VHI has also 
increased. Between 2001 and 2005 the proportion of substitutive VHI policy holders 
opting to pay deductibles in return for lower premiums rose continuously, with older 
people more likely to have higher deductibles than younger people (contrary to what 
economic theory would predict) (Grabka 2006). In 2005 5% of those with 
substitutive VHI (about 350,000 people) were found to be paying premiums that 
were higher than the maximum GKV contribution (Grabka 2006). The government 
introduced further regulation in 2009 (Table 7), including a cap on deductibles. 
However, the maximum deductible permitted in substitutive VHI is €5,000 per year, 
which is very limited in terms of protection when compared to the cap on out-of-
pocket payments for publicly financed care, equivalent to 2% of an individual’s 
annual income or 1% for people with chronic conditions (Busse 2011 in press). Two 
per cent of income for a person with earnings equal to the threshold for opting out 
(€44,550 in 2011) would be around €900. Thus, the level of financial protection 
available in the GKV is much higher than in the VHI market. 
 
Where substitutive VHI is not so tightly regulated, it seems more likely that people 
who rely on it for access to health care will lack adequate financial protection, 
particularly if they have pre-existing conditions. For example, migrant workers 
buying substitutive VHI in the Czech Republic are not covered for immunisation, 
childbirth or chronic conditions such as HIV/AIDS and mental health problems, and 
must pay out of pocket for these essential services (Dlouhy 2009). 
 
In complementary VHI markets covering excluded services the absence of regulation 
may reflect judgements about the likelihood of people incurring catastrophic costs 
when in need of services such as dental care and physiotherapy. However, 
comparative research indicates that the use of dental care is heavily skewed in favour 
of richer people in many OECD countries, suggesting that poorer people may face 
financial and other barriers to access (van Doorslaer et al 2006; Võrk et al 2009). The 
same research finds income-related inequality in the use of dental care in OECD 
countries to be lowest in the Netherlands, which suggests that the very high take-up 
of complementary VHI among the Dutch population contributes to financial 
protection (van Doorslaer et al 2006). Open enrolment is not a formal rule in the 
Dutch VHI market but in 2006 and 2007, under pressure from parliament, insurers 
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agreed collectively not to reject applications for cover (Roos and Schut 2011). The 
agreement was not renewed in 2008 and insurers are making increasing use of health 
questionnaires in scrutinising applications and setting premiums (Roos and Schut 
2011). If access to VHI becomes more difficult, its contribution to financial 
protection may fall. 
 
Although VHI is critical to financial protection in Germany, and probably also for 
regular users of health care in France and Slovenia (where statutory user charges are 
high and there is no cap on out-of-pocket spending on health), there is evidence to 
suggest that the quality (depth) of VHI coverage has declined in France and Germany 
in the last five years. Policy makers in all three countries have been sufficiently 
concerned about financial protection to introduce extensive regulation of VHI 
(Germany and Slovenia) and significant means-tested tax subsidies (France), or to 
propose major reform of statutory user charges (Slovenia). 
 
Equity in financing and use of health care 
Health policy aims to promote a more even distribution of the burden of financing 
the health system, often by requiring richer people to pay more for health care, as a 
proportion of their income, than poorer people. Equity in financing health care 
should be considered alongside equity in the use of health care because a health 
system may be highly progressive in terms of financing, but exhibit financial and 
other barriers that restrict access to health care for some groups of people (Smith 
2010; Smith and Normand 2009). 
 
There is no recent comparative research on equity in financing health care in Europe. 
However, it is plausible to assume that substitutive VHI will lower equity in 
financing where those who are not covered by the statutory scheme do not make 
financial contributions to it, particularly if they are wealthier and would therefore 
have made higher than average income-based contributions. Earlier international 
research confirms this assumption (Wagstaff et al 1999). It is also plausible to 
assume that the larger the proportion of the population covered by VHI, the more 
regressive its effect is likely to be, as demonstrated by Wagstaff et al (1999) and 
more recent analysis of equity in financing the Irish health system (Smith 2010). 
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In France the introduction of vouchers for low-income households (CMU-C) may 
have improved equity in financing complementary VHI covering statutory user 
charges. Nevertheless, VHI in France remains regressive. Survey data found that in 
2006 the cost of paying for voluntary cover accounted for 3% of household income 
for the richest quintile versus 10% for the poorest quintile (Kambia-Chopin et al 
2008). Tax subsidies that are not targeted at poorer households are generally 
regressive because VHI tends to favour richer groups; they are highly regressive if 
provided at the marginal rate of taxation, which means that higher-rate tax payers 
receive larger subsidies (Sheils and Haught 2004). 
 
Health care use is considered to be equitably distributed when it is based on need 
rather than other factors such as socio-economic status. Socio-economic status has a 
clear effect on the likelihood of having VHI in many countries (Paccagnella et al 
2008)*. In France there is good evidence of variation in the likelihood of having VHI 
and the quality of VHI coverage by socio-economic status (Saliba and Ventelou 
2007). Prior to the introduction of CMU-C, only 72% of unskilled workers were 
covered by VHI compared to 93% of those in managerial, academic and professional 
positions (Bocognano et al 2000; Sandier et al 2004). Additionally, over 60% of 
those earning at least €1,220 per month had an average or high level of VHI cover 
(providing good financial protection), compared to only about 20% of those earning 
less than €610 per month (Chevreul and Perronnin 2009). CMU-C has not had a 
significant impact on these trends. Survey data show that 97% of people in the top 
two income quintiles were covered by VHI in 2008 compared to 88% in the lowest 
quintile and 84% among people who had never worked (IRDES 2011a). Among 
households not eligible for CMU-C, the trend was even more marked, with 97% of 
those in the top two income quintiles covered by VHI versus only 65% in the lowest 
quintile. Similar results have been found for supplementary VHI in Ireland (Smith 
2010; Smith and Normand 2009). These confirm the findings of earlier research 
indicating that the probability of having VHI increased with income in the four 
countries studied (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom) (Jones et al 
2006). 
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Variations in health care use among those with and without VHI manifest themselves 
in three ways: differences in the frequency of using health services, differences in 
waiting times for treatment and differences in the quality of care received. 
Comparative research based on data from the second half of the 1990s found that 
VHI was positively associated with a higher probability of visiting a specialist in the 
four countries studied (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom) (Jones et al 
2006). Further research using data from 2000 found that specialist visits favoured 
richer groups in OECD countries and were particularly pro-rich in Portugal, Finland, 
Ireland and Italy, all countries in which supplementary VHI (and in Portugal’s case 
out-of-pocket payments) play a significant role in providing access to specialists (van 
Doorslaer et al 2006). Survey data from 2004 indicate that older people with VHI use 
health services more frequently than older people without VHI (Paccagnella et al 
2008). The almost universal VHI cover of dental care in the Netherlands (unique in 
the European Union) seems to have a positive effect on equity in dental care use; the 
study found inequality in the use of dental care to be lowest in the Netherlands. The 
following paragraphs summarise the findings of national research from Austria, 
France, Germany and Ireland. 
 
Research has consistently shown that in France those without VHI use health 
services less frequently than those with VHI (Figure 4), even though their self-
reported health status is worse (Figure 5) (Buchmueller et al 2003; Perronnin et al 
2011). A further equity issue in France concerns discrimination against CMU-C 
beneficiaries by doctors. Because CMU-C does not reimburse patients the difference 
between collectively negotiated fees and extra billing by doctors (in contrast to 
normal complementary cover), some doctors appear to refuse to treat CMU-C 
beneficiaries (Chevreul and Perronnin 2009). Fear of not being treated is one of the 
reasons people give for purchasing complementary VHI privately even when they are 
eligible for free CMU-C cover (Perronnin et al 2011). Other reasons given include 
good health (among younger people), linguistic barriers (among non-native French 
speakers), embarrassment and fear of being stigmatised. 
 
The volume of research available in France is not matched in Slovenia, the other 
large market for complementary VHI covering statutory user charges. However, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that people without VHI in Slovenia sometimes face 
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barriers to accessing publicly financed care due to fears on the part of providers 
about patients not being able to pay the necessary user charges (Milenkovic Kramer 
2009). 
 
Providers in Germany generally receive substantially higher fees for treating 
privately insured patients and there have been concerns about the effect of payment 
differences on equity in the use of health care. Research based on survey data of 
older people found a significantly higher intensity of use of specialist care among 
men with private cover (Gruber and Kiesel 2010). Other research has found 
significant variation by coverage status in waiting times for outpatient specialist 
appointments (Schellhorn 2007), with GKV members waiting on average about three 
times longer than the privately insured (Lüngen et al 2008)23. Studies also show that 
the privately insured have faster access to patented and innovative drugs than GKV 
members (Krobot et al 2004; Ziegenhagen et al 2004). There is no evidence of the 
impact of differential access on health outcomes and evidence of the impact on user 
satisfaction is inconclusive (Mielck and Helmert 2006; Schellhorn 2007). 
 
Better access to hospital care is cited as a key reason for purchasing supplementary 
VHI in Ireland (Nolan 2006) and survey data show significantly shorter waiting 
times for inpatient care, outpatient consultations and day case procedures among 
those with VHI (Tussing and Wren 2006). As Smith (2008) has noted, the value of 
VHI to such a large proportion of the population (around 50%) suggests that non 
take-up of VHI among poorer households may be linked to lack of affordability. 
Concern about waiting time differences led the government to set up a National 
Treatment Purchase Fund in 2002 to purchase private care in Ireland and abroad on 
behalf of publicly financed patients waiting for extended periods of time (McDaid 
and Wiley 2009; Smith 2010). There are also concerns about differences in access to 
specialists, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that VHI-financed patients are more 
likely than publicly financed patients to receive care from specialists (as opposed to 
more junior hospital doctors) (Turner 2009). 
 
                                                 
23
 Differences in waiting time between the two groups ranged from 24.8 working days for a 
gastroscopy to 17.6 working days for an allergy test (including pulmonary function test) and 4.6 days 
for a hearing test (Lüngen et al 2008). 
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Austrian survey data show that waiting times are four times longer for publicly 
financed patients than for VHI-financed patients for cataract surgery, three and a half 
times longer for knee operations and twice as long for intracardiac catheterisation 
(Statistik Austria 2007). Given that average waiting times for these procedures are 
100 days, 97 days and 28 days respectively, these differences can be substantial. 
 
Figure 4 Variation in access to care by type of care and coverage status in 
France, 2008 
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Figure 5 Variation in health status by coverage status in France, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Perronnin et al (2011) 
 
Supplementary VHI has generated concerns about ‘two-tier’ health care in other 
countries such as Denmark, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom*. The main reasons for differential access in the countries reviewed 
here include access to treatment in private facilities, which allows those with VHI to 
bypass waiting lists for publicly provided care, and the incentives facing providers, 
which encourage them to prioritise VHI-financed patients regardless of the sector in 
which care is actually provided. 
 
Although there is good research linking VHI with access to health care based on 
factors other than need for health care, what is lacking is evidence of any negative 
impact on health outcomes. Even so, VHI’s role in skewing the distribution of health 
services away from need may be a cause for concern about efficiency in the use of 
resources, as discussed in the next section. 
 
Incentives for efficiency and quality in health care delivery 
The extent to which VHI contributes to efficiency has not been subject to much 
research and is therefore difficult to establish. Economic theory suggests competition 
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between insurers will enhance efficiency if people can choose and switch insurer 
with ease and without incurring significant costs, if competition is based on price and 
quality rather than risk selection, and if insurers have tools to influence health care 
costs and quality (Enthoven 1988). This section therefore considers the extent to 
which these conditions hold in VHI markets. If consumer mobility is limited and 
competition is based on risk selection, insurers are unlikely to bear much financial 
risk and will therefore lack incentives to enhance efficiency. The section also 
considers different ways in which the failure to align incentives across VHI and 
statutory health insurance can undermine the efficiency of public spending on health. 
 
In the absence of risk equalisation schemes, voluntary insurers in most countries 
have incentives and ample opportunity to select risks*. They can generally reject 
applications for cover, charge high-risk individuals higher premiums, exclude cover 
of pre-existing conditions and refuse to renew contracts. As a result of these 
freedoms for insurers, older people and people with pre-existing conditions are 
particularly likely to face barriers to switching. Thus, while research on financial and 
other barriers to switching in VHI markets is more or less non-existent, it is plausible 
to conclude that switching incurs significant transaction costs for some groups of 
people. In Germany until recently it was not possible for ageing reserves to be 
transferred from one insurer to another and as a result there was almost no consumer 
mobility in the substitutive VHI market; competition focused on new entrants (those 
leaving the GKV to take up VHI) (Thomson and Mossialos 2006). 
 
Consumer mobility may also be limited if VHI products are highly differentiated, 
which lowers transparency and increases transaction costs (Office of Fair Trading 
1997). During the 1990s there were concerns in several countries about the lack of 
transparency in VHI markets and the potential for consumer detriment 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen 2001; Mossialos and Thomson 
2004; OECD 2004b; Office of Fair Trading 1998). Product differentiation now 
characterises most VHI markets (the exceptions are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, 
Malta and Slovenia)*. In some countries central agencies, consumer associations or 
independent websites and other media have established centralised sources of 
comparative information to help people choose VHI cover (the Netherlands, Italy, 
Ireland, Finland and France)*. These may make price comparison easier. 
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Due to their ability to select risks and limited consumer mobility for some groups of 
people, it is reasonable to conclude that many voluntary insurers lack incentives to 
enhance efficiency. As a result, it is not surprising that so few insurers seem to 
engage in efforts to generate efficiency gains through, for example, better 
purchasing. Voluntary insurers usually have access to a much wider set of purchasing 
tools than their statutory counterparts (for example, freedom to negotiate provider 
fees on a case by case basis, to contract providers selectively or to integrate vertically 
with providers), but they rarely use them (Table 5); nor do they tend to make use of 
purchasing tools more frequently used in statutory health insurance, such as health 
technology assessment (HTA) to inform clinical guidelines and coverage decisions. 
There are one or two exceptions, notably in the UK, where a voluntary insurer was 
among the first to experiment with patient-reported outcome measures to identify 
poor-quality care (Maynard 2008). 
 
Voluntary insurers in the European Union frequently favour passive reimbursement 
of providers, offering them retrospective fee-for-service payment in more or less 
every case; and the fees they pay providers are either the same as or (much more 
commonly) higher than the fees paid in statutory health insurance (Table 5). The 
question is whether higher provider fees result in commensurately better quality of 
care or better health outcomes. If they do not, they would represent an efficiency 
loss. In Germany there is no evidence to suggest that the significantly higher fees 
paid for VHI-financed treatment (sometimes two to three times higher) result in 
better clinical quality. Private insurers argue that these additional funds indirectly 
subsidise the costs of outpatient care for GKV members (Niehaus and Weber 2005), 
but there is no evidence to support such a hypothesis and research showing 
substantially longer waiting times for GKV members seems to refute it. 
 
Overall, it is difficult to find evidence to support the idea that voluntary insurers are 
actively engaged in trying to enhance efficiency and quality in health care delivery, 
particularly in the largest markets. Of more concern for public policy, however, is the 
way in which failing to align incentives across VHI and statutory health insurance 
can undermine the efficiency of public spending on health. The following paragraphs 
highlight three areas in which incentives are often not aligned: value-based benefit 
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design, direct and indirect tax subsidies for VHI, and conditional sale of VHI and 
statutory health insurance. 
 
Research shows that user charges are a blunt policy tool, reducing the use of 
appropriate and inappropriate care in almost equal measure (Chernew and Newhouse 
2008; Lohr et al 1986). Recognising this, statutory cost sharing policy in many 
countries has often exempted or offered reduced charges to children, poorer 
households and people with chronic conditions (Thomson et al 2009b). Some 
countries have also tried to apply user charges selectively, with the aim of steering 
patients towards health care that is ‘high value’ (cost-effective) and away from 
treatment or patterns of use that are ‘low value’ (Fendrick and Chernew 2006). 
Several countries adopt this so-called value-based approach for pharmaceuticals to 
discourage people from using less effective drugs, including France (Chevreul et al 
2010). Some countries have also applied the approach to other areas to encourage 
people to obtain referrals to specialists and adhere to care protocols (Thomson et al 
2010a). 
 
Complementary VHI undermines the value-based approach where it covers all or 
almost all cost sharing, as in France and Slovenia. In France it also conflicts with the 
more fundamental aim of statutory user charges, which is to moderate demand for 
health care (Buchmueller et al 2003). In response to this latter issue, the French 
government introduced (in 2008) small minimum deductibles that all except children, 
very low-income patients (including those eligible for CMU-C) and pregnant women 
must pay at the point of use (€0.50 per prescription and €1 per doctor visit) 
(Chevreul et al 2010). The government has tried to encourage VHI not to cover these 
flat-rate charges by exempting insurers who agree not to cover them from paying 
insurance premium tax, but the exemption has been found to contravene EU 
competition rules (European Commission 2011b). Recent research suggests that the 
deductibles create financial barriers to access for low-income people and people with 
poor health, even though they are small and subject to an annual out-of-pocket cap, 
and in spite of exemptions (Kambia-Chopin and Perronnin 2010). In Slovenia the 
government has also expressed concern about VHI undermining efforts to enhance 
efficiency in statutory health insurance (Ministry of Health 2011). 
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In some countries VHI allows people to bypass gatekeeping and access specialists 
without referral. Research shows that while the privately insured in Germany visit 
GPs at a much lower rate than GKV members (55% vs 81%), as befits their healthier 
risk profile (Table 8), they visit specialists at almost the same rate (45% vs 47%) 
(Mielck and Helmert 2006). This may indicate a degree of inappropriate use of 
specialists among those with VHI, a phenomenon also observed in Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom (Jones et al 2006; Rodríguez and Stoyanova 
2004). In Austria it is reported that VHI-financed patients sometimes receive too 
much care, being subject to multiple laboratory tests or being kept in hospital for 
longer than is medically necessary (Url 2006). 
 
Table 8 Comparison of health status and health care use among the publicly and 
privately insured in Germany, 2006 
Health status and 
health care use 
Mandatory GKV 
(those with 
earnings under 
the threshold) 
Voluntary GKV 
(those with 
earnings above 
the threshold) 
Mandatory PHI 
(those who have 
opted for VHI and 
are aged >55)24 
Voluntary 
PHI (those 
opting for 
VHI and 
aged <55) 
Been ill during the 
last three months 
46% 42% 47% 28% 
Chronically ill 47% 33% 45% 23% 
Regularly take 
medication 
50% 35% 54% 21% 
Number of visits to 
a doctor in a year 
6.6 4.4 6.2 3.2 
Source: Leinert (2006b) 
 
In any VHI market there is a real risk that direct tax subsidies for VHI will not be 
self financing. Where this is the case, the government needs to consider whether the 
use of public resources to subsidise VHI represents good value. Research has 
estimated that in order for tax relief for supplementary VHI in the United Kingdom 
in the 1990s to have been self financing, the market would have had to have grown 
by 28% (Emmerson et al 2001). When the relief was abolished in 1997 it saved the 
government £135 million per year; although it also reduced demand for VHI, it is 
unlikely that the costs to the National Health Service in that year of providing health 
care to the 6,600 individuals who gave up VHI would have been equal to £135 
million, particularly as UK VHI policies only cover acute care (Emmerson et al 
2001; Foubister 2009). 
                                                 
24
 Those who are not permitted to return to the GKV. 
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Indirect subsidies to VHI may also lower value in public spending on health. The 
only recent attempt to quantify the magnitude of both direct and indirect tax 
subsidies for VHI comes from Ireland. The Irish government has in the past argued 
that VHI helps to ensure ‘the effectiveness and profitability of the public health 
insurance scheme by reducing pressure on the costs which it would otherwise bear, 
particularly as regards care provided in public hospitals’ (European Court of Justice 
2008: paragraph 204). However, research suggests that the public budget provides a 
substantial indirect subsidy to VHI in addition to the direct subsidy it contributes 
through tax relief for VHI (20% of the premium) (Turner and Smith 2012 
forthcoming). About half of all VHI-financed care is delivered in public hospitals, 
but public hospital charges for VHI-financed care do not cover the full economic cost 
of that care; therefore, the total public subsidy to VHI-financed treatment in public 
hospitals is estimated to amount to over 60% of the cost of care (Smith 2008 cited in 
Turner and Smith 2009 forthcoming). This estimate does not account for: the fact 
that VHI-financed patients in private facilities are treated by public doctors who have 
been trained at public expense; the longer waiting times for inpatient care publicly 
financed patients face due to provider incentives to prioritise VHI-financed patients; 
or the government having to purchase private care in Ireland and abroad on behalf of 
publicly financed patients waiting for extended periods of time (through the National 
Treatment Purchase Fund set up in 2002), which is more expensive than treating 
patients in public hospitals (McDaid and Wiley 2009; Smith 2010). Consequently, 
while tax relief for VHI cost the Irish government €321 million in 2008 (roughly 
equivalent to 2.5% of public spending on health, 8.7% of private spending on health 
and 25.4% of VHI spending on health) (Revenue Commissioners 2009; WHO 
2011b), the full public cost of direct and indirect subsidies for VHI is much higher. 
 
In Ireland financial flows from the government to VHI and, by extension, to a 
wealthier part of the population are visible due to the fact that the market is relatively 
large (covering half of the population). But the elements of public policy design that 
allow incentives to be skewed in this way are present in other countries, among them 
providers being paid significantly more to treat VHI-financed patients, public doctors 
being able to treat VHI-financed patients in public hospitals, VHI subscribers being 
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able to choose to be treated in public hospitals, and public hospitals failing to charge 
private insurers the full economic cost of treating these patients. 
 
Finally, allowing the same insurers to sell statutory and voluntary cover in countries 
where people have choice of statutory insurer (possible in Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia) may limit consumer mobility in 
statutory health insurance. Voluntary insurers may (threaten to) cancel voluntary 
cover or charge higher premiums for it when an individual wants to switch to another 
insurer for statutory cover (Paolucci et al 2007). This is unlikely to be problematic in 
the Czech Republic or Slovakia because the VHI market in those countries is 
marginal. It is much more likely to be an issue in Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands, where VHI plays a larger role. There is some evidence to suggest so-
called conditional sale occurs in the Netherlands (even though it is prohibited in 
law); research also indicates that a small but growing number of Dutch people, 
particularly those with lower health status, are deterred from switching to an 
alternative insurer for statutory cover because they fear losing their voluntary cover 
(Roos and Schut 2011). This may have the effect of lowering statutory insurers’ 
incentives to enhance efficiency, undermining a key aim of insurer competition. 
 
Administrative costs 
It is difficult to compare the administrative costs of statutory and voluntary coverage 
due to the absence of reliable data. Where these data are available, they suggest that 
statutory coverage incurs much lower administrative costs, of around 5% to 10% of 
revenue (OECD 2010), in comparison to VHI (Figure 6). Higher administrative costs 
among voluntary insurers may be attributed to the duplication of tasks necessitated 
by fragmented pooling and the extensive bureaucracy required to assess risk, rate 
premiums, design products and review claims. The VHI administration in Slovenia 
employs around 400 people, for example, whereas the statutory scheme employs 
around 800 people, and yet VHI accounts for only 13% of total spending on health, 
whereas the statutory scheme accounts for about 70% (Rupel 2011). Voluntary 
insurers also incur additional expenses through advertising, distribution, reinsurance 
and the need to generate a profit or surplus. Following liberalisation of the VHI 
market in Ireland, the administrative costs of the dominant insurer rose from 2% of 
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premium income in 1996 (Light 1998) to 8.5% in 2007 (Turner 2008). In EU 
countries these additional costs cannot be justified on the grounds that voluntary 
insurers are more innovative than their public counterparts in devising mechanisms 
to improve quality and efficiency. Most attempts by insurers to contain costs operate 
on the demand side, through cost sharing, rather than through improved purchasing*. 
The very high administrative costs incurred by voluntary insurers have been 
controversial in Poland (Kozierkiewicz 2009), and the cost of administering means-
tested vouchers for VHI has been a concern in France (Perronnin et al 2011). 
 
Figure 6 VHI administrative costs as a percentage of premium income, selected 
EU countries, 2008 
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Source: Survey responses 
Notes: Denmark: data for commercial insurers; the figure for non-profit insurers is much lower, at 
4.6%; Germany: some of these costs include provisions for ageing reserves; Ireland: data for 2006; 
Luxembourg: data for commercial insurers; Netherlands: data for 2007; Poland: data for 2007; Spain: 
administrative costs range from 20-30%; UK: average of BUPA’s and AXA PPP’s administrative 
costs as a proportion of their respective premium incomes (2003). 
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Discussion 
 
How have markets for VHI developed since 2000? 
VHI market growth has been mixed. No ‘new’ markets have emerged since 2000, but 
some old ones have disappeared and others have grown. Following the demise of 
substitutive VHI in the Netherlands (in 2006) and Belgium (in 2008), Germany now 
has the only significant substitutive market. Complementary VHI covering user 
charges has grown in France due to the introduction of government vouchers and 
other subsidies targeted at low-income households, but had already reached 
saturation point in Slovenia by the mid 1990s. Although Hungary’s market for 
complementary VHI covering excluded services has grown as a result of generous 
(but highly regressive) tax subsidies, it remains marginal. Some supplementary 
markets have experienced rapid growth, mainly due to favourable tax incentives 
(Denmark, Ireland), an increase in the purchase of VHI as an employee benefit 
(Belgium, Denmark, Sweden) or lack of confidence in the public system due to 
waiting times for elective surgery (Denmark, Ireland, Sweden). 
 
Commercial insurers now have a larger share of the VHI market than in 2000 and 
often play a dominant role in supplementary markets. Non-profit insurers continue to 
enjoy a dominant market position in a handful of countries, particularly those in 
which complementary VHI plays a significant role. In some countries risk selection 
by commercial insurers has triggered greater regulation (Slovenia), while 
competition between commercial and non-profit insurers has led to legal challenges 
at national and EU levels (Belgium, Ireland, France and Slovenia). VHI markets are 
highly concentrated in many countries and some markets have become more 
concentrated in the last ten years. The effect of market concentration on competition 
is not clear. Buyer characteristics have not changed much since 2000. People with 
higher socio-economic status are still generally more likely to have VHI than people 
with lower socio-economic status. The role of groups in purchasing VHI has grown 
in some countries and declined in others but is still significant overall. 
 
VHI continues to be a generally profitable business in which insurers bear minimal 
financial risk. The price of VHI to consumers is lowered by tax subsidies in many 
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countries and insurers in all except some of the largest markets are free to reject 
applications for cover, charge premiums based on age and health status, charge 
additional premiums for covering dependants, exclude cover of pre-existing 
conditions, terminate policies, differentiate products, set limits to the benefits they 
provide and impose both waiting periods before benefits can be claimed and cost 
sharing. As a result, insurers in most VHI markets have limited incentives to enhance 
efficiency in organisation, administration or health care delivery. Many simply 
reimburse policy holders, often paying providers fees that are higher than the fees 
paid in statutory health insurance, and few make use of the purchasing tools at their 
disposal. 
 
How has public policy towards VHI changed since 2000? 
Measured along a single dimension (the use of tax incentives to encourage take up of 
VHI), there was a public policy trend away from supporting VHI in the 1990s. Since 
then this trend has been reversed, with 19 out of 27 countries offering some form of 
tax incentive for VHI. However, looking at a wider range of factors influencing 
demand for VHI reveals a more complex picture. 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s many of its former 
satellites embraced market mechanisms in the health sector and all introduced 
legislation to allow VHI (Kornai and Eggleston 2001; Kutzin et al 2010; Thomson 
2010). In spite of VHI’s lacklustre performance in these countries (Slovenia 
excepted), public debate has continued to focus on encouraging the development of 
VHI and, in some cases, on involving voluntary insurers in the provision of statutory 
health insurance*. This stands in contrast to the expansion of statutory coverage in 
other (mainly western European) countries. Increases in the breadth of statutory 
coverage have diminished the role of substitutive VHI in Belgium and the 
Netherlands and, to a much lesser degree, in Germany, while proposed increases in 
the scope and depth of statutory coverage are intended to diminish VHI’s role in 
Ireland and Slovenia. 
 
What seems, at first glance, to be an east-west divide in public policy towards VHI 
may actually be a division between smaller and larger VHI markets. With the 
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exception of Belgium, expansions in statutory coverage have taken place in countries 
with the largest markets for VHI (in terms of contribution to total spending on 
health) and government intervention has intensified in these markets since 2000. 
Policy developments in Belgium were heavily influenced by EU infringement 
proceedings (Palm 2009; Van de Voorde 2011). In the other countries, however, 
policy developments arose in response to the acknowledged limitations of VHI and 
concerns about its negative impact on health system performance. It is plausible to 
speculate that as these already large VHI markets grew in size, the problems 
associated with them became more visible, putting pressure on the government to 
take action. Growing fiscal constraints may have added to this pressure, allowing 
policy makers to weigh the costs of further intervention in the VHI market against 
the benefits of expanding statutory coverage. 
 
Since 2000 EU law-related tensions have increased, affecting VHI markets in 
Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovenia. Legal action has usually 
been prompted by insurer rivalry (often rivalry between commercial and non-profit 
insurers). The EU-level framework for VHI restricts material regulation to 
substitutive markets. However, analysis suggests that on one hand the framework 
fundamentally underestimates the contribution VHI makes to financial protection in 
non-substitutive markets, resulting in inappropriate legal action, but that on the other 
hand, this may not be such an issue since the European Court of Justice seems 
reluctant to challenge national sovereignty with respect to general good measures for 
services declared to be of general economic interest (Thomson and Mossialos 2010). 
 
Analysis also suggests that the European Commission’s original premise about the 
effectiveness of deregulation in the VHI sector was misguided. There is no evidence 
of VHI market deregulation and competitive pressures resulting in lower prices for 
consumers*. Rather, the price of VHI has continued to rise and in some cases higher 
premiums have been accompanied by a decline in the quality of VHI coverage; in 
other words, VHI seems to have become worse not better value for money. At the 
same time it is important to note that greater accessibility to VHI has almost 
exclusively arisen through government intervention and not as a result of market 
forces. Thus, while relying on financial regulation may suffice for supplementary 
VHI, it is not appropriate for substitutive VHI and complementary VHI covering user 
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charges. In future public policy should focus more on transparency and consumer 
protection issues and, in non-supplementary VHI markets, on the quality of VHI 
coverage. 
 
How does VHI affect health system performance? 
VHI appears to be critical to financial protection in France, Slovenia and Germany. It 
is difficult to estimate the extent to which VHI in these three countries provides 
adequate financial protection, but there is some evidence to show that the quality of 
VHI coverage (the generosity of benefits) has declined in France and Germany in the 
last five years. Policy makers in all three countries have been sufficiently concerned 
about financial protection to introduce extensive regulation of VHI (Germany) and 
significant means-tested tax subsidies (France), or to propose major reform of 
statutory user charges (Slovenia). In other countries VHI has not developed to fill 
significant gaps in statutory coverage or is too expensive for many of those who are 
likely to need it (since levels of population coverage are low) and is therefore unable 
to address financial protection problems. 
 
VHI is likely to be regressive in substitutive markets and where it covers a 
substantial proportion of the population. Research confirms it is regressive in France 
and Ireland. VHI markets of all types are found to skew the distribution of health 
care away from need, largely as a result of rules allowing those with VHI to bypass 
waiting lists for publicly provided care and the incentives facing providers, which 
encourage them to prioritise VHI-financed patients. Clear differences in patterns and 
frequency of use and waiting times between those with and without VHI are not 
justified by greater need among those with VHI, and are therefore a cause for 
concern about efficiency in the use of health resources. 
 
As already noted, EU markets for VHI do not seem likely to have a positive effect on 
efficiency in the health system due to the absence of appropriate incentives for 
insurers. Of more concern for public policy is the way in which failing to align 
incentives across VHI and statutory health insurance can undermine the efficiency of 
public spending on health – for example, by undermining value-based benefit design, 
  119 
through direct and indirect tax subsidies for VHI, and through conditional sale of 
VHI and statutory health insurance.  
 
Growing government regulation to promote access to VHI in the largest markets has 
not allayed concerns about financial protection for those without VHI or declining 
financial protection for those with VHI. Affordability is a persistent problem even 
where VHI is heavily regulated or subsidised. Concerns about the impact of VHI on 
equity in the use of health care, and the potential for VHI to undermine efficiency in 
public spending on health, have also grown in the largest markets. What is striking, 
however, is just how many of VHI’s negative effects on health system performance 
can be attributed to the quality of public policy towards VHI. Poor policy design 
enables and exacerbates risk segmentation, permits public resource allocation to be 
skewed in favour of those with VHI, and fails to ensure that incentives are aligned 
across VHI and statutory health insurance. Policy makers must accept some of the 
responsibility for failing to create an environment in which insurers have incentives 
to enhance efficiency and for allowing public resources to subsidise VHI (directly or 
indirectly) when such subsidies are of questionable value. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Measured in terms of contribution to total spending on health, VHI’s role in EU 
health systems has grown in many countries in the last ten years (sometimes from a 
very low base), but there has been no clear trend and some significant markets have 
disappeared as governments have expanded statutory coverage. In the next few years 
other markets may decline in significance if proposed reforms in Ireland and 
Slovenia are implemented. Over time VHI markets have become more commercial 
and more concentrated and voluntary cover continues to favour wealthier and better 
educated households. 
 
VHI has a mixed impact on health system performance. Although it provides critical 
financial protection in a handful of countries, its protective quality has declined over 
time, and in many other countries it has completely failed to address significant gaps 
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in statutory coverage. Some of VHI’s negative effects on other dimensions of 
performance – for example, its propensity to make health financing more regressive 
and to skew the distribution of health care away from need, its potential to undermine 
efficiency in public spending on health and its high administrative costs – are 
particularly visible in the larger markets. Growth in these markets has been 
accompanied by increasing government intervention to alleviate fiscal pressures 
caused by risk segmentation, to secure access to VHI, and to redress VHI’s effect on 
efficiency in public spending on health. 
 
Many of the problems associated with VHI are caused or exacerbated by poor policy 
design. This may stem from limited understanding of or lack of attention to the 
interaction between statutory and voluntary health insurance and often results in a 
failure to establish appropriate institutional arrangements. Better understanding of 
how VHI interacts with and affects the rest of the health system will enable policy 
makers to identify the appropriate role for VHI and should contribute to stronger 
policy design. Stronger policy design can also be achieved if policy makers have 
clarity about health policy goals and are able to align incentives in pursuit of these 
goals. 
 
Finally, policy makers must demonstrate the political and technical capacity to 
regulate VHI to secure both financial and consumer protection. A good starting point 
would be to ensure that the regulator has a grasp of the specificities of health 
insurance markets or, if necessary, to establish a dedicated health insurance 
regulator. This also applies to those responsible for determining the EU-level 
regulatory framework. The current framework reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of markets for VHI. It is therefore no surprise that the 
European Commission’s expectations for deregulation – competitive pressure 
enhancing choice and lowering prices – have not been fulfilled. Oversight should 
also include systematic monitoring and evaluation of the VHI market and its 
interactions with and impact on the health system. Regular data collection and 
analysis of VHI are the exception rather than the norm and there are only a handful 
of countries in which there is a good evidence base for policy development. 
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Study 2: Private health insurance and the 
internal market 
 
 
 
Paper provenance and peer review 
 
 
This paper is primarily the work of the PhD author. In 2007 it was published as: 
 
Thomson, S. and E. Mossialos (2007). Regulating private health insurance in the European 
Union: the implications of single market legislation and competition policy. Journal of 
European Integration 29(1): 89-107. 
 
Prior to publication in the journal it was subject to double-blind peer review by two 
referees. An extended and updated version of the journal article was subsequently 
included in an edited book published by Cambridge University Press in 2010: 
 
Thomson, S. and E. Mossialos (2010). Private health insurance and the internal market. 
Health systems governance in Europe: the role of EU law and policy. E. Mossialos, G. 
Permanand, R. Baeten and T. Hervey. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 419-460. 
 
It is the book chapter that is presented in the thesis. The book chapter was reviewed 
by two of the book’s editors (Rita Baeten, Senior Policy Analyst at the OSE, 
European Social Observatory, Brussels and Tamara K. Hervey, Professor of Law at 
the University of Sheffield) and an expert in EU law (Willy Palm, formerly the 
Managing Director of AIM, the International Association of Mutual benefit 
societies). It also benefited from comments from Wolf Sauter (Professor of 
Healthcare Regulation, Tilburg Law and Economics Center). 
 
ST and EM devised the paper and the book chapter. ST reviewed the literature and 
drafted the paper and the book chapter. EM commented on drafts of the paper and 
the book chapter. 
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Introduction: private health insurance and EU law 
 
In 1992 the legislative institutions of the European Union (EU) adopted regulatory 
measures in the field of health insurance. The mechanism affirming the free 
movement of health insurance services – the Third Non-life Insurance Directive 
(from here on referred to as ‘the Directive’) – does not apply to health insurance that 
forms part of a social security system (European Commission 1992). But all other 
forms of health insurance, which the paper refers to as ‘private health insurance’, fall 
within the Directive’s scope. 
 
This paper examines the implications of the Directive, and some aspects of EU 
competition law, for the regulation of private health insurance in the European 
Union. The EU-level regulatory framework created by the Directive imposes 
restrictions on the way in which governments can intervene in markets for health 
insurance. However, there are areas of uncertainty in interpreting the Directive, 
particularly with regard to when and how governments may intervene to promote 
public interests. As in most spheres of EU legislation, interpretation largely rests on 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law, so clarity may come at a high cost and 
after considerable delay. 
 
The paper also questions the Directive’s capacity to promote financial and consumer 
protection in health insurance markets. In many ways the Directive reflects the health 
system norms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a time when boundaries between 
‘social security’ and ‘normal economic activity’ were still relatively well defined in 
most member states (White 1999). Today these boundaries are increasingly blurred – 
the new health insurance system in the Netherlands is a case in point. As 
governments look to private health insurance to ease pressure on public budgets or to 
expand consumer choice, uncertainty about the scope of the Directive and concerns 
about its restrictions on regulation are likely to grow. 
 
The paper’s analysis is based on discussion of private health insurance-related ECJ 
rulings and cases of infringement of the Directive or other EU rules. Where actual 
examples are lacking, the analysis is, inevitably, more speculative. The following 
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sections summarise the main changes brought about by the Directive and its initial 
impact on regulation of private health insurance in EU member states; examine 
uncertainty as to when and how governments can intervene in health insurance 
markets; and conclude with a summary of key points and policy implications. 
 
 
Regulation and the Third Non-life Insurance Directive 
 
Health insurance attempts to alleviate some of the uncertainty around ill health. We 
do not usually know if or when we might fall ill; nor do we always know how severe 
an illness will be or how much it will cost to treat it. By pooling health risks (across 
groups of people) and resources (over time), health insurance provides protection 
from the financial risk associated with ill health, making a valuable contribution to 
social welfare. However, markets for health insurance require regulation to protect 
consumers and insurers from the potentially negative effects of market failures such 
as adverse selection and risk selection (Barr 1998). Without government intervention 
to correct market failures, health insurance would not be easily accessible to people 
at high risk of ill health, people already in ill health and people with low incomes. 
Governments in most high-income countries therefore ensure that health insurance is 
compulsory for the whole population, that contributions are based on income, and 
that publicly financed ‘insurers’ (whether sickness funds, private insurers or a 
national health service) cannot deny cover to any individual. 
 
In contrast to the rules applied to statutory health insurance, the principles of which 
are broadly convergent across the European Union, there is considerable variation in 
the regulation of private health insurance. Prior to the introduction of the Third Non-
life Insurance Directive in 1992, the extent to which EU governments intervened in 
markets for health insurance was largely determined by the role private cover played 
in the health system. Thus, substitutive private health insurance in Germany and the 
Netherlands tended to be relatively heavily regulated, mainly to ensure access to 
private cover for older people and people in poor health, but also to protect the 
finances of the statutory health insurance scheme, which in both cases covered a 
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disproportionate amount of higher-risk households (Thomson and Mossialos 2006).25 
The extent of regulation was also influenced by aspects of market structure, such as 
the number and mix of insurers in operation (particularly markets dominated by 
mutual associations) and political ideology. 
 
Two broad approaches to regulation prevailed: minimal financial or prudential 
regulation focusing on solvency levels, or material regulation emphasising control of 
prices and products. While both approaches aimed to protect consumers from insurer 
insolvency,26 material regulation also endeavoured to ensure access to health care 
through access to health insurance. Under the subsidiarity principle, established in 
EU law through the European Community Treaty (Article 5 EC), governments were 
free to decide on the appropriate form of regulation required in a given context. Over 
the last thirty years, the EU legislature has restricted this freedom by introducing a 
series of directives aimed at creating an internal market in insurance services 
(European Commission 1973; European Commission 1988; European Commission 
1992). Grounded in the principle of the free movement of services (enshrined in 
Articles 43 49 and 50 EC), the internal market in insurance services was intended to 
enhance competition and consumer choice. EU competence in this area comes from 
the fact that insurance is considered to be an economic activity. 
 
The Third Non-life Insurance Directive created, for the first time, an EU-level 
framework for regulating health insurance. The first and second generation of 
insurance directives had been limited to the cover of ‘large risks’ of a commercial 
nature, such as aviation or marine insurance and reinsurance (which were considered 
small enough, in relation to the size or status of their policy holders, not to require 
special protection) (Mabbett 2000; Merkin and Rodger 1997). ‘Mass risks’ involving 
individuals and small businesses were excluded on the grounds that they required 
special protection because their policy holders would not normally have the ability to 
judge all the complexities of the obligation they undertook in an insurance contract 
                                                 
25
 This is partly due to the way in which these systems are (were, in the Dutch case) designed and 
regulated. For example, in Germany, the statutory health insurance scheme is attractive to families 
because it covers dependants for free, whereas private insurers charge separate premiums for all 
family members. It is also due to risk selection by private insurers. 
26
 Financial or prudential regulation focuses on ex post scrutiny of an insurer’s financial returns on 
business. Material or contract regulation involves ex ante scrutiny of an insurer’s policy conditions 
and premium rates on the grounds that this eliminates the potential for insolvency. 
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(Nemeth 2001). The third generation of insurance directives extended the application 
of internal market legislation to all types of risks, including mass risks such as health 
insurance. 
 
As a result of the Directive, insurers have full freedom to provide services 
throughout the European Union, with or without a branch presence. The mechanisms 
facilitating free movement are ‘home country control’ (Article 9), a single system for 
the authorisation and financial supervision of an insurance undertaking by the 
member state in which the undertaking has its head office; the mutual recognition of 
systems of authorisation and financial supervision; and the harmonisation of 
minimum solvency standards (Article 17). ECJ case law confirms that insurance 
activities fall under the scope of the Directive (Article 2) when they are carried out 
by insurance undertakings at their own risk with a view to making a profit (European 
Court of Justice 2000). ECJ case law more broadly (not relating to the Directive) also 
suggests that activities with an exclusively social purpose involving solidarity are 
beyond the scope of internal market and competition rules (European Court of 
Justice 1993; European Court of Justice 2004). 
 
To protect the freedoms outlined above and to prevent barriers to competition, the 
Directive brought about two key changes for private health insurance. First, the 
Directive accords primacy to the financial approach to regulation: the requirement 
for governments to abolish existing product and price controls (Articles 6(3), 29 and 
39) renders material regulation redundant and, in some cases, illegal. Second, it 
requires governments to open markets for private health insurance to competition at 
national and EU levels (Article 3). 
 
Material regulation in the form of national rules requiring the prior approval or 
systematic notification of policy conditions, premium rates, proposed increases in 
premium rates and printed documents insurers use in their dealings with policy 
holders is no longer permitted (Articles 6(3), 29 and 39). Such rules played an 
important regulatory function in several countries – notably, France, Germany and 
Italy. However, most member states amended existing laws or passed new laws to 
comply with the Directive. Legislative changes generally involved the introduction 
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of tighter solvency controls. Some also resulted in the loosening or outright abolition 
of prior approval and systematic notification. 
 
Although the Directive prevents governments from introducing regulatory measures 
that go beyond solvency requirements, member states do retain limited residual 
powers to protect policy holders. For example, if the home supervisory authority fails 
to prevent an insurer from infringing the host country’s domestic law, the host 
supervisory authority may take action (Article 40(5)). More importantly, the host 
supervisory authority may impose specific measures, in the form of restrictions on 
insurance contracts, in the interest of the ‘general good’, where contracts covering 
health risks ‘may serve as a partial or complete alternative to health cover provided 
by the statutory social security system’ (Article 54(1)). Where this is the case, the 
government can require private insurers to ‘comply with the specific legal provisions 
adopted by that member state to protect the general good in that class of insurance’ 
(Article 54(1)). 
 
Article 54(2) and recitals to the Directive list the types of legal provisions that may 
be introduced if private cover provides a partial or complete alternative to statutory 
cover: open enrolment, community rating, lifetime cover, policies standardised in 
line with the cover provided by the statutory health insurance scheme at a premium 
rate at or below a prescribed maximum, participation in risk equalisation schemes 
(referred to as ‘loss compensation schemes’) and the operation of private health 
insurance on a technical basis similar to life insurance. Measures taken to protect the 
general good must be shown to be necessary and proportional to this aim, not unduly 
restrict the right of establishment or the freedom to provide services, and apply in an 
identical manner to all insurers operating within a member state. 
 
The German government has used Article 54(1) to justify intervention in its 
substitutive market, where risk selection by private insurers has prevented some 
older people and people with chronic illnesses from buying an adequate and 
affordable level of private cover (Rupprecht et al 2000; Wasem 1995). Regulatory 
measures include the provision of lifetime cover, the introduction of policies with 
mandatory pooling, standardised minimum benefits and guaranteed prices. Similar 
regulatory measures were also present in the Dutch substitutive market prior to 2006. 
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Private insurers in the German substitutive market are subject to further regulation 
concerning the way in which they fund cover (on a similar basis to life insurance) 
and the provision of information to potential and existing policy holders. 
 
In contrast, regulation of many markets for complementary and supplementary cover 
has tended to focus on ex post scrutiny of financial returns on business to ensure that 
insurers remain solvent. Insurers are often permitted to reject applications for cover, 
exclude cover of, or charge higher premiums for, individuals with pre-existing 
conditions, rate premiums according to risk, provide non-standardised benefit 
packages and offer annual contracts, while benefits are usually provided in cash 
rather than in kind. However, there are some notable exceptions – many of them 
recent – particularly where complementary private health insurance is concerned. 
Relatively heavy government intervention in markets for complementary or 
supplementary cover can be found in Belgium, France, Ireland and Slovenia. It is no 
coincidence that these are also the countries in which regulation of private health 
insurance has been most problematic from an EU law perspective (see below). 
 
At first sight, the Directive appears to give governments significant scope for 
regulating private health insurance under the general good principle, which broadly 
refers to any legislation aimed at protecting consumers (in any sector, not just the 
insurance sector). But on closer examination interpretation of the principle is shown 
to be problematic in two areas: first, the issue of what is meant by complete or partial 
alternative to statutory health insurance; and second, what types of intervention are 
necessary and proportional. These problems arise because there is no agreed 
definition of the general good; interpretation relies on ECJ case law. Following 
complaints about the absence of a definition, the European Commission (from here 
on referred to as ‘the Commission’) tried to clarify when and how the general good 
might be invoked in the insurance sector, but its Interpretive Communication failed 
to provide new information (European Commission 2002). Calls for further 
clarification persist on the grounds that the lack of a definition creates legal 
uncertainty, while the process of testing questionable use of the general good through 
the courts is prohibitively lengthy and expensive (Mossialos and Thomson 2004). 
The paper discusses interpretation of the general good in relation to when and how 
governments can intervene in markets for private health insurance. 
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When can governments intervene? 
 
There is uncertainty about when the general good can be invoked to justify material 
regulation, mainly because the Directive does not define what it means by partial or 
complete alternative to statutory health insurance. How is it possible to distinguish 
between private cover that falls into this category and private cover that does not? 
Circumstantial factors suggest that the distinction may hinge on whether or not 
private health insurance plays a substitutive role. For example, Article 54 was 
inserted during negotiations prior to the drafting of the Directive at the instigation of 
the German, Dutch and Irish Governments (Association Internationale de la 
Mutualité 1999). Perhaps as a result of lobbying by member states with substitutive 
markets, the regulatory measures outlined in Article 54(2) are an exact match of 
those that were in place in Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands when the Directive 
was being negotiated. To date, the regulations applied to private insurers in these 
three countries have not been challenged by the Commission.27 In addition, a 
summary of the Directive available on the Commission’s web site refers to the 
Directive having ‘specific rules for health cover serving as a substitute for that 
provided by statutory social security systems’ (European Commission 2011c). 
 
Recent policy developments in the Netherlands shed further light on how this 
distinction might be made. Dissatisfaction with the dual system of statutory cover for 
lower earners and voluntary private cover for higher earners had led successive 
Dutch governments to consider the introduction of a single, universal system of 
health insurance. Some governments favoured a public system, others preferred 
private options, in spite of concerns about the applicability of internal market rules to 
a private system (Maarse 2002). In 2006, a universal and compulsory privately-
operated system governed under private law came into force. Regulatory measures 
under the new system include open enrolment, lifetime cover, government-set 
income-based contributions deducted at source, additional community-rated 
premiums set by each insurer, a package of minimum benefits in kind or cash defined 
by the government and a risk equalisation scheme (Hamilton 2003; Ministry of 
Health Welfare and Sport 2005). 
                                                 
27
 Although some aspects of the regulatory environment in Ireland have recently been questioned by 
the Commission (see below). 
  129 
 
Prior to the introduction of the new system, the Dutch Government asked the 
Commission to clarify whether or not Article 54 could be relied on to justify such 
extensive regulation (Hoogervorst 2003). The Commission’s response came in the 
form of a letter to the Dutch Minister of Health from the (then) Commissioner for the 
Internal Market, Frits Bolkestein (Bolkestein 2003). In the letter (the legal status of 
which is not clear), Bolkestein states that the privately-operated system falls within 
the scope of the Directive, even though it is compulsory, because the insurers 
involved are carrying out ‘an insurance activity’. However, he notes that the 
regulatory measures can be justified under Article 54 for two reasons: first, the 
system, though private, can be construed as constituting a ‘complete alternative’ to 
statutory health insurance; and second, the regulations (with some caveats, see 
below) ‘appear necessary to ensure legitimate objectives pursued by the Dutch 
government’ (Bolkestein 2003: 2). The Commission supported this position in 
response to written questions put forward by Members of the European Parliament in 
2005 (McCreevy 2005; McCreevy 2006a; McCreevy 2006b). It also stated that the 
new Dutch system was ‘to be considered as a statutory sickness insurance scheme’ 
(Špidla 2006). 
 
Bolkestein’s letter goes on to point out that it would not be proportionate to apply the 
proposed regulatory measures to ‘any complementary insurance cover offered by 
private insurers which goes beyond the basic social security package of cover laid 
down by the legislation’ (Bolkestein 2003: 3) (emphasis added). The letter therefore 
suggests that ‘partial or complete alternative’ can be understood in terms of the 
benefits provided by a particular insurance scheme. Substitutive private health 
insurance constitutes an alternative to statutory cover because it replaces statutory 
benefits for those who are excluded from some aspects of the statutory system 
(higher earners in the Netherlands and Ireland) or those who are allowed to choose 
statutory or private cover (higher earners in Germany). Whether the substitutive 
cover is a partial or complete alternative depends, presumably, on whether the 
benefits it provides are ‘partial’ (for example, cover of mainly outpatient care in 
Ireland) or ‘complete’ (cover of outpatient and inpatient care in Germany and the 
Netherlands). Conversely, complementary and supplementary cover cannot be 
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construed as alternatives to statutory cover because they offer benefits in addition to 
those offered by the statutory system. 
 
On the basis established in Bolkestein’s letter, material regulation would only be 
permissible where private health insurance covers the same benefits as those 
provided by statutory health insurance. But ‘partial alternative’ could be interpreted 
in other ways. The logic behind allowing governments to intervene in substitutive 
markets implies that purely financial regulation of solvency levels will suffice for the 
purposes of consumer protection but will not be enough to ensure financial 
protection (access to health care). Bolkestein’s letter implicitly assumes that only 
substitutive private health insurance provides financial protection. But what if other 
forms of private health insurance also contribute to financial protection? For 
example, where the statutory benefits package (the ‘basic social security package of 
cover’ mentioned by Bolkestein) is relatively narrow or subject to extensive co-
payments it could be argued that individuals do not have adequate protection from 
the financial risk associated with ill health unless they purchase complementary 
private health insurance covering excluded (and effective) services or statutory user 
charges. In such cases, complementary cover provides a degree of financial 
protection. Material regulation to prevent private insurers from selecting risks might 
therefore be justified. Under the Directive, however, rules to ensure affordable access 
to complementary private cover would be illegal. 
 
The implications of outlawing material regulation of complementary cover depend 
on various factors, not least the extent to which this form of cover does, in practice, 
contribute to financial protection. This issue may become more serious in future if 
markets for complementary cover develop and expand in light of constraints on 
public funding. For example, in recent years, policy makers across the European 
Union have intensified efforts to define statutory benefits packages, often putting in 
place explicit criteria (including cost-effectiveness) to determine whether or not 
certain procedures should be publicly financed (Gibis et al 2004; Schreyögg et al 
2005). Such efforts may implicitly assume that statutory benefits packages can be 
complemented by voluntary take-up of private insurance covering non-cost-effective 
services. In practice, however, efforts to set priorities and measure cost-effectiveness 
tend to be limited by technical, financial and political considerations, making it 
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easier for governments to exclude whole areas of service, such as primary care, 
outpatient drugs or dental care, than single interventions of low cost-effectiveness 
(Ham and Robert 2003). This means that complementary insurance often covers a 
range of cost-effective, essential services. 
 
Similarly, in some countries, governments have introduced or raised statutory user 
charges to supplement public resources, again under the assumption that 
complementary cover will bridge the funding gap. Complementary cover of statutory 
user charges in France has grown from covering 33% of the population in 1960 to 
85% in 2000 (Sandier et al 2004). It now accounts for about 13% of total expenditure 
on health (Figure 2). Complementary cover of statutory user charges introduced in 
Slovenia in 1993 now covers over 90% of the population eligible to pay user charges 
(about 70% of the total population) and accounts for over 11% of total health 
expenditure (Albreht et al 2002; Albreht et al 2009). 
 
However, greater reliance on complementary cover can create or exacerbate 
inequalities in access to health care. In France, the likelihood of having 
complementary cover and the quality (generosity) of that cover have been highly 
dependent on social class and age, employment and income levels (Blanpain and Pan 
Ké Shon 1997; Bocognano et al 2000). Research from France and Spain shows that 
those who do not have complementary cover do not consult doctors and dentists as 
frequently as those with cover (Breuil-Genier 2000; Rajmil et al 2000). In Slovenia, 
there are concerns about the affordability of complementary cover and its effect on 
access to publicly financed health care (Albreht et al 2002; Albreht et al 2009). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that doctors may be reluctant to provide publicly 
financed care to people without private cover in case they are unable to pay the 
necessary user charges (Milenkovic Kramer 2009). There are also concerns for 
market stability, as complementary private health insurance covers a 
disproportionately high number of older people. 
 
Governments in several member states recognise that complementary cover of 
statutory user charges can contribute significantly to financial protection. In 2000, 
the French government introduced free complementary cover for people with low 
incomes (through a scheme known as Couverture Maladie Universelle-
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Complémentaire, CMU-C), raising the proportion of the population covered to over 
92% (Durand-Zaleski 2008). In 2006 it extended favourable fiscal treatment to any 
private insurers offering open enrolment and community-rated premiums (see 
below). Since 2005 the Slovenian government has required private insurers to offer 
open enrolment and community-rated policies accompanied by a risk equalisation 
scheme (Milenkovic Kramer 2006). In 2007 the Belgian government also introduced 
open enrolment and other rules to ensure access to health insurance, particularly for 
people in poor health and disabled people. 
 
The lack of a definitive interpretation of partial or complete alternative creates 
further uncertainty in the case of a particular market for health insurance changing 
from playing a substitutive to a complementary role. In Ireland, for example, private 
health insurance developed at a time when entitlement to publicly financed inpatient 
and outpatient care was restricted to low- and middle-income households. A 
significant proportion of the population could only access health services by paying 
out of pocket or buying private cover, which may partly explain why, when the Irish 
market was liberalised in 1994, private insurers were subject to quite stringent 
regulation involving open enrolment, minimum benefits, community-rated premiums 
and a risk equalisation scheme28 (see below). However, the level of public benefits 
has gradually increased so that low-income households and all those aged seventy 
and over have free access to all types of care, while non-elderly higher-income 
households have access to services that are predominantly publicly financed but 
subject to co-payments (McDaid and Wiley 2009). In 2006 the government further 
increased the number of people eligible for free primary care (Department of Health 
and Children 2006). The regulatory framework originally justified under Article 
54(1) could now be questioned on the grounds of whether or not private health 
insurance in Ireland still constitutes a partial or complete alternative to statutory 
health insurance. In other words, it is debatable whether the Irish market for private 
health insurance continues to play a significant role in providing financial protection. 
 
In the past, the Commission has avoided formally addressing what might or might 
not constitute a partial or complete alternative where the issue has not been 
                                                 
28
 In effect, these were the regulations already in place prior to 1994 (with the exception of the risk 
equalisation scheme, which had not been necessary when Vhi Healthcare was the only insurer). 
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absolutely clear cut. When it approved the Irish risk equalisation scheme, for 
example (see below), it deliberately abstained from commenting on the compatibility 
of the regulatory framework with the Directive. The recent BUPA ruling on the Irish 
regulatory framework did not address the issue either (see below) (European Court of 
Justice 2008). Informally, however, Commission officials have acknowledged that 
there is a need for further clarification. 
 
Beyond its potential impact on social protection, the restriction of material regulation 
of non-substitutive cover may have implications for consumer protection. Examples 
include the possibility of conditional sale and consumer detriment arising from 
product differentiation. Where voluntary cover is offered by the same entities 
responsible for providing statutory cover, insurers can take advantage of the absence 
of open enrolment or lifetime cover requirements for voluntary cover to terminate a 
voluntary contract when an individual moves to a rival insurer for statutory cover. 
This ‘conditional’ sale is a form of risk selection that is particularly likely to deter 
older people or people in poor health from switching from one statutory insurer to 
another, for fear that a new insurer might reject their application for cover or that a 
new voluntary contract might be too expensive (taking into account the person’s 
current age) or might exclude pre-existing conditions (that had developed since the 
signing of the original voluntary contract and were therefore covered by that 
contract). Conditional sale poses a barrier to competition among statutory health 
insurers. If construed as abuse of dominant position, it could breach EU competition 
rules. However, although there is some evidence to suggest that conditional sale 
prevents fair competition in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, 
there is no ECJ case law in this area (Paolucci et al 2007). The issue of product 
differentiation is discussed in the following section. 
 
 
How can governments intervene? 
 
The second area of uncertainty concerns the types of intervention that might be 
considered necessary and proportional. Article 54(2) and recitals to the Directive list 
the legal provisions governments can introduce where private cover provides a 
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partial or complete alternative to statutory cover. But it is not clear if the list should 
be understood as being exhaustive, in which case unlisted interventions would 
contravene the Directive. And, again, there is the problem of interpreting partial or 
complete alternative. This section discusses interventions that have been disputed 
under internal market or competition legislation, or that may be contentious in future. 
 
Financial transfers (risk equalisation schemes) 
Risk equalisation schemes are a direct form of intervention typically involving 
financial transfers from insurers with low risks to insurers with high risks. They are 
an essential component of health insurance markets with open enrolment and 
community rating, where they are introduced to ensure access to health insurance and 
fair competition among insurers (Puig-Junoy 1999; van de Ven and van Vliet 1992). 
Risk equalisation aims to lower insurers’ incentives to compete through risk selection 
and to encourage insurers to compete in terms of cost and quality. As such, it is 
widely applied to public or quasi-public entities involved in the provision of statutory 
health insurance (van de Ven et al 2007). More recently, governments have applied it 
to private health insurers in the Netherlands (2006), Ireland (2006) and Slovenia 
(2005). Internationally, risk equalisation schemes are also applied to private health 
insurers in Australia, Chile and South Africa. Wherever risk equalisation has been 
introduced in the European Union, it has been subject to legal challenge by private 
insurers or infringement proceedings29 initiated by the Commission in response to 
complaints. 
 
The legal challenges in Ireland and the Netherlands have focused on the potential for 
financial transfers made under a risk equalisation scheme to breach competition rules 
on state aid (European Court of Justice 2006; European Court of Justice 2008). There 
has been less emphasis on whether or not they breach internal market rules in the 
                                                 
29
 Infringement proceedings based on the Article 226 EC procedure are triggered by complaints to the 
European Commission. Following an informal process (informal contacts with the member state 
concerned to provide the Commission with more information) and failure to reach a settlement, the 
formal process involves three stages. First, the Commission writes a letter of infringement to the 
member state government asking it to submit its observations on the alleged infringements. Second, if 
the Commission considers that the member state has not satisfactorily responded, it delivers a 
‘reasoned opinion’, setting out the formal reasons why the member state has failed to comply with its 
obligations under the Treaty and asking the government to redress the breach, usually within two 
months. Third, if the member state does not respond satisfactorily, the Commission refers the matter 
to the European Court of Justice. 
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form of the Directive. An unsuccessful domestic legal challenge in Slovenia also 
focused on unfair competition, but did not refer either to EU competition or internal 
market rules (Milenkovic Kramer 2006). However, the Commission’s current 
infringement proceedings against the Slovenian government do focus on breach of 
the Directive. One of the issues at stake seems to be whether or not the risk 
equalisation scheme in Slovenia can be justified by Article 54. The following 
paragraphs briefly outline the legal challenges in the three countries. 
 
The Netherlands 
Bolkestein’s letter to the Dutch Minister of Health raised concerns that the Dutch 
Government’s risk equalisation scheme, part-financed from public funds, might 
contravene EU rules about state aid (Bolkestein 2003). However, in 2005 the 
Commission issued a decision authorising the transfer of public funds as, in its 
opinion, the aid did not unduly distort competition (European Commission 2005c; 
McCreevy 2005). Despite further assurances from the European Commissioner for 
Competition (Reerink and Rosenberg 2005), Dutch analysts and politicians 
continued to question the legality of the risk equalisation scheme, noting that the ECJ 
would have the final say on whether or not the scheme was both necessary and 
proportionate (den Exter 2005; Meijer and Liotard 2005). In 2006 a Dutch insurer 
brought a case before the European Court of Justice, challenging the Commission’s 
2005 authorisation of the risk equalisation scheme primarily on the grounds that the 
scheme breached EU rules on state aid (European Court of Justice 2006). The insurer 
also argued that the new Dutch health insurance system was incompatible with the 
Directive and Articles 43 and 49 EC (on freedom of establishment and free 
movement of services respectively). It accused the Commission of failing to provide 
reasons to substantiate its view that the risk equalisation scheme did not contravene 
either the Directive or competition rules on state aid. In 2008 the case was withdrawn 
when the insurer was taken over by another company. 
  
Ireland 
The risk equalisation scheme in Ireland has also been challenged as breaching 
competition rules on state aid. In 1994 the Irish market was opened up to competition 
to comply with the Directive. Prior to this, private health insurance was almost 
exclusively provided by Vhi Healthcare, a quasi-public body under the jurisdiction of 
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the Department of Health. By 1994 Vhi Healthcare covered about 37% of the 
population (Department of Health and Children 1999). After the market was opened 
up to competition, the Irish Government relied on Article 54 to formalise the rules 
that had applied to Vhi Healthcare, involving open enrolment, community-rated 
premiums, minimum benefits and lifetime cover. The Irish government also passed 
new legislation allowing it to establish a risk equalisation scheme to be activated by 
the government at the request of the independent Health Insurance Authority (HIA) 
if it became evident that private insurers were competing through risk selection 
rather than on the basis of administrative efficiency and quality (Department of 
Health and Children 1999). In 2006 the government triggered the risk equalisation 
scheme on the advice of the HIA. 
 
In 1998 BUPA Ireland, a branch of the UK insurer BUPA set up in Ireland in 1996, 
complained to the Commission that the risk equalisation scheme was a form of state 
aid that distorted competition and discouraged cost containment in the health sector 
(BUPA Ireland 2003). In response, the Irish Government argued that the Directive 
allowed member states to exercise reasonable discretion with respect to the general 
good and that the scheme had particular regard for the need for proportionality 
(Department of Health and Children 2001). Five years later, the Commission issued a 
decision30 stating that financial transfers made under the scheme would not constitute 
state aid for two reasons (European Commission 2003). First, the scheme would 
legitimately compensate insurers for obligations they faced in carrying out a service 
of general economic interest (Article 86(2) EC). Second, the compensation was 
limited to what is necessary and proportionate to ensure stability in a community-
rated market for private health insurance. The decision also noted that the scheme 
would not distort competition, penalise efficiency or create perverse incentives that 
might lead to cost inflation, nor was it likely to deter insurers from entering the 
market, as new entrants can exclude themselves from the scheme for up to three 
years. Even if financial transfers were to be considered a form of state aid, the 
Commission pointed out that this aid would not, by itself, amount to a violation of 
the Directive. 
                                                 
30
 Unlike Bolkestein’s letter, a Commission decision is binding and judicially reviewable at the suit of 
the addressee or those directly and individually concerned (Article 230 EC). Article 88(2) EC and 
Regulation 659/99/EC give the Commission the power to make such decisions. 
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The Commission’s decision is as noteworthy for what it abstains from commenting 
upon as for what it confirms. It explicitly states that it assessed the risk equalisation 
scheme’s compatibility with state aid rules ‘without prejudice to the analysis of its 
compatibility with other relevant EU rules, and in particular with [the Directive]’, 
emphasising that it was made independently of any consideration as to whether the 
Irish market could be regarded as a partial or complete alternative to cover provided 
by the statutory system (European Commission 2003). BUPA Ireland subsequently 
challenged the Commission’s reluctance to consider whether the scheme infringed 
the Directive. Asking the ECJ to suspend the decision in 2003, it accused the 
Commission of misapplying the public service compensation test and wrongly 
identifying open enrolment, community rating, minimum benefits and lifetime cover 
as public service obligations when they actually represent rules generally applied to 
all insurers offering private health insurance (European Court of Justice 2008). It also 
accused the Commission of failing to consider whether these obligations imposed a 
financial burden on Vhi Healthcare and whether the risk equalisation scheme would 
affect the development of trade contrary to the interests of the Community, and of 
failing to initiate a formal investigation procedure, given the complexity of the 
arguments and the economic analysis required. The Dutch and Irish governments and 
Vhi Healthcare joined the legal proceedings in defence of the Commission. BUPA 
Ireland also launched a domestic challenge to the risk equalisation scheme in 2006 
(see below). The following year, it pulled out of the Irish market and its business was 
bought by Quinn Healthcare, an Irish company. Quinn Healthcare has also 
challenged the risk equalisation scheme (within Ireland). 
 
In 2008 the Court of First Instance (CFI) dismissed BUPA’s application, finding its 
claim inadmissible (European Court of Justice 2008). The Court used the criteria31 
laid down in Altmark (European Court of Justice 2003), finding that the Commission 
had been right to conclude that the risk equalisation scheme did not contravene EU 
state aid rules. It is worth going into the Court’s decision in some detail, since the 
                                                 
31
 These are as follows: (a) the recipient undertaking must have public service obligations to discharge 
and the obligations must be clearly defined; the service must also be of a universal and compulsory 
nature; (b) the parameters on the basis of which the compensation for carrying out the SGEI mission is 
calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner; (c) the necessity 
and proportionality of the compensation must be provided for; and (d) comparison with an efficient 
operator must be established. 
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arguments involved are revealing. BUPA had argued that private health insurance in 
Ireland could not constitute a service of general economic interest (SGEI) since there 
was no obligation of general interest imposed on insurers to provide certain services 
and those services were not available to the whole population. Rather, they were 
optional – even ‘luxury’ – financial services and not intended to replace the public 
social security system. BUPA also argued that the decision of whether or not SGEIs 
were being carried out was a decision for European Community institutions and not 
to be delegated to national authorities. In contrast, the Irish Government contended 
that the definition of SGEIs falls primarily within the competence and discretion of 
the member states and that private health insurance is ‘an important instrument of the 
social and health policy pursued by Ireland … and an important supplement to the 
public health insurance system, although it does not replace that system’ (European 
Court of Justice 2008: para 164) (emphasis added). It added that, because the 
obligations of open enrolment and community rating ensure that private health 
insurance is available to all, it is not necessary that it should be universal, 
compulsory, free of charge, economically accessible to the whole population or 
constitute a substitute for the public social security system. 
 
Responding to these claims and counterclaims, the Court confirmed that member 
states have a wide discretion to define what they regard as SGEIs. Moreover, the 
definition of such services by a member state can only be questioned by the 
Commission in the event of a manifest error (European Court of Justice 2008). It 
found that there had been an act of public authority creating and entrusting an SGEI 
mission in Ireland. It also found that the compulsory nature of the SGEI mission 
could lie in the obligation on insurers to offer certain services to every citizen 
requesting them (open enrolment) and was strengthened by other obligations, such as 
community rating, lifetime cover and minimum benefits (European Court of Justice 
2008: paras 188-191). According to the Court, these obligations guarantee that the 
Irish population has ‘wide and simple access’ to private health insurance, which 
entitles private health insurance to be characterised as universal within the meaning 
of Community law (European Court of Justice 2008: para 201). The Court went on to 
note: 
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[T]he criterion of universality does not require that the entire population should have or 
be capable of having recourse to it in practice … the fact that approximately 50% of the 
Irish population has subscribed to PMI [private medical insurance] cover indicates that, 
in any event, the PMI services respond to a very significant demand on the Irish PMI 
market and that they make a substantial contribution to the proper functioning of the 
social security system, in the broad sense, in Ireland (European Court of Justice 2008: 
para 201). 
 
The Court further found that the parameters used to calculate the risk equalisation 
payments were sufficiently clearly defined and that the scheme itself was necessary 
and proportionate to the costs incurred. In addition, it found that insurers operating 
less efficiently than their competitors would not be able to gain undue advantage 
from the risk equalisation scheme, because the scheme compensated insurers based 
on average costs. Finally, the Court concluded that the risk equalisation scheme was 
necessary and proportionate for the purposes of Article 86(2) EC. It noted that the 
Commission had been right to support the risk equalisation scheme as a measure 
necessary to prevent destabilisation of the community-rated Irish market caused by 
active risk selection on the part of Vhi Healthcare’s competitors (European Court of 
Justice 2008: paras 285-286). 
 
The comments by the Court on the nature of the Irish market are particularly 
revealing. Paragraph 204 states: 
 
In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s [BUPA’s] very general argument concerning 
the optional, complementary and ‘luxury’ nature of the PMI services cannot succeed. 
Apart from the fact that the applicants disregard, in this context, the various levels of PMI 
cover available, they have not submitted a detailed challenge to the argument put forward 
by the defendant [the Commission] and by Ireland that Irish PMI constitutes, alongside 
the public health insurance system, the second pillar of the Irish health system, the 
existence of which fulfils a mandatory objective of social cohesion and solidarity 
between the generations pursued by Ireland’s health policy. According to the 
explanations provided by Ireland, PMI helps to ensure the effectiveness and profitability 
of the public health insurance scheme by reducing pressure on the costs which it would 
otherwise bear, particularly as regards care provided in public hospitals. Within the 
framework of the restricted control that the Community institutions are authorised to 
exercise in that regard, those considerations cannot be called in question either by the 
Commission or by the Court. Accordingly, it must be accepted that the PMI services are 
  140 
used by Ireland, in the general interest, as an instrument indispensable to the smooth 
administration of the national health system and they must be recognised, owing to the 
PMI obligations, as being in the nature of an SGEI. 
 
These comments and the ruling as a whole suggest three things. First, not only do 
national governments have considerable discretion in deciding what is in the general 
interest, but the regulations in place themselves contribute to the definition of a 
particular service as being in the general interest. In other words, if the Irish 
government defines a service as being in the general interest, regulations such as 
open enrolment and community rating can only strengthen the government’s case, 
although the necessity and proportionality tests would still apply. This apparently 
circular argument reflects the complexity of determining what is and is not an SGEI 
in the absence of a central definition, but it reinforces the significant scope for 
member state autonomy in this area. Second, the Irish government claims that, even 
though private health insurance in Ireland plays a supplementary rather than a 
substitutive role, it is an important instrument of Irish social and health policy – ‘the 
second pillar of the Irish health system’ – and helps to sustain the public health 
insurance scheme by relieving pressure on public hospitals. The ruling notes that 
these claims cannot be questioned by the Commission or the Court. Consequently, if 
a government says that private health insurance is a key component of the national 
health strategy, the European Union’s legislative institutions must accept it as being 
the case. Third, the Court makes much of the fact that private health insurance in 
Ireland covers about half of the Irish population and takes this as evidence that it 
makes a ‘substantial contribution to the proper functioning of the [Irish] social 
security system’. Thus, the degree of population coverage might bolster arguments 
about the contribution of private health insurance to the ‘national health strategy’. 
 
In spite of the Court’s ruling, which BUPA decided not to appeal against, the Irish 
regulatory framework has continued to be questioned in the domestic courts. In 2006, 
the Irish High Court ruled against BUPA’s legal challenge to the risk equalisation 
scheme. BUPA appealed and, in 2008, the Supreme Court upheld its appeal on 
procedural grounds, finding that the risk equalisation scheme was based on an 
incorrect interpretation of the meaning of community rating in the relevant law and 
would therefore have to be abandoned (Supreme Court of Ireland 2008). However, 
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the Supreme Court did not question the risk equalisation scheme on other grounds, so 
a change in legislation may be sufficient to secure the scheme’s domestic legitimacy. 
In the meantime, the scheme has been set aside. 
 
Slovenia 
The BUPA ruling came after the Commission had initiated infringement proceedings 
against Belgium and Slovenia, but may have some bearing on both of these cases. 
This subsection discusses the case against Slovenia. The case against Belgium is 
discussed in a subsequent subsection. In 2005 two of the three insurance companies 
operating in the Slovenian complementary private health insurance market (covering 
statutory user charges) challenged legislation establishing a risk equalisation scheme. 
The largest insurer, Vzajemna (a mutual association), argued that the scheme would 
favour the two other (commercial) insurers and encourage risk selection, while the 
larger commercial insurer, Adriatic, argued that the scheme would distort 
competition (Adriatic 2005; Vzajemna 2005). Neither challenge referred to EU law, 
and the Slovenian High Court ruled in the government’s favour (Toplak 2005). 
However, in 2007, following a complaint from Vzajemna, the Commission initiated 
infringement proceedings against the Slovenian Government, arguing that the risk 
equalisation scheme could not be justified under Article 54(1) of the Directive 
because complementary private health insurance in Slovenia does not constitute a 
partial or complete alternative to statutory health insurance. The Commission’s letter 
of formal notice, the contents of which have not been made publicly available, may 
also have noted that the requirement for insurers involved in the complementary 
market to inform the regulator of changes to policy conditions and premiums 
breaches the Directive (Articles 6, 29 and 39) (Rednak and Smrekar 2007). The 
requirement for insurers to put 50% of any profits generated back into the private 
health insurance scheme was also problematic. 
 
The Slovenian government responded by arguing (in May 2007) that the 
complementary market is a part of the broader social security system and has been 
defined in legislation as a service of general interest (Slovenia Business Week 2007). 
It also drew to the Commission’s attention the similarities between the Irish market 
and the Slovenian market. Previously, the Commission had rejected the 
government’s claim that the Slovenian market represented a partial or complete 
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alternative to compulsory health insurance, arguing instead that the market played a 
supplementary role. While it seems clear that the Slovenian government will need to 
address potential breaches of the Directive’s ban on systematic prior notification of 
policy conditions and premiums, it is less clear, following the BUPA ruling, whether 
the risk equalisation scheme breaches the Directive or EU state aid rules. The Court’s 
rationale for upholding the Commission decision in favour of the risk equalisation 
scheme in Ireland could apply, with even greater force, in the Slovenian case. First, 
there is an act of public authority creating and entrusting an SGEI mission (given in 
the Slovenian Health Care and Health Insurance Act), which, along BUPA lines, is 
both compulsory and universal in nature. Second, complementary private health 
insurance covers an even greater proportion of the population than in Ireland (70%), 
strengthening the government’s claim that the complementary market is part of the 
social security system. And, third, following BUPA, does the Commission have the 
right to question the claims of the Slovenian government? 
 
Both the Dutch and Slovenian cases for risk equalisation seem stronger than the Irish 
case, in the Netherlands because the ‘private’ health insurance scheme is the 
statutory health insurance scheme, and in Slovenia because the complementary 
market makes a more significant contribution to financial protection than the 
predominantly supplementary market in Ireland. For example, the extent of statutory 
cost sharing has increased in Slovenia in recent years, whereas it has gone down in 
Ireland (McDaid and Wiley 2009; Milenkovic Kramer 2006). Reflecting this, private 
health insurance in Slovenia accounts for over half of all private spending on health 
(the second highest proportion in the European Union after France), but only a third 
of private health expenditure in Ireland (Figure 3). 
 
Benefits 
Governments can regulate the benefits offered by private insurers by specifying a 
minimum level or standard package of benefits or requiring benefits to be provided 
in kind rather than in cash. The first intervention aims to facilitate price competition, 
while both aim to lower financial barriers and ensure access to a given range of 
health services. 
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Minimum or standard benefits 
The question of whether or not regulators should be able to specify minimum or 
standard benefits – as they do in Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands (prior to 2006 
and now) – has not yet been legally challenged as a form of material regulation that 
contravenes the Directive or as an intervention that impedes the free movement of 
services. Nevertheless, it is worth raising as an issue that has implications for 
consumer protection. The issue is also pertinent since a key objective underlying the 
introduction of the internal market in insurance was to stimulate competition among 
insurers, precipitating efficiency gains and bringing consumers the benefits of wider 
choice and lower prices (European Commission 1998). The preamble to the 
Directive states that it is in policy holders’ interest that they should have access to 
‘the widest possible range of insurance products available in the Community so that 
[they] can choose that which is best suited to [their] needs’ (Recital 19) (European 
Commission 1992). 
 
In theory, product differentiation benefits consumers by providing policies tailored to 
meet particular needs. It benefits insurers by allowing them to distinguish between 
high- and low-risk individuals. But in practice it may be detrimental to consumers in 
two ways. First, it gives insurers greater opportunity to select risks, leading to access 
problems for high-risk individuals. Second, making consumers choose from a wide 
range of highly differentiated products restricts competition, which only operates 
effectively where consumers find it easy to make informed comparisons about price 
and quality. 
 
To encourage competition based on price and quality (rather than risk selection), 
regulators can require insurers to offer a standard package of benefits, use 
standardised terms when marketing products, inform potential and existing policy 
holders of all the price and product options open to them and provide consumers with 
access to centralised sources of comparable information. However, the Directive 
specifically outlaws product and price controls, except where private health 
insurance constitutes a partial or complete alternative to statutory cover. Even in 
these circumstances, control is limited to offering benefits standardised in line with 
statutory benefits – that is, the primary aim is to ensure that the privately insured 
have access to the same services as the publicly insured, rather than to facilitate price 
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competition. For example, governments in Germany and the Netherlands have 
required private insurers to offer older policy holders benefits that match statutory 
benefits (Mossialos and Thomson 2004). 
 
In the absence of product regulation, liberalisation of health insurance markets in 
some member states has been accompanied by rising levels of product 
differentiation, with evidence suggesting that consumers may be confused by the 
proliferation of products on offer (Mossialos and Thomson 2004). For example, an 
official investigation into information problems in the market for supplementary 
private health insurance in the United Kingdom found that increased product 
complexity did not benefit consumers; rather, consumers sometimes paid more than 
they should and often purchased inappropriate policies (Office of Fair Trading 1998). 
An OECD study noted that as the diversity of schemes in the UK market rose, 
consumers faced increasing difficulty in comparing premiums and products, a 
concern echoed by consumer bodies in other member states (OECD 2004b). 
 
Perhaps due to limited price competition and private insurers’ limited ability to 
control costs, prices appear to have gone up rather than down in many member 
states. Research based on data from several member states shows that, during the 
1990s, the compound annual growth rate of private health insurance premiums rose 
much faster than the average annual growth rate of total spending on health care 
(Mossialos and Thomson 2004). 
 
Benefits in kind 
The provision of benefits in kind enhances social protection by removing financial 
barriers to accessing health care. Bolkestein’s letter to the Dutch Minister of Health 
suggests that the Dutch Government’s requirement for insurers to provide a basic 
package of benefits in kind could infringe the free movement of services by creating 
barriers for non-Dutch insurers entering the market and might need to be assessed for 
proportionality and necessity (Bolkestein 2003). This raises concerns not only for the 
new Dutch system, but for statutory and substitutive private health insurance in other 
member states. However, the issue has not yet been subjected to legal challenge. 
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Differential treatment of insurers 
Under the Directive, governments can no longer influence market structure (by 
restricting the provision of private health insurance to a single approved insurer or to 
statutory health insurance funds) or discriminate against particular types of insurer. 
For example, Recital 25 outlaws regulations preventing non-specialist or composite 
insurers from providing health insurance. When the German government transposed 
the Directive, it had to abolish its rule excluding non-specialist insurers from entering 
the private health insurance market, but used its social law to prohibit employers 
from contributing to policies offered by composite insurers, leading the Commission 
to refer Germany to the European Court of Justice (European Court of Justice 2001). 
Germany amended its legislation and the case was removed from the register in 
December 2003. Other areas in which the Directive affects differential treatment of 
insurers concern solvency requirements and tax treatment. 
 
Solvency requirements 
National laws often distinguish between non-profit and for-profit institutions, 
sometimes resulting in preferential treatment of non-profit institutions. This usually 
favours mutual associations, which have a long history of involvement in statutory 
and private health insurance in many member states and traditionally operate in 
different areas of the market from commercial insurers (Palm 2002). The special 
status accorded to mutual associations has given rise to difficulties under the 
Directive. For example, French mutual associations operated under a special Code de 
la Mutualité, which means they were subject to less rigorous solvency rules than 
commercial insurers or provident associations (Palm 2002). In 1999 the European 
Court of Justice ruled against France for its failure to completely transpose the 
Directive with regard to mutual associations (European Court of Justice 1999). 
However, the French Government failed to act and the Commission was forced to 
begin fresh infringement proceedings under Article 228 EC the following year, 
which eventually resulted in the adoption of a revised code tightening the solvency 
requirements for mutual associations and bringing French law in line with the 
Directive (European Commission 2000a; European Commission 2000b). 
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Solvency rules have also led to controversy in Belgium and Ireland. Mutual 
associations in Belgium that are engaged in selling a mixture of complementary and 
supplementary private health insurance operate under separate solvency rules from 
commercial insurers. Both types of insurer competed to provide cover for self-
employed people, who were excluded from statutory cover of outpatient care. More 
recently, they also began to compete to provide complementary cover of some 
hospital costs. For example, the Mutualité Chretienne, which is one of several 
statutory health insurers, also provided its members with compulsory complementary 
cover of all hospital costs above a deductible per inpatient stay (Mutualité Chretienne 
2008). Previously, this type of cover had been exclusively offered by commercial 
private insurers. In 2006 the European Commission began infringement proceedings 
against the Belgian Government on the grounds that differential treatment might 
distort the market (European Commission 2006). 
 
The issue regarding self-employed people in Belgium has been addressed by 
extending statutory cover of outpatient care to them from 2008. However, the issue 
of complementary private health insurance has been more problematic. The Belgian 
Government has argued that the Directive does not apply to mutual associations 
because the cover they provide is part of the social security system, their activity is 
based on solidarity rather than being economic in nature and, if the complementary 
cover they provide were to be viewed as an economic activity, it would be a service 
of general economic interest and exempt from competition rules under Article 86(2) 
EC. In 2008 the Commission rejected this defence and sent a reasoned opinion to 
Belgium, asking it to amend its national rules so that mutual associations are no 
longer governed by separate solvency and supervisory rules (European Commission 
2008c). As shown in the discussion of France (below), the Commission is unlikely to 
consider this type of differential treatment of insurers to be necessary or 
proportionate to the costs incurred in carrying out SGEI activities. 
 
In the 1970s the Irish government had obtained a derogation from the First Non-life 
Insurance Directive’s solvency requirements for its quasi-state insurer Vhi 
Healthcare (The Competition Authority 2007). This meant that Vhi Healthcare was 
not subject to the same solvency requirements as its commercial competitors and was 
not regulated by the same regulatory body. In January 2007 the Commission began 
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infringement proceedings against Ireland in response to a claim made by Vivas (a 
commercial insurer that entered the Irish market in 2004) that Vhi Healthcare had 
breached the conditions of its derogation from the Directive by carrying out business 
in addition to its core health insurance activity (European Commission 2007b). The 
Irish government subsequently brought forward plans to change the status of Vhi 
Healthcare, announcing that Vhi Healthcare would become a conventional insurer 
authorised by the financial regulator by the end of 2008 (Department of Health and 
Children 2007). However, in late 2008 the Commission sent a ‘complementary 
reasoned opinion’ to the Irish government and in 2009, following further complaints 
from Vivas32 (O'Regan 2009), it referred the case to the European Court of Justice 
(European Commission 2008b; European Commission 2009). 
 
Some of these solvency issues may change in the future, with the introduction of new 
economic risk-based solvency requirements in 2012 (the so-called ‘Solvency II’ 
framework) (European Commission 2007c). The Commission is proposing to move 
away from a ‘one-model-fits-all’ method of estimating capital requirements to more 
entity-specific requirements, which would be applied to all entities regardless of their 
legal status. However, as yet, the implications of this new framework for health 
insurance are not clear. 
 
Tax treatment 
Tax incentives for voluntary health insurance in France, Luxembourg and Belgium 
have traditionally favoured mutual or provident associations over commercial 
insurers. In Luxembourg, the existence of a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between mutual 
associations and commercial insurers has prevented the latter from complaining 
about preferential tax treatment (Mossialos and Thomson 2004). The agreement rests 
on the understanding that mutual associations will not encroach on commercial 
insurers’ dominance of the market for pensions and other types of insurance. Prior to 
2008, Belgian mutual and commercial insurers competed to cover outpatient care for 
self-employed people. Mutual associations providing this cover benefited from state 
subsidies, whereas commercial insurers did not. The commercial insurers tried to 
challenge this in the Belgian courts, but lost their legal challenge. In 2006 the 
                                                 
32
 Trading as Hibernian Aviva following a takeover in 2008 by British company Aviva, one of the 
world’s largest health insurance companies. 
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Commission began infringement proceedings against preferential treatment. The 
issue of cover for self-employed people is no longer relevant, as in 2008 the Belgian 
Government extended statutory outpatient cover to all self-employed people 
(European Commission 2006). 
 
Preferential tax treatment of mutual insurers has been most problematic in France, 
where mutual and provident associations have been exempt from health insurance 
premium tax since 1945. In 1992 the French Federation of Insurance Companies 
lodged two complaints against the French government for this discriminatory tax 
policy, arguing that it contravened EU rules on state aid. Their complaints were 
eventually upheld by a Commission decision in November 2001 and the French 
government was asked either to abolish the tax exemptions in question or to ensure 
that the aid did not exceed the costs arising from the constraints inherent in a service 
of general economic interest (European Commission 2001c). At the same time, the 
Commission noted that it did not regard the provision of private health insurance by 
these associations to be a service of general economic interest explicitly provided for 
in their articles. The French government responded by removing the health insurance 
premium tax exemption for mutual and provident associations (European 
Commission 2005b)33 and, instead, applying it to two types of private health 
insurance contract: those based on ‘solidarity’ (contrats solidaires) – in this case, 
contracts concluded without a prior medical examination or other reference to an 
individual’s risk of ill health – or ‘responsible’ contracts (contrats responsables), in 
which private health insurers agree not to cover new co-payments, intended to 
encourage patients to obtain a referral for specialist care and to adhere to protocols 
for the treatment of chronic illnesses. At first, the Commission agreed that this form 
of exemption was compatible with EU rules on state aid (European Commission 
2001a; European Commission 2005a). However, in 2007, it launched a formal 
investigation into the new contrats, to find out if they are indeed non-discriminatory 
and how much consumers really stand to benefit from the advantages granted to 
insurers (European Commission 2007d). The results of this investigation have not yet 
been published. 
                                                 
33
 In 2006, in response to a further decision from the Commission, the French government abolished 
the exemption from insurance premium tax for mutual and provident associations on non-health 
insurance business.  
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Some argue in favour of treating mutual associations differently on the grounds that 
they provide better access to health services because they generally offer open 
enrolment, lifetime cover and community-rated premiums, whereas commercial 
insurers usually restrict access by rejecting applications, excluding the cover of pre-
existing conditions and risk rating premiums (Rocard 1999). In a market where 
mutual associations and commercial insurers operate side by side, the latter may be 
able to undermine the former by attracting low-risk individuals with lower 
premiums, leaving mutual associations to cover high risks. However, while the 
distinction between non-profit and for-profit insurers is important in so far as an 
insurer’s profit status determines its motivation and influences its conduct, in 
practice there is considerable variation in the way in which mutual associations 
behave; in some member states their conduct may be indistinguishable from the 
conduct of commercial insurers. As it is not possible to make assumptions about an 
insurer’s conduct on the basis of its legal status, it would be more appropriate to 
discriminate on the basis of conduct, favouring insurers who offer greater access to 
health services or, where appropriate, penalising those who restrict access. This was 
the approach taken by the French government in 2004 and again in 2006, when it 
expanded the remit for exemption from insurance premium tax to any insurer 
agreeing to abide by specific rules intended to promote access to health care 
(Sécurité Sociale 2008). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The EU regulatory framework established by the Directive places limits on national 
competence in the area of private health insurance. It relies on financial regulation to 
protect consumers, prohibiting material regulations such as price and product 
controls, except where private cover constitutes a complete or partial alternative to 
statutory health insurance and so long as any intervention is necessary, proportionate 
and non-discriminatory. The paper has argued that the Directive is not sufficiently 
clear about when governments can justify material regulation of private health 
insurance. This is mainly because there is no explicit consensus about the meaning of 
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partial or complete alternative, leading to uncertainty and confusion among policy 
makers, regulators and insurers. Where the Commission and, more recently, the 
European Court of Justice (in BUPA), have had opportunity to clarify this aspect of 
the Directive, they have tended to sidestep the issue, relying instead on rules about 
services of general economic interest to authorise (Ireland) or prohibit (France) 
government intervention. Key exceptions are Bolkestein’s letter, in which he argues 
that Article 54(1) of the Directive should not to be used to justify material regulation 
of complementary private health insurance, and a description of the Directive on the 
Commission’s web site, which refers to ‘substitutive’ private health insurance 
(European Commission 2011c). 
 
Bolkestein’s definition of complementary cover fails to recognise that this type of 
private health insurance increasingly contributes to social protection for those who 
purchase it, operating in an unofficial partnership with statutory health insurance 
where it offers reimbursement of statutory user charges and/or provides access to 
effective health services excluded from the statutory benefits package. In particular, 
complementary cover of statutory user charges tends to be purchased by a relatively 
high proportion of the population, making it regressive in financing health care 
(because it is not restricted to richer groups) and creating or exacerbating inequalities 
in access to health care (van Doorslaer et al 2006; Wagstaff et al 1999). If, as the 
paper has argued, the logic underlying Article 54(1) is to permit material regulation 
where private health insurance fulfils a financial protection function, then, in either 
case, obliging complementary insurers to offer open enrolment, lifetime cover and 
community rating would be necessary to ensure equitable access to health care, while 
a risk equalisation scheme might be needed to lower incentives to select risks and to 
encourage competition based on price and quality. The Irish experience highlights 
the complexity of the issues at stake and the difficulties caused by legal uncertainty. 
 
The Directive has been amended several times since its introduction, most recently in 
2007 (European Commission 2007a). None of the amendments has had any direct 
bearing on private health insurance. In 2008 the Commission circulated a proposal 
for an amended directive that would repeal and replace the Third Non-life Insurance 
Directive and several other insurance-related directives under the ‘Solvency II’ 
framework (European Commission 2008a). Once again, there are no major changes 
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specifically relating to private health insurance. The only real change seems to be in 
the wording of Recital 58 (Recital 24 of the original Directive), which now excludes 
open enrolment, community rating and lifetime cover as possible measures that may 
be introduced to protect the general good (where private health insurance serves as a 
partial or complete alternative). It is not clear whether this omission has any 
particular significance.34 
 
By maintaining the same wording as the Directive (‘complete or partial alternative’; 
Article 204), the proposed new directive has missed a key opportunity to address 
legal uncertainty. The Commission’s reluctance to be explicit about what the phrase 
means, the importance of the phrase in the infringement proceedings against 
Slovenia (but its seeming irrelevance in the eyes of the Court of First Instance in 
BUPA), and increasing reliance on the Treaty (Article 86(2) EC) to justify 
intervention in private health insurance markets (in France and Ireland), suggest that 
the Commission would have done better to have removed the phrase from the 
proposed directive. As the Court confirms, whether or not private health insurance 
requires material regulation to protect the general good should be a matter for 
national governments. The paper has argued that the logic underlying Article 54(1) is 
to ensure access to private health insurance where it contributes to financial 
protection. However, as definitions of financial protection may vary from one 
country to another (and even within a country, over time), deciding what does or 
does not contribute to financial protection is a largely political issue. It is therefore a 
matter best left to the discretion of national political processes. 
 
If, as the Court states in BUPA, governments have relative freedom to define private 
health insurance as being a service of general economic interest, and regulations such 
as open enrolment can be construed as demonstrating SGEI obligations, then there 
seems little need for further elaboration of this particular issue in the form of a 
directive, particularly given the uncertainty created by the current and proposed 
wording and the fact that proportionality must still be tested, regardless of which 
process (Treaty or directive) applies. It remains to be seen whether the BUPA ruling 
                                                 
34
 As before, Recital 58 of the ‘Third Non-life Insurance Directive’ states that standardised benefits 
offered at a premium rate at or below a prescribed maximum, participation in loss compensation (risk 
equalisation) schemes, and private health insurance operated on a technical basis similar to life 
insurance may be introduced as measures to protect the general good. 
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will change the position of the Commission in its infringement proceedings against 
Slovenia (at least concerning the legality of the risk equalisation scheme), since the 
Slovenian government now has a good legal basis on which to defend the SGEI 
nature of its complementary private health insurance market. The SGEI argument is 
unlikely to be much help to the Belgian government, however, because case law 
consistently rejects differential treatment of insurers based on legal status. A more 
pragmatic (and effective) approach to influencing the conduct of insurers is to favour 
those who adhere to specific principles. France has led the way here, with its system 
of tax exemptions for insurers that uphold contrats solidaires or contrats 
responsables, although even this move is under investigation by the Commission. 
 
The paper has also argued that there is uncertainty about what sort of government 
intervention in the private health insurance market might be considered to be 
necessary or proportionate, not just because of the Directive, but also under EU state 
aid rules. While it is clear that differential treatment of insurers based on legal status 
will not be tolerated, it is much less clear whether regulatory requirements such as 
open enrolment and risk equalisation schemes are compatible with the Directive – 
particularly (but not exclusively) where non-substitutive private health insurance is 
concerned. For example, the Commission’s decision to authorise risk equalisation in 
the Netherlands has been challenged by a Dutch insurer, even though the new Dutch 
health insurance system is broadly accepted as being statutory in nature (European 
Court of Justice 2006). The Commission has contributed to this uncertainty by 
approving the risk equalisation scheme in Ireland (on the grounds that private health 
insurance in Ireland constitutes a service of general economic interest), but accusing 
the Slovenian risk equalisation scheme of contravening the Directive – and yet, as 
the paper has argued, the case for risk equalisation is stronger in Slovenia than in 
Ireland. It is possible that the BUPA ruling will, in practice, remove some of this 
uncertainty. 
 
Finally, the paper has argued that the Directive’s regulatory framework may not 
provide sufficient protection of consumers. In markets where private health insurance 
does not contribute to financial protection, the Directive assumes that financial 
regulation will protect consumers. But solvency rules alone may not be adequate if 
health insurance products are highly differentiated. Information asymmetry 
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exacerbated by product differentiation appears to be a growing problem in markets 
across the European Union and the Commission has not yet put in place mechanisms 
for monitoring anti-competitive behaviour by insurers. Communications from the 
Commission have also raised doubts about the compatibility of certain regulatory 
measures with competition rules – for example, the provision of benefits in kind 
(Bolkestein 2003). If a requirement for insurers to provide benefits in kind were to be 
found to contravene competition rules, there would be implications for statutory as 
well as private health insurance. 
 
The Directive reflects the regulatory norms of its time. When it was introduced in 
1992, the Commission may have been convinced that it would provide ample scope 
for governments to protect consumers where necessary and would not jeopardise 
statutory arrangements. Article 54 would protect markets contributing to financial 
protection, while, in markets regarded as purely supplementary, the benefits of 
deregulation (increased choice and competition resulting in lower prices) would 
outweigh concerns about consumer protection. These assumptions are more 
problematic now, partly because there is no evidence to suggest that the expected 
benefits of competition have, as yet, materialised. Private health insurance premiums 
in many member states have risen rather than fallen in recent years, often faster than 
inflation in the health sector as a whole, while insurers’ expansion across national 
borders has been limited to cross-border mergers and acquisitions, rather than 
genuinely new entrants to the market (Mossialos and Thomson 2004). The new 
Dutch health insurance system has not yet seen any cross-border activity and the 
number of insurers in operation has swiftly fallen to about five (Maarse 2009). 
 
The assumptions are also problematic due to increased blurring of the boundaries 
between normal economic activity and social security. On the one hand, the case law 
reviewed in this paper shows governments how they might put their health insurance 
arrangements beyond the scope of internal market law, either by placing them firmly 
within the sphere of social security or by invoking the general good defence. On the 
other hand, as the Dutch system shows, the trend seems to be going in the opposite 
direction. Consequently, social security is no longer the preserve of statutory 
institutions or public finance, a development likely to bring new challenges for 
policy makers. Greater blurring of the public-private interface in health insurance 
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gives rise to complexities that neither the existing Directive nor the proposed new 
directive seem equipped to address. In light of these complexities, only some of 
which the paper has attempted to highlight, it is time for a debate about how best to 
move forward. A priority for debate should be to find ways of thinking about private 
health insurance that go beyond ‘partial or complete alternative’ to statutory cover. 
These terms are unclear and do not reflect the often complicated relationship 
between public and private cover. At least in the European Union, private health 
insurance rarely offers a genuine ‘alternative’ to statutory cover (Thomson et al 
2009b). The paper also emphasises that financial regulation may not be the only or 
best means of protecting consumers in health insurance markets. If it is not possible 
to reach a political consensus about re-examining the need for material regulation of 
private health insurance under some circumstances, then the Commission and the 
member states should consider how best to improve the way in which products are 
marketed and the quality of the information available to consumers. 
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Introduction: opting out of health insurance 
 
Since 1945 governments across Europe have successfully worked towards the 
provision of universal or near-universal statutory (public) insurance for health care. 
The exceptions are Germany and the Netherlands, where the public insurance 
scheme covers 92% and 70% of the population respectively, leaving a substantial 
number of people to rely on voluntary (private) insurance, either by choice, as in 
Germany since 1970 and the Netherlands from 1941 to 1986, or through compulsion, 
as in the Netherlands since 1986 (OECD 2004a). More recently, and in the context of 
universal health coverage, various European countries have considered emulating the 
German model, among them Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom during the 
1990s and Croatia, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia in the last five years 
(Atella and Spandonaro 2004; Propper and Green 2001; World Bank 2003). Debates 
about choice of public or private insurance tend to be framed in terms of offering 
some or all of the population the possibility of ‘opting out’ of the public insurance 
scheme. 
 
Arguments in favour of opting out, generally derived from economic theory, 
presuppose that enhancing consumer choice and stimulating competition between 
insurers will be beneficial for health policy goals such as equity and efficiency. But 
economic theory also suggests that, due to failures in markets for health insurance, 
choice of public or private coverage may adversely affect equity and efficiency and 
could, in the longer term, restrict consumer choice (Barr 1998). This apparent 
contradiction merits investigation. The paper therefore examines the European 
experience of choice of public or private health insurance to establish whether there 
is empirical support for economic theory regarding choice in health insurance 
markets and to review and assess real policy outcomes using equity in funding health 
care and efficiency in production as evaluative criteria. 
 
The only European countries in which choice of public or private health insurance 
has been available to a significant part of the population for a prolonged period are 
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Germany (1970 to the present day) and the Netherlands (1941 to 1986)35. In 1986 the 
Dutch government abolished choice, changing to a system, still in place today, in 
which higher earners are simply excluded from public coverage. The paper focuses 
on a comparative examination of the German and Dutch experience for three reasons. 
First, choice of public or private health insurance is an option increasingly raised in 
European policy debates but usually proposed without supporting evidence. Second, 
the small body of empirical literature addressing the impact of opting out draws on 
the Chilean experience (Bitran et al 2000; Sapelli and Vial 2003); to date, health 
insurance choices in Germany and the Netherlands have not been systematically 
documented or evaluated. Third, the German and Dutch governments have 
responded differently to problems arising from choice of public or private health 
insurance, the former attempting to find solutions while maintaining choice, the latter 
preferring to replace choice with exclusion of higher earners from public coverage. A 
comparative approach allows us to examine the extent to which either response 
succeeds in tackling market failures relating to health insurance choices. 
 
 
Framework for analysis 
 
Based on economic theory regarding consumer choice, a key argument in favour of 
opting out assumes that the threat of voluntary exit from the public scheme will be 
sufficient to stimulate competition between public and private insurers, leading to 
greater responsiveness and increased efficiency (Hirschman 1970). A further 
argument – more pertinent in countries with large informal sectors or where tax 
evasion is widespread, but also made in richer countries – concerns the sustainability 
of public health care funding. Proponents claim that encouraging individuals, 
particularly the wealthy, to opt for private coverage (the German model) will ease 
pressure on government budgets and allow public finances to be spent on improving 
the provision of health services for poorer people (Chollet and Lewis 1997). If 
curbing public expenditure takes political precedence over boosting consumer 
                                                 
35
 Governments in Austria (1999), Portugal (1993) and Spain (1975) have introduced arrangements 
that increase access to private health insurance for specific groups, but the Austrian system involves 
collective rather than individual decision making, while the Portuguese and Spanish systems still 
require the payment of statutory contributions, so the choice is one of public or private provision 
rather than insurance (Mossialos and Thomson 2004). 
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choice, policy makers may even favour the outright exclusion of some groups from 
public coverage (the Dutch model). The implication is that either model will enhance 
equity in funding health care if those who opt out of, or who are excluded from, 
public coverage continue to contribute to public resources – for example, through 
taxation. 
 
However, these arguments may be undermined by important aspects of economic 
theory as it applies to health insurance (Barr 1992; Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000). 
Markets for health insurance suffer from ‘failures’ relating (mainly) to information. 
This means they can only operate efficiently if certain conditions hold: the 
probabilities of ill health must be independent, less than one and known and there 
should be no major problems with adverse selection, moral hazard and monopoly. 
Moral hazard and monopoly issues may feature in both public and private systems of 
health insurance. The issue of most relevance to this paper concerns adverse 
selection, which arises because those seeking insurance are able to conceal 
information about their risk of ill health from insurers (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). 
 
Where there is choice of more than one type of health insurance ‘plan’, plans 
offering a more generous level of benefits or a lower level of cost sharing will attract 
individuals with a higher risk of ill health. In response to the ensuing risk 
segmentation, plans with a concentration of high risks must raise their premiums, 
provoking low risks to switch to cheaper plans – for example, those with fewer 
benefits or higher deductibles – or forego cover altogether, if either of these options 
is open to them. This precipitates further premium rises and exacerbates the problem 
of segmentation. Ultimately, more generous plans become financially unstable and 
are forced out of business. Researchers have shown how adverse selection led to the 
swift collapse of indemnity health insurance plans in the United States (Cutler and 
Zeckhauser 1997). 
 
Health insurance markets suffering from adverse selection are inefficient because 
they prevent low risks from purchasing full cover – comprehensive and free of cost 
sharing – or cover at an actuarially fair price, while the threat of adverse selection 
creates strong incentives for insurers to engage in risk selection; that is, to attract low 
risks and deter high risks (Barr 1998; Rice 2001). Unless these incentives are curbed 
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by regulation, older people and those in poor health may not be able to obtain any 
cover or cover at an affordable price. 
 
Giving consumers a choice of public or private health insurance, as in Germany and 
in the Netherlands prior to 1986, is similar in effect to offering a choice of more than 
one plan and is likely to result in two main outcomes: a market segmented by degree 
of risk and financial barriers to private coverage for high risks. Negative effects can 
be avoided, to some extent, by careful policy design or addressed by regulation – for 
example, abolishing choice and making health insurance compulsory for the whole 
population, prohibiting voluntary exit from the public scheme by excluding some 
groups from public coverage, as happened in the Netherlands in 1986, and more 
incremental measures to tackle risk selection and increase access to coverage, such as 
cross-subsidies from private to public insurance, or tighter regulation of insurers, 
including risk adjustment (Table 9). 
 
In the following sections the paper examines whether the German and Dutch policies 
have led to risk segmentation and created financial barriers to private coverage. It 
then assesses their impact on equity in funding health care and efficiency in 
production, focusing on these particular analytical concepts partly because 
proponents of choice of public or private health insurance argue that it can enhance 
equity and efficiency, but also because they are commonly cited as key health policy 
goals (Aday 1998; European Commission 2001b; WHO 2000)36.  
 
Two caveats are worth noting. First, the German and Dutch policies were not 
intended to curb public expenditure or stimulate competition by expanding consumer 
choice. In the context of partial rather than universal coverage, they aimed to 
increase equity in access to health care by offering public coverage to individuals 
who had previously relied on private coverage. Thus, they allowed people to opt into 
the public scheme, whereas contemporary proposals aim to enable people to opt out 
of it. However, once people had opted into the public scheme they were then also 
free to opt out of it, so analysis of the German and Dutch experience may usefully 
inform current and future debates, not least by highlighting potential policy 
                                                 
36
 Due to space constraints, lack of data and analytical complexity the paper does not consider other 
criteria such as efficiency in resource allocation, quality, responsiveness or impact on health status. 
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implications and demonstrating the nature and extent of regulation required to 
preserve the policy goals noted above. 
 
Second, the analysis that follows is not based on any ideal benchmark for equity and 
efficiency in health insurance markets. Rather, it considers the impact of opting out 
(or exclusion, as is now the case in the Netherlands) in comparison to a system of 
universal public coverage, as this is the starting point for current debates about health 
insurance choices in European health systems. Equity and efficiency may have 
multiple interpretations. The paper considers whether similar individuals are treated 
equally based on the extent to which public contributions or private premiums are 
detached from characteristics such as age, income, family size and health status 
(horizontal equity); and the degree of progressivity in funding health care based on 
the extent to which richer people contribute or pay proportionately more than poorer 
people (vertical equity). For efficiency in production, which can be defined as 
obtaining maximum output from given inputs, we consider whether competition 
based on risk selection rather than price and quality lowers incentives for private 
insurers in Germany and the Netherlands to make gains in productive efficiency; the 
extent to which private insurers minimise operating costs by avoiding administrative 
waste; and the extent to which they attempt to lower their prices by controlling 
provider payment and behaviour (Barr 1998). 
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Table 9 Choice of public or private health insurance: policy outcomes and regulatory responses 
Policy outcomes Regulatory responses Implications Germany Netherlands 
Risk selection by private 
insurers leading to a 
segmented market 
 abolish choice of public or private 
health insurance; replace with a 
universal compulsory plan 
 adverse selection no longer a threat x (proposed in current policy 
debates) 
x (planned, with effect from 
2006) 
  prohibit voluntary exit from the 
public plan by excluding some 
groups from public coverage 
 loss of public contributions and 
potential for concentration of high risks 
in the public plan 
x  1986 higher earners 
excluded from public 
coverage 
  introduce cross-subsidies from the 
private to the public plan 
 may not be sufficient to compensate the 
public plan 
 may be contested under EU 
competition law 
x  1986 cross-subsidy from 
private to public plan 
  restrict access to the public plan for 
those who choose the private plan 
 high risks may not be able to pay rising 
private premiums 
 1994 restricted to <65 
 2000 restricted to <55 
 1986 higher earners 
excluded from public 
coverage 
  tighten regulation of private plans 
through risk adjustment 
 crude risk adjustment may encourage 
risk selection 
 sophisticated risk adjustment may be 
technically difficult to implement 
x x 
Limited access to private 
plans for high risks 
 tighten regulation of private plans 
through open enrolment, lifetime 
cover and community-rated 
premiums 
 may encourage risk selection  private insurers must offer 
lifetime cover with ageing 
reserves to prevent 
premiums rising with age 
x 
  tighten regulation of private plans 
by introducing mandatory pooling 
and product and price controls 
 may encourage risk selection  2000 standard policy for 
>55 
 1986 standard policy for 
>65 
  raise the earnings/income threshold 
making more people eligible to 
join the public plan 
 may entrench existing risk 
segmentation 
 annually; higher than 
average increase in 2003 
 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: x = not applied;  = applied 
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Comparison of policy outcomes and regulatory responses 
 
The development of choice of public or private health insurance 
Germany is currently the only country in Europe to offer individuals choice of public 
or private health insurance. Enrolment in the public scheme (Gesetzliche 
Krankenversicherung; GKV) is compulsory for all non-public sector employees 
earning less than €46,344 a year (in 2004) (Busse and Riesberg 2004)37. Those with 
earnings above this threshold and their dependants (about 20% of the population) 
have three options: they can remain in the GKV; they can opt for substitutive private 
health insurance, which exempts them from contributing to the GKV; or they can 
abstain from health insurance all together. The majority (76%) choose to remain in 
the GKV as voluntary members, most of the remainder purchase private coverage 
and only 0.1% of the German population have no health insurance (Busse and 
Riesberg 2004). 
 
Choice of public or private health insurance was introduced in 1970, when legislation 
to promote equity of access extended compulsory enrolment in the GKV to white 
collar workers with earnings below a specified threshold (Rosenberg 1986). 
Previously, the GKV had only covered blue collar workers. The same law also 
allowed white collar workers with earnings above the threshold to enrol in the GKV 
on a voluntary basis, again for equity reasons. In 1989 choice of public or private 
cover was made available to all non-public sector workers with earnings above the 
threshold, in order to eliminate an increasingly irrelevant distinction between blue 
and white collar workers. 
 
In the Netherlands, choice of public or private health insurance was available 
between 1941 and 1986. Health insurance had been voluntary for the whole 
population until German forces occupying the Netherlands during the Second World 
War introduced a public scheme that was compulsory for employees and voluntary 
for self-employed people (Cox 1993). The rest of the population relied on private 
                                                 
37
 The paper does not intend to provide detailed information about the German and Dutch health 
systems. This can be found elsewhere (see Busse and Riesberg 2004 and den Exter et al 2004). 
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coverage. In 1966 the Dutch government reformed the system, establishing three 
public schemes (Ziekenfondswet; ZFW): two compulsory schemes for employees and 
older people and a voluntary scheme for everyone else. Eligibility for each scheme 
was subject to an earnings threshold (den Exter et al 2004). Those not covered by the 
compulsory schemes, mainly self-employed people, could choose one of three 
options: public coverage through the voluntary scheme, substitutive private coverage 
or no coverage at all. 
 
As in Germany, the primary reason for setting up the ZFW was to increase equity of 
access to health care, although it was also intended to put an end to the somewhat 
piecemeal development of the public scheme (den Exter et al 2004). However, the 
government was prevented from introducing universal public coverage by pressure 
from private insurers, who wanted to ensure that they would still be able to sell 
policies to a significant proportion of the population, and medical professionals, who 
were keen to maintain access to more profitable private patients (Maarse and Okma 
2004). A more detailed analysis of institutional arrangements and stakeholder views 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Risk segmentation and risk selection 
Risk segmentation can be demonstrated by differences in the characteristics of those 
covered by public and private health insurance. In both countries, policies 
introducing choice of public or private coverage have developed in such a way as to 
result in risk segmentation. In Germany the demand for substitutive private cover is 
heavily influenced by age, sex, income and family size. Those most likely to be 
privately insured are young, single people, couples with double incomes and adult 
males living in what used to be West Germany (Datamonitor 2000). Consequently, 
the GKV covers a disproportionate number of women and children, older people and 
larger families (Rupprecht et al 2000). For example, in 1999 men accounted for 
52.7% of those with private coverage, while women and children only accounted for 
32% and 15.3% respectively (PKV 2000). People aged 65 and over account for 22% 
of all those covered by the GKV but only 11% of those covered by the largest private 
insurer and voluntary members of the GKV have almost twice as many dependants 
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(0.76 per contributor) as compulsory members (0.47) (Schneider 2003; Schnitzler 
2005). 
 
Risk segmentation can be attributed to important differences in the rules governing 
public and private insurers, creating opportunities for risk selection by the latter (see 
below). Private premiums are rated according to age, sex and health status, with 
women facing premiums that are 30-50% higher than premiums for men (PKV 
2002a). Private insurers can reject applications, exclude cover of pre-existing 
conditions, charge extra for dependants and offer discounted premiums in exchange 
for high deductibles. However, they cannot terminate contracts, must offer lifetime 
cover and should not raise premiums as policy holders age, unless required to do so 
by unexpected discrepancies between actuarial forecasts and the current cost of 
providing benefits. 
 
The problem of risk segmentation became acute soon after the 1989 law extended 
choice of public or private health insurance to all higher earners. During the early 
1990s private premiums rose sharply for older policy holders, partly due to 
mismanagement and partly due to exploitation of loopholes in the regulatory 
framework. Private insurers had based premium calculations on average life 
expectancy, failing to account for the longer life expectancy enjoyed by substitutive 
policy holders, who come from higher socio-economic groups. This ‘unexpected’ 
discrepancy between premiums and benefit costs allowed them to raise premiums. 
Some private insurers also barred new policy holders from joining existing risk 
pools, which meant that current policy holders were unable to benefit from lower 
premiums arising from the entry of younger people (Riemer-Hommel et al 2003). 
The GKV subsequently faced an influx of older people who had previously chosen 
private cover but could no longer afford the premiums (Wasem 1995). Increased risk 
segmentation and other factors fuelled the growth in the GKV’s deficits and 
prompted steady rises in average GKV contribution rates (from 12.4% in 1991 to 
13.2% in 1993 and 13.6% in 1997), which in turn created even stronger incentives 
for younger people to opt for private cover (Busse and Riesberg 2004; Busse and 
Wörz 2004). 
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Financial pressures precipitated a series of reforms aimed at restricting voluntary exit 
from, and return to, the GKV. In 1994 the decision to leave the GKV became 
irreversible for those aged 65 and over and in 2000 for those aged 55 and over (CEA 
2000). The legislation passed in 2000 also aimed to prevent future age-related 
premium increases in the private market by imposing a surcharge of up to 10% on all 
new private policies and 2% a year for 5 years for existing policy holders 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen 2001). 
 
While these regulatory responses addressed, in part, the problem of people returning 
to the GKV and benefiting from public cover even though they had not previously 
contributed to it, they largely failed to tackle risk segmentation. High risks and the 
risk averse are now much less likely to leave the GKV, to the advantage of private 
insurers, who have been swift to highlight the fact that private cover is best value for 
the young, single and healthy (PKV 2002b). 
 
Prior to the establishment of the ZFW in 1966, private insurers in the Netherlands 
operated on relatively egalitarian lines; most offered community-rated premiums. 
During the 1970s, however, a major private insurer decided to offer discounted 
premiums to students, prompting others to follow suit (Tapay and Colombo 2004). 
This coincided with further changes in private insurers’ conduct; some began to 
reject applications for cover, risk-rate premiums, exclude cover of pre-existing 
conditions and market policies with reduced premiums but high deductibles, all of 
which encouraged younger and healthier individuals to leave the ZFW’s voluntary 
scheme in favour of cheaper private cover (Gresz et al 2002b). At the same time, 
private cover became significantly more expensive for older and unhealthier people, 
many of whom returned to the ZFW, contributing to its rising deficits (Wasem 1995). 
 
The Dutch government responded by abandoning its policy of choice of public or 
private health insurance. In 1986 it abolished the compulsory scheme for older 
people and the voluntary scheme for the self-employed, transferring most of their 
members to the remaining compulsory scheme for employees. It also changed the 
rules for enrolment in this scheme, establishing the system in place today. Those with 
earnings above a threshold (€32,600 a year in 2004), and their dependants, are no 
longer eligible for public cover. If they want health insurance, they can purchase 
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private cover for themselves and their dependants (den Exter et al 2004). Currently, 
the ZFW covers about 63% of the population and substitutive private insurance, 
including the WTZ (Health Insurance Access Act) scheme (see below), 30% (Maarse 
and Okma 2004). 
 
By prohibiting voluntary exit from the ZFW, while maintaining a market for private 
insurance, the government successfully dealt with adverse selection and risk 
selection between public and private coverage. However, it was less successful in 
addressing risk segmentation. In fact, the 1986 reform of the ZFW served to entrench 
the unequal distribution of high risks, a problem that persists to this day. For 
example, Table 10 shows that the ZFW covers a much higher proportion of older 
people and a much lower proportion of younger people than private insurers. To 
compensate the ZFW for the financial burden this entails, the government introduced 
the MOOZ scheme (1986), which requires all private policy holders to subsidise the 
ZFW through an annual flat-rate contribution (den Exter et al 2004). 
 
Table 10 Age distribution in the Dutch population and public and private 
coverage, 2000 
Age Population (%) ZFW (%) Substitutive VHI and WTZ (%) 
0-19 24.4 21.3 30.9 
20-64 62.0 63.4 59.0 
65+ 13.6 15.2 10.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Vektis 2000 
Note: ZFW = public scheme covering non-long-term care; WTZ = scheme created in 1986 to ensure 
access to private coverage for specific groups 
 
Financial barriers to private coverage 
In both Germany and the Netherlands measures taken to restrict voluntary exit with a 
view to protecting the finances of the public scheme had the unintended effect of 
lowering access to health care for specific groups of people. Some of those who were 
no longer eligible for public coverage faced financial barriers to private coverage for 
themselves and their dependants – for example, older private policy holders in 
Germany and older people and younger self-employed people with pre-existing 
conditions in the Netherlands. This problem has precipitated further reforms 
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involving mandatory pooling, product and price controls and changes to the 
threshold for public coverage. 
 
In 2000 the German government introduced a ‘standard’ policy to protect older 
private policy holders who could no longer return to the GKV, even if their earnings 
fell below the threshold. Open to those aged 55 and under who have been privately 
insured for at least 10 years and whose earnings are below the threshold, the standard 
policy guarantees access to the same level of benefits as the GKV for a premium that 
cannot exceed the average maximum GKV contribution (or 1.5 times the 
contribution for married couples) (PKV 2001). In order to address information 
problems in the private market, the government also requires private insurers to 
inform policy holders of the irreversibility of the decision to opt out of the GKV, the 
likelihood of premiums rising with old age and the possibility of changing to a 
standard policy (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen 2001). 
 
Every year, the government raises the threshold for compulsory enrolment in the 
GKV in line with increases in average earnings. In 2002, to prevent younger and 
healthier individuals from opting for private cover, the government proposed raising 
the threshold by as much as a third (Busse and Wörz 2004). It was eventually raised 
by about 11% in 2003, from €41,400 to €45,900, but the threshold for returning to 
the GKV remained at €41,400 (Busse and Wörz 2004). 
 
The Dutch government introduced the WTZ scheme in 1986 to guarantee private 
policy holders access to a standard policy providing a similar level of benefits to the 
ZFW for a fixed premium (calculated as the typical private premium for someone of 
average risk) and no exclusion of pre-existing conditions (den Exter et al 2004). The 
standard policy covers all privately insured people aged 65 and over (since 1989) or 
whose private premiums have been higher than the WTZ premium for three 
consecutive years (since 1991) and students eligible for financial assistance (since 
1992). As the WTZ premium only covers part of the standard policy’s costs, private 
insurers are compensated through a centrally administered equalisation fund financed 
by annual contributions from non-WTZ private policy holders (Zorgverzekeraars 
Nederland 2005). The WTZ scheme currently covers about 12% of privately insured 
persons (Ministry of Health Welfare and Sport 2002). 
  168 
 
Over time it has become clear that the WTZ scheme alone is unable fully to remove 
financial barriers to private cover, partly due to requirements to purchase separate 
policies for dependants. Consequently, the government has taken measures to 
increase access to public cover. Since 1998 ZFW members aged 65 and over are 
permitted to stay where they are, even if their earnings rise above the threshold, 
while privately insured persons aged 65 and over are eligible for public cover if their 
annual household taxable income (not earnings) is less than €20,750 (in 2004) (den 
Exter et al 2004). However, once they have enrolled in the ZFW they can no longer 
leave it. 
 
The Dutch government has also used the border line between public and private 
coverage to benefit those just above the threshold (den Exter et al 2004). However, 
any concern for equity of access has been constrained by the politics of health 
insurance – notably, the government’s attempt to ensure a stable market share for 
private insurers (Maarse and Okma 2004). 
 
 
Impact on equity and efficiency 
 
Horizontal and vertical equity in funding health care 
Contributions to public insurers in Germany and the Netherlands are mainly set as a 
proportion of wages and are therefore independent of ability to pay. Making 
contributions entitles the payer, and any non-working dependants he or she may 
have, to a package of benefits defined by the government. The existence of a ceiling 
on contributions breaches vertical equity and individual sickness funds are allowed to 
set their own contribution rates (Germany) or additional flat-rate premiums (the 
Netherlands), which breaches horizontal equity (Busse and Riesberg 2004; den Exter 
et al 2004). 
 
However, the degree to which public cover breaches horizontal equity is limited 
when compared to private cover: determined by an individual’s age, sex and health 
status, private premiums do not cover dependants and depend on ability to pay. This 
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means that there may be significant differences in funding health care among the 
privately insured and between those with public and private coverage, even if they 
share the same characteristics. It is difficult to demonstrate the magnitude of these 
differences in financial terms as data regarding public contributions and private 
premiums are either presented in average amounts (both countries) or do not 
distinguish between different types of privately insured persons (Germany) and 
cannot therefore give sufficient indication of the level of benefits covered. 
Nevertheless, the distribution of high risks among public and private insurers shown 
in the previous section strongly suggests that private coverage is likely to be 
expensive for older people and larger families and may not even be available to those 
in poor health. 
 
Although the German and Dutch governments have taken action to ensure that 
private cover is affordable for older people and those in poor health, financial 
barriers probably remain. For example, the Dutch standard policy premium is still 
20% higher than the average ZFW contribution and neither the Dutch nor the 
German standard policies cover dependants, who must be separately insured. 
 
As level of earnings determines eligibility for public coverage in both countries, the 
public pool is funded by people with lower earnings and loses the potentially larger 
contributions of higher earners who choose private cover or were subsequently 
excluded from public cover, as in the Netherlands. The combination of a public pool 
predominantly funded by lower earners and covering a disproportionate 
concentration of high risks means that the burden of paying for health care largely 
falls on those with public cover. Consequently, the publicly insured contribute 
proportionately more towards health care costs than privately insured higher earners. 
Over time this burden will worsen as those who have opted for private cover return 
to the public scheme and claim benefits towards which they have not previously 
contributed. The public scheme may be forced to raise contribution rates, not only to 
cover the costs of caring for high risks, but also to compensate for the influx of new 
members, many of whom may themselves be high risks. 
 
The Dutch government’s MOOZ scheme attempted to rectify this anomaly, but the 
size of the subsidy involved is small (about 5% of the average private premium) and 
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does not adequately compensate the ZFW for its concentration of high risks or for 
the loss of contributions from higher earners (Hamilton 1996). Ironically, as ZFW 
contributions are based on earnings rather than income, some private policy holders 
may in fact be subsidising ZFW members who are low earners but have large non-
wage incomes (Westerhout 1999). 
 
Taking these factors into account, and assuming that private premiums are, on 
average, cheaper than public contributions, it is possible to conclude that a health 
system offering choice of public or private insurance is regressive in funding health 
care, thereby breaching vertical equity. International analysis confirms that funding 
from all sources together (public insurance, taxes, private insurance and direct 
payments) was regressive in Germany and the Netherlands at the end of the 1980s 
and in the Netherlands in the early 1990s (Wagstaff et al 1999). However, funding 
through public insurance alone was not only regressive, but considerably more so 
than funding from all sources together due to the voluntary exit or exclusion of richer 
people. Because the private pool consists almost exclusively of higher earners, 
funding from private insurance alone was found to be mildly progressive. The 
analysis concluded that health care funding in the Netherlands was pro-rich in its 
redistributive effect, a factor attributed to the dual system of income-related public 
contributions for lower earners and non-income-related private premiums for higher 
earners; the same conclusion can be drawn for Germany (Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer 1997; Wagstaff et al 1999). 
 
Efficiency in production 
The private market in both countries is characterised by weak incentives for insurers 
to compete on the basis of efficiency in production. First, private insurers have strong 
incentives to avoid financial risk, either through risk selection or by shifting risk to 
other entities (such as the GKV in Germany and the WTZ scheme in the 
Netherlands; thanks to the latter, Dutch private insurers do not bear any financial risk 
for unhealthy and older policy holders). So rather than competing on the basis of 
their ability to operate more efficiently than their rivals, for a given level of quality, 
private insurers are more likely to compete on the basis of their ability to select risks. 
Analysis of Dutch private insurers’ non-medical expenditure, based on a sample, 
  171 
shows that they spend 14 times as much on selection (€28 per insured) as on 
efficiency measures (€2 per insured) (Douven and Westerhout 2000). Public insurers 
spend less on selection (€10 per insured) and more on efficiency measures (€3 per 
insured). 
 
Second, levels of competition among private insurers are low, measured by level of 
policy holder movement, because those who have been privately insured for some 
time are likely to find it difficult to change from one insurer to another without 
incurring higher premiums. Risk-rated premiums combined with rejection of 
applications, exclusion of pre-existing conditions, the non-transferability of claims 
histories and (in Germany) the existence of ageing reserves and surcharges on new 
policies mean that individuals become ‘locked in’ to their existing policies. 
Consequently, movement between private insurers is minimal in both countries 
(Datamonitor 2000). In contrast, a survey carried out in Germany in 1999 showed 
that 7.3% of the population had changed from one public insurer to another since the 
introduction of competition among public funds in the mid 1990s (Zok 1999). The 
proportion switching in the Netherlands is lower but has been increasing over time 
(Gresz et al 2002a). 
 
In the private sector, competitive efforts focus on attracting new entrants to the 
market and (in the Netherlands) sales to groups (Westerhout 1999). Private insurers 
that succeed in attracting new entrants will probably keep them for as long as those 
individuals remain in the private market, partly due to the constraints on mobility 
already noted but also because market exit is determined by income level rather than 
choice. Not only does this encourage some insurers to behave in ways that 
disadvantage consumers in the long run (Riemer-Hommel et al 2003), it also means 
they are less likely to compete through avoiding administrative waste and exerting 
control over provider payment and behaviour. For example, German private insurers 
spend almost three times as much of their income on administration as sickness funds 
(16.7% versus 6.1% in 2002), as do Dutch private insurers (12.7% versus 4.4% in 
2000) (Busse and Riesberg 2004; PKV 2003; Vektis 2000). 
 
Private insurers in both countries have been slow to adopt cost containment strategies 
such as vertical integration, selective contracting or monitoring of providers’ 
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behaviour (Mossialos and Thomson 2004). Effective negotiation of lower prices with 
providers and control of provider behaviour by private insurers are also limited by 
market fragmentation and provider power (Busse and Riesberg 2004; Schut 1995; 
Westerhout 1999). Cost inflation tends to be much higher in the private than the 
public sector. For example, in Germany between 1992 and 2002 per capita 
expenditure among private insurers rose by 1.4 times as much as the rise in spending 
by sickness funds; some of this increase is due to the fact that doctors are permitted 
to charge their privately insured patients higher fees (Busse and Riesberg 2004). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This review of policy outcomes in Germany and the Netherlands provides some 
empirical support for inequity and inefficiency in markets where there is choice of 
public or private health insurance, as predicted by economic theory. It shows that 
choice of public or private coverage breaches horizontal and vertical equity in 
funding health care, heightens the degree of financial risk borne by the public 
scheme and lowers incentives for private insurers to operate efficiently. 
 
Policies introducing choice of public or private coverage have developed in such a 
way as to result in risk segmentation, partly through poor design and partly through 
the incentive structures they bring about. First, eligibility for this choice depends on 
level of earnings and as income is usually correlated positively with health status and 
negatively with old age, it seems inevitable that the public scheme will cover a 
disproportionate amount of poorer, unhealthier and older individuals (Whitehead 
1992). Second, the choice itself creates incentives for insurers to select risks. Third, 
rules aimed at preventing public insurers (sickness funds) from explicit risk selection 
– for example, open enrolment, wage-related contributions, automatic coverage of 
dependants at no extra cost and benefits defined by government – make it even easier 
for private insurers, free from similar regulation, to attract low risks and deter high 
risks. It is difficult to establish the separate influence of these three factors on risk 
segmentation in the German and Dutch markets for health insurance. The aim here 
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was simply to demonstrate how policy design and regulation have combined to 
facilitate risk selection by private insurers. 
 
Regulatory responses to risk segmentation and risk selection differ in their 
effectiveness and have varied across the two countries. German efforts to deal with 
these issues at the same time as maintaining choice have had the unintended 
consequence of limiting access to coverage for some groups. However, the more 
radical Dutch solution of moving from choice to exclusion of higher earners from 
public coverage, while protecting the public scheme from adverse selection, has 
entrenched existing levels of risk segmentation and also led to problems of access. 
More incremental measures, such as cross-subsidies from private to public insurance, 
tend to be limited in their impact and could be contested under supranational 
competition law – for example, European single market legislation (Neudeck and 
Podczeck 1996; Palm 2002). Others, such as risk adjustment and tighter regulation of 
insurers, are not only technically difficult to implement but may also be resisted by 
insurers (Puig-Junoy 1999; van de Ven et al 2000). It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to examine why governments prefer some measures to others, but stakeholder 
interests are likely to have had considerable influence on the policy making process. 
 
In practice, neither country’s regulatory approach has resolved the underlying issues, 
even after successive reforms. From a theoretical perspective, abolishing choice and 
making health insurance compulsory for the whole population is the most effective 
means of dealing with adverse selection – a conclusion that governments in both 
countries have recently reached (Barr 1998; Hsiao 1995a). German proposals for 
compulsory universal health insurance are still under debate, but Dutch plans to 
introduce a compulsory universal scheme have been approved by parliament and will 
take effect in 2006 (Busse and Riesberg 2004; Maarse 2002; Rürup-Kommission 
2004). 
 
Proponents of choice of public or private health insurance argue that this type of 
choice is valued by consumers and may curb public expenditure on health care. The 
absence of relevant data makes it difficult to address the first issue. However, the 
extent to which individuals value choice of public or private coverage may be 
determined by attitudes towards risk; uncertainty about future health care needs, 
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family size, earnings and regulation complicate decision making and a choice made 
at one point in time may, at a later stage, turn out to have been sub-optimal. 
Importantly, the conduct of private insurers and technical and information problems 
in private markets in Germany and the Netherlands have severely restricted choice 
for certain individuals and prevented others from exercising any choice at all. It is 
not known what effect choice for some has on those who do not qualify for choice or 
who cannot exercise choice due to poor health. 
 
The voluntary nature of choice of public or private health insurance also makes it 
hard to establish whether there will be a net cost or net benefit to public finances in 
the long term, but the possibility of adverse selection against the public scheme 
makes the prospect of lower per capita public expenditure unlikely. Total levels of 
public expenditure might fall if governments follow the Dutch model of excluding 
higher earners from public coverage, but given that private insurers have limited 
incentives to operate efficiently, increasing private coverage may actually lead to 
rises in total levels of spending on health care. Advocates of opting out or excluding 
some groups from public coverage should also be explicit about the distributional 
implications. The ostensible aim of such policies may be to shift health care costs 
from public to private insurance. In reality, however, costs tend to be shifted in the 
opposite direction, from private to public coverage, as the public scheme finds itself 
paying for a disproportionate amount of high risks with a lower level of 
contributions. 
 
This examination of the German and Dutch experience suggests that the potential 
benefits of opting out or excluding higher earners from public coverage may be 
overestimated in current policy debates. These policies give rise to perverse 
incentives and, while measures can be taken to correct any negative impact on equity 
and efficiency, some forms of regulation will face opposition from interest groups; 
others may be technically difficult to implement. 
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Introduction: the rationale for insurer competition 
 
Choice of and competition among health insurers has gained prominence in Europe 
in the last 15 years and is now an integral feature of health financing policy in 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Slovakia 
(Thomson et al 2009b). Although not yet widespread, the idea that third-party payers 
(whether health insurers or other entities) should compete for clients is an option 
debated with growing frequency in countries as diverse as England and Estonia 
(Bevan and van de Ven 2010; Thomson et al 2010b). 
 
Arguments in favour of insurer or payer competition (the terms are used 
interchangeably) derive from neo-classical economic theory. They take as their 
starting point the idea that if people can buy the same good or service from more 
than one firm, the possibility of a person buying from a rival firm – the threat of exit 
(Hirschman 1970) – will encourage all firms to improve the price-quality ratio of 
their products or lose clients and, eventually, face bankruptcy. Competition between 
insurers is intended to secure efficiency (enhanced value) through two mechanisms: 
making insurers bear financial risk and giving people free choice of insurer 
(Enthoven 1988). Where insurers have a fixed and prospectively determined budget 
within which they must meet the health care costs of their enrolees they will, it is 
argued, aim to use resources judiciously. Those that do not will have to charge higher 
premiums and risk losing enrolees. The threat of consumer exit will also encourage 
insurers to be more responsive to public preferences. If people are sensitive to price 
and quality, insurers will try to enhance value – maintaining or improving quality 
while minimising costs – using a range of tools, including cutting overheads and 
engaging in strategic purchasing (Figueras et al 2005). 
 
The ultimate aim of insurer competition is to improve the performance of the health 
system – that is, to strengthen the health system’s ability to meet its goals (WHO 
2000). For this to happen, however, the mechanisms listed above must be in place 
and at least three further assumptions must hold38. First, people should be able to 
                                                 
38
 Bevan and van de Ven (2010) have set out a larger number of conditions that must be fulfilled if 
insurer competition is to achieve its goals. This paper has condensed some of these conditions so that 
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choose and switch insurer with ease and without incurring significant transaction 
costs. This implies that people are able to make an informed choice of insurer and do 
not face barriers to switching. Second, insurer competition must be based on price 
and quality rather than risk selection, otherwise it will not create incentives for 
efficiency (van de Ven and Ellis 1999). Third, insurers must have access to tools that 
allow them to enhance value, and be willing to use them. 
 
This paper considers the potential for insurer competition to improve health system 
performance in western Europe. It does so by assessing the extent to which the 
assumptions noted above hold in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. If the assumptions do not hold, it may be difficult for insurer 
competition to succeed in strengthening the health system. This may in turn help to 
explain why reforms introducing or expanding insurer choice and competition have 
not always lived up to policy makers’ expectations. It is also useful to know why 
assumptions do not hold, so that barriers to successful implementation can be 
identified and addressed. The paper does not attempt to assess the impact of insurer 
competition on health system performance, which would in any case be difficult to 
do due to noise from other reforms and the absence of knowledge about the 
counterfactual (what might have happened without insurer competition). After 
briefly outlining the history, development and goals of insurer choice and 
competition in western Europe, the paper examines each of the three assumptions in 
turn, summarises the outcome of reforms and discusses implications for policy. 
 
 
Insurer choice and competition: history, development and goals in 
western Europe 
 
This section outlines the history and development of insurer choice and competition 
in the four countries in chronological order. It also highlights the policy goals 
underpinning more recent reforms. Awareness of the goals specific to each country, 
and the context in which they have been formulated, is important for the assessment 
                                                                                                                                          
they fall under the three assumptions listed here. It also takes some of the conditions in Bevan and van 
de Ven’s list (such as regulation) as a given: for example, freedom to switch could probably only be 
achieved through regulation. 
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of outcomes and discussion of implications in subsequent sections. Table 11, Table 
12 and Table 13 depict key features of current health insurance coverage, regulation 
and market structure. 
 
Switzerland 
Choice of health insurer in Switzerland dates to 1911, when the first federal law on 
Sickness and Accident Insurance came into force. At that time the health insurance 
system was mainly managed by small-scale, private, non-profit institutions, and state 
subsidies were required to encourage voluntary enrolment and make premiums more 
affordable. In order to qualify for subsidies, insurers had to offer open enrolment to 
people under the age of 55 and portable benefits. They also had to limit the 
difference between premiums for men and women to 25%. By 1945, about half of 
the population was covered, expanding to near-universal coverage between 1985 and 
1990. 
 
Weak regulation, premiums based on age at enrolment, and the entry of new insurers 
led to a degree of unfair competition based on risk selection. During the early 1990s, 
many sickness funds collapsed or merged with others to avoid bankruptcy. Concerns 
about unequal access to health insurance, combined with concerns about health 
expenditure and gaps in coverage, gave rise to a new Federal Health Insurance Act 
(FHIA) in 1996. The new law made health insurance universally compulsory. To 
encourage fair competition based on price and quality, it extended open enrolment 
and introduced a standard benefits package, risk equalisation and minimum cost-
sharing requirements. The law maintained collective contracting of providers, but 
gave insurers leeway to develop so-called managed-care plans (involving referral to 
specialists, selective contracting and capitation-based provider payment) and sell 
them to those willing to accept limited choice of provider in return for lower 
premiums. Thus, the reform aimed to enhance access to health care but at the same 
time to create incentives for better quality and cost control (Crivelli 2012 in press). 
 
Belgium 
Compulsory health insurance for employees was established in Belgium in 1944 and 
is currently managed by five non-governmental, non-profit sickness fund 
  179 
associations comprising 57 local sickness funds, a special fund for railroad 
employees and a public insurer of last resort. In 1964 compulsory coverage of 
inpatient care was extended to self-employed people and in 2008 coverage for the 
self-employed was further extended to include outpatient care. 
 
Although Belgian residents have enjoyed free choice of sickness fund since 1945, 
this choice has not been regarded as a means of stimulating insurer competition. 
Rather, funds were associated with different political or religious groups, and choice 
simply allowed people to express their preference for a ‘Christian’ or ‘Socialist’ 
insurer. Even when sickness funds took on some financial risk (in 1995 the 
government introduced partial prospective funding of sickness funds, accompanied 
by risk equalisation), the underlying policy intention was not to encourage 
competition among sickness funds but to place them on an equal footing and 
encourage them to contain health care costs (Schokkaert and Van de Voorde 2000). 
The sickness funds were not given new tools, such as selective contracting, with 
which to influence health service costs and quality (Schokkaert and Van de Voorde 
2003). 
 
Belgium is the only one of the four countries to have a public insurer of last resort. 
Unlike the sickness funds, the public fund has no historical affiliation to political or 
religious groups, nor does it offer compulsory additional benefits39 (as the local 
sickness funds do). As a result, its small share of the market (1%) is made up of 
people who do not wish to pay for any additional benefits or who prefer a ‘neutral’ 
fund.  
 
The Netherlands 
In 1991 the Dutch government introduced free choice of non-profit sickness fund for 
the two-thirds of the population eligible for statutory coverage and, for the first time, 
sickness funds began to take on financial risk for their enrolees’ health care costs. 
                                                 
39
 The local sickness funds have traditionally offered a mixture of compulsory additional benefits and 
voluntary supplementary and complementary health insurance. Additional benefits are compulsory on 
the grounds that if everyone pays for them adverse selection can be avoided and they will be cheaper 
to cover. In 2010 a change in the law separated compulsory and voluntary activity. From 2012 
voluntary additional benefits will be sold by new non-profit societies of mutual assistance, which are 
part of the national sickness fund associations.  
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Free choice of fund was intended to improve efficiency and responsiveness to 
consumer preferences. By the end of 2005, the sickness funds bore financial risk for 
53% of their revenue. However, there was growing dissatisfaction among policy 
makers with the absence of other incentives for efficiency and innovation within the 
prevailing regulatory framework, coupled with concerns about long waiting times for 
specialist care. The increasingly heavy regulation required to ensure access to 
voluntary private health insurance for the third of the population excluded from 
statutory coverage was also seen as unsatisfactory. 
 
The 2006 Health Insurance Act extended statutory coverage to the whole population 
under a new system managed by private insurers, some of whom were formerly 
sickness funds. Insurers now have stronger incentives to be prudent purchasers of 
health services, including increased financial risk (75% of revenue) and some tools to 
stimulate competition among providers. It was expected that over time consumer 
choice of insurer would reduce the emphasis on government regulation of health care 
supply and increase the use of strategic purchasing to enhance value. This in turn 
would make health care more affordable, more responsive to patient needs and more 
effective (Westert et al 2010). 
 
Germany 
Historically, statutory health insurance (SHI) in Germany was compulsory for all 
blue-collar employees and white-collar employees with earnings below a threshold. 
Employees were assigned to a non-profit, quasi-public sickness fund based on 
geographical or occupational criteria. Only white-collar employees with earnings 
above the threshold were allowed a choice of voluntary enrolment in the SHI system 
or voluntary private health insurance; if they chose SHI, they not only had free 
choice of sickness fund but also the ability to switch fund at regular intervals (Busse 
2011 in press). Assigned membership led to large variations in income-related 
contribution rates (of up to 8 percentage points in the early 1990s) because sickness 
funds covered people with very different income levels and risk profiles (Gaskins 
and Busse 2009). Over time, variation in contribution rates and differences in the 
rights of white- and blue-collar employees came to be regarded as inequitable, 
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particularly since blue-collar employees often experienced higher contribution rates 
than white-collar employees. 
 
In 1992 the German government extended free choice of sickness fund to almost all 
those covered by SHI, with effect from 1996. This was primarily intended to tackle 
equity concerns about varying contribution rates by permitting anyone to choose a 
sickness fund with a lower contribution rate. It was expected that free choice would 
lead to a convergence in contribution rates and, since the national and international 
ideological climate at that time favoured the introduction of market mechanisms in 
health care, it was also hoped that fostering competition within the SHI system 
would control health care costs and increase efficiency. Free choice of sickness fund 
was preceded by the introduction (in 1994–1995) of risk equalisation to prevent risk 
selection and ensure contribution rates would signal a sickness fund’s ability to 
operate efficiently. Although it was clear from its inception that the risk-adjustment 
formula was crude, the government did not have the tools and data necessary to 
implement a more sophisticated scheme. 
 
In 2009 the government made health insurance compulsory for all permanent 
residents. SHI covers employees (with the exception of civil servants) and their 
dependants (non-earning spouses and children), and other groups such as the 
unemployed, pensioners, students, farmers, and (since 2007) anyone not covered by 
private health insurance (PHI). Employees whose gross wages exceed €49,950 a year 
(less than 15% of the population) can choose to opt for PHI instead, but they must 
have some form of coverage. Less than a third of this high-earning group opts for 
PHI. SHI covers about 85% of the population, PHI covers around 10% (more than 
half of whom are civil servants and the self-employed) and government schemes 
cover about 4%. As people aged 55 and over who have opted for PHI are no longer 
eligible for SHI coverage (to prevent people from opting for PHI when younger and 
then returning to SHI when older), PHI has become increasingly tightly regulated to 
ensure financial protection and access to health care. For example, private insurers 
are required to offer a basic PHI package, which matches SHI benefits and 
contribution rates, on an open enrolment basis. 
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Summary of policy goals across the four countries 
The range of policy goals underlying insurer competition varies across the four 
countries, but there is common ground. While Germany was unique in expanding 
consumer choice of insurer to address equity concerns, all four countries expected 
this form of consumer choice, combined with greater financial risk for payers, to 
enhance efficiency and quality in health care administration and delivery and to keep 
costs under control. 
 
Belgium is the only one of the four countries in which public policy has not 
emphasised insurer competition to improve health system performance. However, it 
is included in the analysis because the 1995 reform shifting some financial risk to 
sickness funds aimed to stimulate greater cost control, one of the main goals of 
insurer competition in the other countries. Following this reform, consumer choice of 
sickness fund (which dates to 1945) became an integral part of the incentive structure 
facing insurers, even though it was not originally intended to have such an effect. 
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Table 11 Health insurance coverage, 2011 
 Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Statutory coverage 
breadth (universality) 
Coverage compulsory for all residents 
since 2008 (salaried workers: 1944; 
inpatient care for self employed: 1964; 
outpatient care for self employed: 2008). 
Coverage compulsory under SHI since 
2007; coverage compulsory for all 
residents since 2009. Around 85% 
covered by SHI, 10% through PHI, 4% 
through other government schemes. 
Coverage compulsory for all legal 
residents since 2006. 
Coverage compulsory for all residents since 
1996. 
What % of the population 
is not covered? 
Less than 1.0% of the population (a high 
of 1.4% in 2007). 
Probably less than 0.5% of the population 
(in 2007, before the introduction of 
compulsory insurance). 
About 1.0% of the population (plus a 
further 1.0% who are illegally 
resident). 
About 2.0% until January 2011. A new 
regulation should have significantly reduced 
this percentage (but no official statistics exist). 
What are the 
characteristics of the 
uninsured? 
Not known (a mixture of people unable 
and unwilling to pay health insurance 
premiums). 
Before 2007/09: Self employed, formerly 
voluntary SHI members, people aged 55+ 
no longer eligible for SHI, divorced 
women formerly covered as dependants 
and illegal immigrants. 
Low-income individuals, both legal 
and illegal immigrants (illegal 
immigrants are not allowed to 
purchase subsidised health insurance). 
Not known (there was a big debate about 
whether the uninsured were unable or 
unwilling to pay health insurance premiums). 
More likely to be aged 20-59, foreigners, 
divorced or single, below or just above the 
threshold for social assistance, users of mental 
health services. 
What is the main role of 
voluntary health 
insurance? 
Supplementary (mainly for superior 
accommodation in a hospital, not to 
increase choice or for faster access) and 
complementary covering eye and dental 
care. 
 
Substitutive, covering civil servants, self-
employed and high-earning employees 
who choose private insurance (in total, 
around 10% of the population); 
complementary, covering user charges 
and some uncovered services (around 
20% of the population). 
Complementary, offering mainly 
dental care and physiotherapy benefits 
(about 90% of the population). 
Supplementary cover (offering free choice of 
hospital across all cantons, free choice of 
physician in public hospitals, higher standards 
of hotel comfort in private and semi-private 
wards, daily cash benefits) and 
complementary cover of excluded or partially 
covered services (eg dental care and home 
care). In 2005 59% of the population had 
hospital cover, 37% had cash benefit cover, 
11% had dental cover and 52% had cover for 
other excluded services (Kocher and Oggier 
2007). 
Coverage scope (benefits) Broad coverage. Broad coverage. Broad coverage. Broad coverage. 
What health services are 
typically not covered? 
Eyeglasses and contact lenses, hearing 
aids, orthodontic care, cosmetic plastic 
surgery, less necessary drugs, alternative 
medicine. 
Eyeglasses, contact lenses and over-the-
counter and ‘lifestyle’ drugs. 
Eyeglasses and contact lenses, dental 
care for adults, orthodontic care, 
cosmetic plastic surgery, alternative 
medicine. 
For eyeglasses and contact lenses only a lump 
sum is paid. Inpatient care provided at a 
hospital not on a specific cantonal list, 
psychotherapy (covered subject to certain 
conditions), drugs not listed in the ‘catalogue 
of pharmaceutical specialities’, alternative 
medicine, dental care, and cosmetic plastic 
surgery. 
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 Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Who defines the statutory 
benefits package? 
Federal government based on proposals 
negotiated between sickness funds and 
providers. The Minster of Social Affairs 
defines entitlement to drugs based on 
advice from the Drug Reimbursement 
Committee.  
In general terms federal 
legislature/parliament; details by Federal 
Joint Committee representing payers, 
providers and patients. 
Central government based on advice 
from the independent Dutch Health 
Care Insurance Board (CVZ). 
Central government based on advice from the 
Federal Commission on Health Insurance 
Benefits and General Questions representing 
payers, providers, patients and scientific 
advisors. 
Coverage depth (user 
charges) 
Co-insurance or co-payments applied to 
most health services, with an annual out-
of-pocket maximum. 
Co-payments for adults applied to most 
health services, with an annual out-of-
pocket maximum. 
Annual deductible of €170 per adult 
(18+) applied for non-primary care 
services. 
Minimum annual deductible of CHF 300 
(€250) plus co-insurance or co-payments 
applied to most health services, with an annual 
out-of-pocket maximum. The maximum 
optional deductible for adults is CHF 2500 
(€2085). Controversial proposal debated in 
parliament: to introduce a 20% co-insurance 
rate for people who do not opt for managed-
care contracts. 
Who defines user charges 
policy? 
Federal legislation.  Federal legislature/parliament. Sickness 
funds can waive some charges (eg for 
enrolment in DMPs). 
Central government. Insurers can 
waive or increase some charges for use 
of preferred/non-preferred providers. 
The insured can choose to pay a higher 
annual deductible. 
Central government. Insurers may waive or 
increase some charges. The insured can 
choose to pay a higher annual deductible. 
Source: Survey responses 
Note: Currency converted using 30 June 2011 exchange rates from www.oanda.com; DMP = disease management programme 
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Table 12 Regulation of statutory health insurance, 2011 
 Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Who sets and collects 
contributions? 
Federal government sets and collects 
a uniform income-related 
contribution. Sickness funds set and 
collect additional community-rated 
premiums. 
From 2011 a national contribution 
rate is defined in legislation. In 
2009/10 the federal government 
(the cabinet) set a uniform income-
related contribution rate. Prior to 
this the sickness funds determined 
their own contribution rate. 
Contributions are collected by 
sickness funds but transferred to a 
central health fund. Sickness funds 
set and collect additional 
community-rated premiums. 
Central government sets and collects a uniform 
income-related contribution. Insurers set and 
collect additional community-rated premiums. 
 
Insurers set and collect their own 
community-rated premiums. 
How are statutory health 
insurance revenues pooled 
and (re)allocated? 
Income-related contributions and 
general tax revenue pooled by a 
central fund and allocated to 
sickness funds based on a risk-
adjusted formula and actual costs. 
Income-related contributions and 
general tax revenue pooled by a 
central fund (see note) and 
allocated to sickness funds based 
on a risk-adjusted formula. 
Income-related contributions and general tax 
revenue to cover children pooled by a central fund 
and allocated to insurers based on a risk-adjusted 
formula. 
Premiums pooled by insurers and 
redistributed at cantonal level based on a 
risk-adjusted formula managed by a 
foundation owned by the insurers. General 
tax revenue is pooled by Cantons and used 
to pay for about half of all inpatient care 
costs. 
Who sets the formula for 
(re)allocating resources? 
Federal government. Federal Ministry of Health. Central government. Parliament defines the principles on which 
risk adjustment should be based. The 
Federal Council is responsible for applying 
them in setting the formula. 
Who monitors insurer 
competition? 
A government agency (Control 
Office of the Sickness Funds) and 
the Belgian Central Bank (NBB). 
SHI: the Federal Insurance 
Authority; PHI: the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority 
Semi-public supervisory authorities at arm’s 
length: the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) 
manages competition among the providers and 
insurers; the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) 
covers all sectors (monitoring the health sector now 
accounts for about one third of its time); the Dutch 
Central Bank (DNB) supervises financial solvency. 
Under the FHIA, the Federal Office of 
Public Health controls SHI activity; VHI 
activity falling under the private Law on 
Insurance Contracts (VVG) is supervised by 
FINMA, the Swiss Financial Markets 
Supervisory Authority, which replaced the 
Federal Office of Private Insurance in 2009. 
 
Source: Survey responses 
Note: Farmers’ sickness funds in Germany do not participate in the central fund and are not subject to the risk equalisation scheme. 
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Table 13 Market structure of statutory health insurance, 2011 
 Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
What is the legal/profit status of insurers? Sickness funds are non-governmental non-
profit organisations under public law. The 
market is closed to new entrants. 
Sickness funds are non-governmental, non-
profit organisations under public law. 
Private insurers fall under private law. 
Insurers are private entities 
allowed to share profits with 
their shareholders. 
Insurers are private entities 
and cannot make a profit on 
SHI business. 
If profit status varies, what is the balance 
between non-profit and for-profit? 
Not relevant. Among private insurers, 20 insurers are 
non-profit and 26 are for-profit. 
Most insurers are non-profit 
mutual associations. 
About 60% have non-profit 
legal status (foundations or 
associations) and 40% are 
stock companies owned by 
non-profit institutions. 
If profits are allowed, are there any 
controls on profit margins? 
Not relevant. No.  No. Profits not allowed for SHI 
business (see note). 
How many insurers are there? Five sickness fund associations (divided 
into 57 local funds), a public insurer of last 
resort and a scheme for railroad workers. 
169 sickness funds in 2010 and 46 private 
insurers. 
11 health insurance holding 
companies in 2010, 28 different 
health insurers in total. The 
largest holding company 
contains 7 insurers. 
82 insurers involved in SHI in 
2010. 
What is the market share of the largest 
three insurers? 
About 90%. About 32% for the sickness funds and 
around 42% for private health insurance. 
74% for holding companies. Nationally: 45% (holdings); 
28% (individual insurers). 
Cantonal markets are much 
more concentrated. 
Can insurers who sell SHI also sell 
voluntary cover? 
Yes, but in 2010 local sickness fund 
compulsory health insurance activity was 
separated from VHI activity. From 2012 the 
latter will be offered by non-profit societies 
of mutual assistance (part of the national 
sickness fund associations).  
Sickness funds can broker VHI sold by 
private insurers; in practice the line is 
becoming blurred as SHI policies for 
‘integrated care’ include some 
supplementary benefits (eg smaller wards in 
hospital). 
Yes. The Dutch Health 
Insurance Act prohibits the 
termination of VHI contracts 
when enrolees switch to another 
insurer for SHI cover. 
Yes. Legislation prohibits tied 
sales of VHI and SHI. 
Source: Survey responses 
Note: A survey of 65 Swiss funds found that only one had distributed part of its VHI profits to the holding company. This suggests profits on VHI business are generally kept within 
companies to increase reserves, reduce premiums or invest in marketing campaigns (Hefti and Frey 2008).
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Can people move freely between insurers? 
 
The threat of exit may be muted if people cannot move (switch) freely from one 
insurer to another, undermining a major premise of insurer competition. This is most 
likely to be problematic where switching is difficult for regular users of health care – 
for example, those with chronic conditions. Insurers who assume these people have 
no real alternative to their existing insurer, and are therefore ‘locked in’, may not 
have much incentive to respond to their preferences. In the absence of a single metric 
to establish the degree of consumer mobility in insurance markets, a range of factors 
needs to be considered. These include financial and administrative barriers to joining 
a new insurer, actual rates of switching among the total population, the reasons 
people give for switching or staying put and the characteristics of those who do and 
do not switch. 
 
Strategies to facilitate switching 
All four countries employ multiple strategies to ensure that the whole population is 
able to switch from one insurer to another, for statutory benefits, with relative ease 
and at low cost: open enrolment (in Belgium since 2007 only, replacing a system of 
guaranteed renewal of contract), full coverage of pre-existing conditions, premiums 
that are not linked to risk of ill health, fully portable benefits, a standardised benefits 
package to enable straightforward price comparisons, good comparative information 
available through newspapers, web sites40 and intermediaries, and a risk equalisation 
scheme intended to compensate insurers for covering high-risk individuals. These 
universally applied strategies mean that the financial and administrative costs of 
switching are likely to be low. Other transaction costs may be high, however, 
particularly for some groups. 
 
Rates of switching and switcher characteristics 
Switching rates vary across the four countries, with the lowest rates in Belgium and 
the highest rates in Switzerland (Table 14). An important question is whether current 
                                                 
40
 Government-sponsored web sites in the Netherlands (www.kiesbeter.nl) and private initiatives in all 
four countries. 
  188 
mobility levels are sufficient to stimulate competition. It is difficult to say, however, 
what degree of mobility is necessary for the possibility of exit to present a genuine 
threat to insurers. Looking at the characteristics of those who are more (or less) likely 
to switch may be a more useful indicator of consumer mobility. If non-switchers are 
mainly people with predictably high health care costs – a situation termed ‘adverse 
retention’ (Altman et al 1998) – insurers may not have enough incentive to make 
statutory cover attractive to them – for example, by contracting the best providers or 
organising integrated care for people with chronic conditions (Strombom et al 2002). 
This would severely weaken or even eliminate the instrumental effect of exit. 
Depending on the quality of the risk adjustment scheme in place (see below), 
insurers might attempt to erode service quality for this group and take other steps to 
encourage them to switch. Table 14 shows that switchers are more likely to be 
younger and healthier in two out of the three countries for which data are available 
(Germany and the Netherlands). In Switzerland switchers are also likely to be 
younger, but health only seems to be a factor among those with voluntary cover. 
 
Table 14 Switching rates among enrolees for statutory benefits and 
characteristics of switchers 
Country Switching rates Characteristics of switchers 
Belgium Early 2000s: around 1% (Schokkaert and 
Van de Voorde 2003). 
No data available. 
Germany 1997-2007: varied from 4.0% to 5.8% 
(Potratz and Zerres 2010). 
1995-2001: switchers more likely to be 
younger and healthier (Gresz et al 2002a; 
Knaus and Nuscheler 2005; Schut et al 
2003; Zok 1999); 2010: switchers more 
likely to be younger, higher income, 
better educated and not chronically ill 
(Zok 2011). 
Netherlands Before 2000: around 1% (Laske-
Aldershof et al 2004); 2005: around 3% 
(Westert et al 2010); 2006: 18%; 2007: 
4.4%; 2008: 3.6%; 2009: 3.5% (Roos and 
Schut 2011); 2010: 5.5% (Vektis 2011). 
Prior to 2006: switchers more likely to be 
younger and better educated (Gresz et al 
2002a; van Dijk et al 2008); 2006-2009: 
switchers have better self-reported health 
(Roos and Schut 2011). 
Switzerland Switching rates fell from 4.8% in 1997 to 
2.1% in 2000 (Frank and Lamiraud 2009) 
and rose from 12% in 2008/9 to 15.4% in 
2009/10 (25% among those choosing the 
largest annual deductible) (Comparis.ch 
2011). 
1996-2005: switching more likely among 
people choosing higher deductibles, less 
likely with age and less likely among 
people with voluntary cover whose self-
reported health is ‘poor’ or ‘good’ (as 
opposed to ‘very good’) (Dormont et al 
2009); 2000: switching less likely among 
people with voluntary cover (Frank and 
Lamiraud 2009). 
Source: Authors’ research 
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Reasons for switching 
Reasons for switching differ in importance across the four countries, with price 
playing no role in Belgium, a significant role in the Netherlands and Switzerland and, 
probably to a lesser degree, a role in Germany. Consumer perceptions of differences 
in quality seem to play some role in all four countries (Table 15). The Netherlands 
and Switzerland have the largest differences in price across insurers. In the 
Netherlands, however, the gap between the cheapest and most expensive community-
rated premiums is slightly smaller now than in 2006 (€265 in 2008 and €216 in 2010) 
(Westert et al 2010). Premium inflation has been modest. 
 
In contrast, premiums have grown rapidly in Switzerland in recent years, prompting 
the much higher than usual rates of switching seen in 2008/2009 and 2009/2010. 
Premium variation is also significant, which makes the Swiss switching rates seem 
surprisingly low. By selecting the highest deductible and enrolling in a managed-care 
network, Swiss policy holders can lower their premiums by 50%. In just one region 
(Zurich canton), 5% of people paid an annual premium of less than CHF 3,500 in 
2010, while 5% paid over CHF 4,900, a difference of more than CHF 1,400 (Federal 
Office of Public Health 2008). 
 
In Germany in 2010 only 13 of the more than 150 sickness funds charged additional 
community-rated premiums and the premiums are low in comparison to the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. Nevertheless, people appear to be very sensitive to 
price. In the first half of 2010 sickness funds that introduced an additional 
community-rated premium of €8 per month in February of that year lost up to 20% of 
their enrolees (Mihm 2010). In 2011 the cap on additional premiums was lifted, 
which may intensify price competition in future. 
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Table 15 Price and quality differences between insurers  
Country Is price a reason for switching? Is quality a reason for switching? 
Belgium No. Price differences are negligible. In 
2010 additional community-rated 
premiums did not exceed €20 per enrolee 
per year. Price elasticity <1 (Laske-
Aldershof et al 2004). 
Yes. People switch to be with the same 
insurer as a partner, for better customer 
service or to obtain a different set of VHI 
benefits (the main reason). 
Germany Yes. In the late 1990s substantial 
differences in contribution rates across 
insurers and the role of employers in 
financing coverage led to high price 
elasticity (Laske-Aldershof et al 2004; 
Schut et al 2003). Since 2009, with the 
introduction of the nationally uniform 
contribution rate, price signals have 
generally been weak, but people are very 
sensitive to price where signals exist. 
Yes. The reasons given for switching 
include better benefits, better service, better 
image and change of employer or industry 
(Zok 1999). In 2010 additional care offers 
were also mentioned (Zok 2011). 
Netherlands Yes. Negligible price differences before 
2006. Since 2006 insurers differentiate 
themselves through premium discounts 
for higher deductibles or group coverage. 
Yes. Little product differentiation before 
2006. Greater differentiation since 2006 in 
terms of the range of prescription drugs 
reimbursed within a given therapeutic 
category, modes of customer service and 
VHI products. 
Switzerland Yes. Substantial variation in premiums; 
insurers differentiate themselves through 
discounts for children under 18, students 
aged 19-25, enrolees who opt for higher 
deductibles (up to 70% of difference 
between the minimum and the chosen 
deductible) or managed-care contracts 
(up to 20%). 
Yes. People can opt for managed-care 
contracts involving gatekeeping and 
preferred provider networks. 
Source: Authors’ research 
 
Possible barriers to exercising choice of insurer 
Survey data from the Netherlands and Switzerland suggest many people feel no need 
to switch because they are satisfied with their current insurer (45% in the 
Netherlands and 79% in Switzerland) (Frank and Lamiraud 2009; Vos and De Jong 
2009). There is also evidence of people preferring to maintain the status quo 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) or using ‘subjective’ measures of quality to 
determine insurer choice. In Switzerland 40% of those surveyed chose an insurer 
based on parents’ and friends’ choices and ‘tradition’, while 13.5% said they stayed 
with their insurer out of habit; those who had been with an insurer for longer were 
less likely to express an intention to switch (Frank and Lamiraud 2009). About 25% 
said they did not try to choose the insurer with the lowest premiums. Prior to the 
2006 reform in the Netherlands, the most frequently mentioned reason for being 
enrolled with a particular insurer was having joined the fund in early adulthood 
(Gresz et al 2002a), a status quo bias that was perhaps reinforced by the relatively 
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small difference between insurers at that time. In spite of the growth in premium and 
product differentiation since then, the proportion of Dutch respondents who believe 
they do not stand to benefit much by switching has risen from 68% in 2006 to 74% in 
2008 and 18% said it was too much trouble to switch (Vos and De Jong 2009). Seven 
per cent said they did not switch because they felt they would not be able to obtain a 
new VHI policy if they changed to a new insurer for statutory cover (Vos and De 
Jong 2009). 
 
Responses like these suggest that many people have legitimate reasons (from a 
policy perspective) for not switching. Nevertheless, the association between age, 
health and switching suggests, first, that switching costs may be higher for regular 
users of health care who are at greater risk of having to change provider or interrupt 
current treatment (Buchmueller and Feldstein 1997; Knaus and Nuscheler 2005). 
Even where this is not the case, regular users may risk losing valuable knowledge 
about how things work with their current insurer, which makes them reluctant to 
switch. Second, insurers may engage in covert risk selection, trying to encourage low 
risks to enrol and high risks to switch through targeted advertising and reminders of 
the right to switch and product differentiation. Third, VHI can also be used to select 
risks in statutory health insurance if it can be linked to the sale of statutory cover 
(Mossialos and Thomson 2002c; Paolucci et al 2007). Insurers in the four countries 
are generally free to reject applications, charge risk-rated premiums, exclude 
coverage of pre-existing conditions and terminate contracts for voluntary cover 
(Thomson and Mossialos 2009). 
 
In all four countries there is ample opportunity for VHI to be used to select risks in 
statutory health insurance (Paolucci et al 2007). VHI is sold by entities belonging to 
the same sickness funds that provide statutory cover in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, and brokered by statutory insurers in Germany41 (Table 13). Until 
recently, Belgian households were required to purchase voluntary and statutory cover 
from the same entity and VHI was the main way in which insurers differentiated 
themselves. Legislation in Switzerland explicitly prevents insurers from linking the 
                                                 
41
 Although sickness funds are not permitted to sell VHI, in practice this line has blurred as they have 
been allowed to offer more flexible policies (for example, covering better-quality hospital 
accommodation as part of integrated care contracts or complementary and alternative therapies). 
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sale of voluntary and statutory cover (Dormont et al 2009; Roos and Schut 2011), but 
there are close ties between them; 93% of those with voluntary policies (purchased 
by 75% of the population) obtain both types of cover from the same insurer, partly 
because reimbursement is much simpler when it comes from one company (Dormont 
et al 2009). 
 
VHI covers about 90% of the Dutch population and most people buy voluntary and 
statutory cover from the same insurer (Westert et al 2010). The Dutch Health 
Insurance Act prohibits the termination of voluntary contracts when enrolees switch 
to another insurer for statutory cover, a widespread practice prior to 2006, although 
insurers retain the right to raise VHI premiums when people switch (and most do). 
However, recent research has found that, when queried, the customer services 
representatives of half of all insurers in the Netherlands specified that a voluntary 
contract would be terminated if the enrolee switched for statutory cover (whether 
deliberately to mislead or due to poor staff training was not clear), suggesting a gap 
between law and practice (Roos and Schut 2011). Roos and Schut argue that even if 
the new law were effective, Dutch insurers would still be able to link the sale of 
voluntary and statutory cover. Their survey identifies five ways in which insurers did 
this in 2009: 1) 24% of insurers only offered voluntary contracts in combination with 
statutory cover; 2) 34% charged higher premiums when people applied for voluntary 
cover alone; 3) 17% charged higher premiums for voluntary cover when people 
switched to another insurer for statutory cover; 4) 14% applied more stringent 
acceptance criteria when people wanted only voluntary cover; and 5) 86% offer free 
voluntary cover for children if parents and children obtain statutory cover from the 
same insurer. In 2009 97% of insurers adopted at least one of these linking strategies, 
a much higher proportion than in 2006 (at least 44% of insurers). 
 
In spite of the close links between voluntary and statutory cover, a 2007 review 
concluded there was no clear evidence of insurers using VHI to select risks in the 
statutory market in any of the four countries (Paolucci et al 2007). This finding was 
confirmed by studies subsequently carried out in Switzerland (Dormont et al 2009) 
and the Netherlands (Roos and Schut 2011). What the more recent studies clearly 
suggest, however, is that consumer beliefs about risk selection by insurers in the VHI 
market may be a powerful potential barrier to switching in the statutory market. In 
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Switzerland having voluntary cover only affects switching among those whose self-
reported health is less than ‘very good’. In the absence of evidence of risk selection 
by insurers, the study authors argue that high-risk individuals stay where they are 
because they do not think they will be able to obtain voluntary cover from another 
insurer on the same terms. For example, the new voluntary policy may be more 
expensive, reflecting the enrolee’s age, or fail to cover pre-existing conditions. The 
Dutch survey data show that the proportion of non-switching respondents who said 
they did not switch because they believed they would not be able to obtain a new 
voluntary policy at all due to their age or health status (that is, they believed insurers 
would reject their application for voluntary cover) rose from 4% in 2006 to 7% in 
2009 (Roos and Schut 2011). The proportion of respondents who gave this as the 
most important reason for not switching rose from 1.5% in 2006 to 3.4% in 2009. 
Similar figures applied to respondents who did not switch but seriously considered 
doing so.  
 
Another possible explanation for limited consumer mobility includes choice overload 
due to growing product differentiation or the number of insurers operating in the 
market. With the exception of Belgium, insurers have many more ways now than in 
the past of modifying the standard statutory product by offering choice of cash or in-
kind benefits, higher deductibles in return for lower premiums or contributions, no-
claims bonuses and reduced cost sharing for accepting gatekeeping, disease 
management, or use of preferred providers (Table 16). While these options clearly 
benefit some, particularly if they reduce premiums or cost sharing, there is likely to 
be a trade-off in terms of transparency and ease of price comparison. They may also 
restrict choice in other areas; in Germany, for example, people who accept any of the 
options mentioned above lose the right to switch for a three-year period. Swiss 
research shows how the probability of switching is significantly lower in areas with 
larger numbers of insurers, even where premium variation is significant (Frank and 
Lamiraud 2009). Furthermore, among survey respondents who were very dissatisfied 
with their current insurer, 34% intended to switch in areas with fewer than 50 
statutory health insurers versus 22% in areas with more than 50 insurers. This 
suggests a weak relationship between enrolment and both price and quality, which 
may undermine insurer incentives to enhance value. 
 
  194 
 
Table 16 Choice for users, 2011 
Choice regarding: Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Insurance status (to 
be insured or not) 
No No No No 
Insurers Yes. After 12 
months of 
enrolment, people 
can switch 
quarterly. 
Yes. People can 
switch after 18 
months or within 2 
months if the 
insurer introduces 
or raises a 
community-rated 
premium. 
Yes. People can 
switch once a year. 
Yes. People can 
switch twice a year 
giving three 
months’ notice. 
Level of pre-paid 
contribution 
Yes, for 
community-rated 
premiums, but the 
amounts are 
negligible. 
Yes, for the 
community-rated 
premium (but this 
is currently very 
small). 
Yes, for 
community-rated 
premiums. 
Yes 
Range of benefits No No, except for a 
very few benefits 
defined by 
individual sickness 
funds. 
No No 
Benefit modality 
(cash vs in kind) 
No Yes Yes No 
Degree of cost 
sharing 
Only in 
conjunction with 
other conditions 
(eg use of generic 
drugs, use of 
regular GP, 
gatekeeping). 
Same for all 
sickness funds. 
Only in 
conjunction with 
other conditions 
(eg gatekeeping, 
enrolment in 
DMP). Varies by 
sickness fund. 
Yes Yes 
Providers Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Survey responses 
 
In summary, low rates of switching may reflect satisfaction with the status quo; there 
is some evidence to suggest this is the case for many people. But there is also 
evidence of barriers to consumer mobility, particularly among older and less healthy 
people. Lower mobility among this group may have serious implications for the 
effectiveness of purchaser competition to strengthen purchasing because it is likely to 
lower insurers’ incentives to secure value in organising and delivering health care for 
those who use it most. 
 
Three factors warrant policy attention. First, research does not provide evidence of 
insurers using VHI to select risks in statutory health insurance, but the close links 
between the sale of statutory and voluntary cover are a cause for concern in all four 
countries (van de Ven et al 2007). In practice risk selection is arguably less of an 
issue than the impact of linked sales on consumer mobility, as seen in the 
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Netherlands. Insurers do not need to select risks when overall rates of switching are 
low, consumer beliefs about insurer behaviour prevent high risks from trying to 
switch, switching is less likely among high-risk groups and strategies to lock people 
into their statutory cover are so successful (Roos and Schut 2011). The Dutch 
Healthcare Authority (NZa) and consumer and patient associations have been active 
in monitoring and publicly disclosing the extent of medical underwriting for 
voluntary cover (Roos and Schut 2011). However, the evidence suggests they have 
not done enough to allay consumer fears about access to VHI and should focus more 
on tied sales, which seem to be a significant deterrent to switching. The Belgian 
government has tried to address the problem of tied sales by introducing tighter 
regulation of the sale of VHI42 and strict separation of statutory and voluntary cover. 
In the other countries a range of proposals are under discussion43. While it is too 
early to assess the impact of changes that only came into effect in 2010, it is worth 
noting that tighter regulation of VHI has been problematic in light of European 
Union (EU) internal market rules in Belgium and in other countries (Thomson and 
Mossialos 2007b; Thomson and Mossialos 2010).  
 
Second, Swiss research showing lower switching rates in areas with more insurers 
(Frank and Lamiraud 2009) highlights the importance of monitoring the degree of 
choice available to people. Too much choice seems to undermine the instrumental 
value of insurer competition, perhaps by lowering transparency. Lower transparency 
increases the transaction costs of switching and may therefore restrict consumer 
mobility. 
 
Third, research from the United States finds switching costs to be higher for older 
and less healthy people (Buchmueller and Feldstein 1997). These costs are probably 
much lower in the European countries than in the US, but they are far from absent, as 
the 18% of Dutch people reporting it was too much trouble to switch demonstrates 
                                                 
42
 In Belgium open enrolment is guaranteed for compulsory additional benefits. In 2007 legislation 
extended open enrolment requirements to the sale of VHI and prohibited premium differentiation 
based on pre-existing medical conditions (except for people aged 65 years and above who did not 
already hold a similar policy with their former insurer). 
43
 The Swiss Medical Association recently launched a popular initiative to introduce a strict separation 
between SHI and VHI. If the initiative succeeds, Swiss health insurers will have to choose whether 
they want to operate in SHI or in VHI. In Germany, the government had announced plans (in its 2009 
‘coalition contract’) to re-restrict the ability of sickness funds to sell VHI products, but the proposal 
was not included in the SHI financial reform passed in 2010. 
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(Vos and De Jong 2009). They are also likely to grow in future as product 
differentiation increases and selective contracting becomes the norm. The rise of 
selective contracting, clearly an important tool to strengthen purchasing (see below), 
raises questions about the inherent tension between consumer versus purchaser 
choice of provider and how this plays out in the context of consumer choice of 
purchaser. 
 
 
Does competition between insurers create incentives for efficiency? 
 
For insurer competition to be effective it must be based on price and quality rather 
than risk selection. Where insurers are able to operate profitably by selecting people 
with lower-than-average risk and deterring those with higher-than-average risk, they 
may not be sufficiently motivated to focus on enhancing value. Risk selection 
therefore undermines efficiency. The extent to which competition between insurers is 
likely to be effective in creating incentives to enhance value can be gauged by the 
strength of incentives for insurers to select risks and the range of selective tools 
available to them. All other things being equal, insurer incentives to select risks will 
be stronger the greater the degree of financial risk they bear and the less the money 
they have per enrolee reflects the enrolee’s risk of ill health (van de Ven 2011). The 
primary mechanism for reducing insurer incentives to select risks is risk equalisation 
or adjustment.  
 
Prior to the introduction of insurer competition in the countries under review many 
insurers did not bear any financial risk. They were little more than financial conduits, 
channelling centrally raised resources to providers or raising their own revenue but 
with leeway to accumulate deficits. The degree of financial risk borne by insurers has 
increased over time in all four countries and is particularly high in Germany and 
Switzerland, but remains low in Belgium. Each country has also focused on 
developing a risk-adjustment formula to allocate resources to health insurers, 
although there are significant differences both in the design of the formula and the 
degree of insurer revenue subject to the formula (Table 17). The extent to which risk 
equalisation succeeds in lowering incentives to select risks largely depends on the 
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sophistication of the formula, but also on the presence of any risk-sharing 
arrangements in the form of ex-post compensation based on actual health care costs 
incurred. Risk sharing lessens the degree of financial risk insurers bear and therefore 
lowers incentives for risk selection, but it also dampens incentives to enhance 
efficiency (van de Ven 2011). 
 
Table 17 Strength of insurer incentives to select risks 
 Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Prospective resource 
allocation subject to risk 
equalisation (%) 
30% 100% 100% 100% 
Risk equalisation scheme Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Risk adjustment includes 
health-based criteria 
Yes Yes Yes No (but a new 
formula will 
come into force 
in 2012) 
Risk sharing Insurers pay 25% 
of any revenue-
expenditure gap 
No Insurers only pay 
10% of an 
individual’s 
annual costs > 
€22,500 
No (see note) 
Incentive to select risks Low High Moderate Very high 
Source: Survey responses 
Note: Swiss insurers bear full financial risk for outpatient care, but the costs of inpatient care are 
shared between insurers and cantons. 
 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have significantly improved their risk 
equalisation schemes in the last ten years and now have relatively sophisticated 
formulas (van de Ven et al 2003; van de Ven et al 2007). All three countries include 
health-based risk adjusters in the formula, in contrast to Switzerland, which still 
relies on crude indicators (only adjusting for age and gender). 
 
Incentives for risk selection are low in Belgium because of the low level of financial 
risk the sickness funds bear: only 30% of sickness fund revenue is subject to risk 
adjustment and insurers are only financially responsible for 25% of any difference 
between allocated revenue and actual health care expenditure. Risk selection does 
not seem to be a policy concern, even though the link between statutory and 
voluntary cover provides insurers with an effective selection tool (Schokkaert and 
Van de Voorde 2000; Schokkaert and Van de Voorde 2003). At the same time as the 
current arrangements limit incentives for risk selection, they are probably not 
sufficient to motivate insurers to enhance efficiency. 
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Insurers in both Germany and the Netherlands have incentives to select risks beyond 
the criteria included in the risk adjustment formula. Because German insurers bear 
full financial risk, in contrast to their Dutch counterparts, who still receive ex-post 
compensation (although this now accounts for only 25% of revenue), they may have 
stronger incentives to select risks. However, they may have less opportunity to do so, 
since the market for voluntary health insurance (VHI) is small in Germany (in terms 
of population coverage) compared to in Belgium and the Netherlands (Paolucci et al 
2007). Risk selection is difficult to detect in the Netherlands, but it is a major issue, 
at least in terms of public debate (Paolucci et al 2007). Ex-post compensation for 
Dutch insurers lowers incentives to enhance efficiency, but is seen as a necessary 
counterweight to incentives to select risks (van de Ven et al 2007). 
 
Incentives to select risks are probably highest in Switzerland, where risk equalisation 
is weak and insurers bear full financial risk for outpatient care (Minder et al 2000). 
About half of all inpatient costs are financed by the cantons using general tax 
revenue, so insurers are at much less risk for hospital services. Nevertheless, risk 
selection is a serious policy concern. Following debate about how best to tackle the 
high potential for risk selection among insurers, the Swiss government will add 
hospitalisation in the previous year to the formula in 2012. It is also considering the 
inclusion of health-based criteria (Beck et al 2010). 
 
None of the four countries has managed to eliminate incentives for risk selection 
through risk equalisation, even though the formula has been significantly 
strengthened in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (van de Ven et al 2007). In 
all four countries there is circumstantial evidence indicating risk selection through 
targeted advertising, reminders and discounts and through product differentiation in 
VHI44 (Dormont et al 2009; Nuscheler and Knaus 2005; van de Ven et al 2007; 
Westert et al 2010). However, there is only anecdotal evidence of insurers trying to 
                                                 
44
 Swiss insurers use holding companies to direct enrolees to a plan with an ‘appropriate’ premium, 
while in the Netherlands the growth of group contracts has allowed insurers to offer discounts to some 
groups (employers, self-employed people, sports clubs) but not others (patient associations) (van de 
Ven et al 2007). 
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deter high risks from enrolling45. This might reflect the accuracy of risk 
equalisation46, the difficulty of detecting an essentially covert activity or the fact that, 
as noted above, insurers may not need to select risks when consumer mobility is low 
among high-risk groups. 
 
In summary, strengthening risk equalisation is clearly a priority for Switzerland. But 
in all four countries there is room for improving the risk adjustment formula, 
particularly by focusing research on people with the highest expenditure levels over a 
series of years (van de Ven 2011). Currently, risk equalisation is unlikely to be able 
to compensate insurers for covering people with rare diseases (around 6% of the 
population in the Netherlands). Thus, policy should also focus on risk sharing, 
currently used in Belgium and the Netherlands only, where it applies to all enrolees 
with health care expenses above a threshold. Germany had a similar regulation 
between 2002 and 2008 but dropped it when disease-based supplements were added 
to the risk-adjustment formula. Since risk sharing lowers insurers’ incentives to 
enhance efficiency, it would be better to use a differentiated system in which 
compensation is limited to covering the high costs of a small group of enrolees 
identified in advance (van de Ven 2011). Such a move would increase insurers’ 
financial risk without significantly increasing their incentives to select risks. Finally, 
it may be worth noting the difficulty of adapting risk adjustment to account for 
differences in benefit levels. While this is not a major issue in the four countries, the 
growing trend to permit insurers to differentiate the statutory benefits package may 
cause complications in future. 
 
 
Do insurers have (and use) tools to enhance value?  
 
The final dimension of interest is the extent to which purchasers are able to influence 
health care costs and quality. If they were not able to do so, then the main reasons for 
                                                 
45
 In 2011 several hundred members of an insolvent sickness fund were put off joining other sickness 
funds through statements such as “we cannot guarantee that your insurance card will be ready in time” 
etc; the Federal Insurance Authority had to intervene and reminded the sickness funds to obey legal 
requirements. 
46
 Dutch insurers have begun to target diabetic patients in their advertising, suggesting they feel risk 
equalisation provides sufficient compensation for this high-risk group (van de Ven 2011).  
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encouraging them to compete would be to ensure that they provided quality customer 
services, kept administrative costs to a minimum and passed on any cost savings to 
enrolees in the form of lower premiums. These would be satisfactory outcomes, but 
they are not the primary policy goal of insurer competition, which is to strengthen 
purchasing with a view to improving health system performance. This includes but 
goes beyond notions of customer service and administrative efficiency. 
 
Table 18 and Table 19 show how purchaser-provider relations are regulated and the 
availability and take-up of a wide range of tools insurers might use to influence 
health care costs and quality. These tools range from allowing insurers to integrate 
with providers, which would strengthen incentives for cost control, to permitting 
them to selectively contract providers, choose how best to reward or penalise good or 
poor provider performance and influence the types of services to which enrolees 
have access. The list of tools included in Table 19 is not exhaustive. 
 
In Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, collective negotiation between insurers and 
providers is the normal method of setting prices, which limits the ability of 
individual insurers to influence the cost and quality of most health services, but 
preserves free choice of provider for service users (Table 18). However, in Germany 
and Switzerland, insurers have a degree of leeway in the contracting process. People 
in Germany can opt to follow a GP gatekeeping model of care and sickness funds are 
therefore able to selectively contract GPs (in addition to the collective contract) and 
negotiate prices and other conditions on a bilateral basis. The same applies to 
providers who have signed integrated-care contracts with sickness funds. Swiss 
insurers are allowed to engage in selective contracting, negotiate lower prices and 
use capitation to pay providers for people who choose a managed-care plan. 
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Table 18 Regulation of purchaser-provider relations, 2011 
 Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Who regulates 
purchaser-provider 
relations? 
Basic framework established through 
federal legislature. Organised at the 
federal level through collective 
negotiation between provider and 
sickness fund representatives. 
Basic framework established through federal 
legislature. Details negotiated among corporatist 
actors at the federal level with federal Ministry 
of Health oversight, and at state level with state 
ministries responsible for health. 
The Dutch Healthcare Authority and 
the Dutch Competition Authority. 
FHIA defines general rules. Hospital sector 
strongly regulated and planned by the 26 
cantonal authorities. Outpatient care regulated 
through the TARMED tariff scheme. In 2002 the 
Federal Council decreed a moratorium on the 
opening of new medical practices (delegating 
this to the cantons), which was extended to end 
2009 for GPs and end 2011 for specialists. 
Describe the main 
characteristics of 
purchaser-provider 
relations 
Fee schedule determined through 
collective negotiation among sickness 
funds / provider groups. Agreements 
negotiated for two years. Increasingly, 
physicians opt out of the agreements 
(13% of GPs, 20% of specialists, with 
large differences among specialists). 
Selective contracting not allowed. 
Social law stipulates the areas in which decisions 
must be made by joint committees of sickness 
funds and providers (eg SHI benefits and the 
relative point value scale for SHI-accredited 
physicians), and those in which decisions can be 
reached through direct negotiations (total level of 
remuneration for ambulatory care and contracts 
between funds and providers). 
Free pricing for physiotherapy since 
2005 and for selected inpatient 
services (see below). Selective 
contracting and vertical integration 
allowed since 2006. Insurers and 
providers are free to choose tools for 
managing care. 
Insurers must reimburse all medical services 
prescribed by physicians and contract all 
hospitals included in cantonal planning and any 
physician permitted to practise, giving patients 
the right to visit any outpatient physician without 
registration or referral. Selective contracting and 
capitation payment are allowed for patients 
opting for managed-care plans. 
Are there caps on 
insurer 
administrative costs? 
Yes. The cap is determined annually 
by federal law (programme law). 
Yes (since 2004). The cap used to apply to 
administrative costs as a percentage of 
expenditure; for 2011 capped at the 2010 level.  
No. No. 
Who determines how 
providers are paid? 
All payment mechanisms are set out in 
federal legislation. 
Federal legislation increasingly sets out payment 
mechanisms, but details are decided by 
corporatist actors. 
A combination of government and 
free price negotiation between 
insurers and providers. 
National legislation (FHIA) sets out general rules 
for provider payment. 
Who sets health 
service prices? 
Collective negotiation between 
provider / sickness fund 
representatives, approved by Minister 
of Social Affairs. Maximum price of 
pharmaceuticals set by Minister of 
Economic Affairs based on advice 
from a commission of trade unions, 
pharmacists, sickness funds, 
pharmaceutical industry, government. 
Ambulatory care: federal and state corporatist 
institutions (sickness funds and Federal 
Association of SHI Physicians) 
DRGs: federal corporatist institutions (sickness 
funds and German Hospital Federation) and 
federal government if no agreement. 
Pharmaceutical reference prices: corporatist 
institutions at federal level, but manufacturers 
generally free to determine prices.  
Government price setting and free 
price negotiation between insurers 
and providers. The prices of two-
thirds of all hospital products (which 
include doctors’ fees) are set by the 
government, and the government 
sets maximum prices for most GP 
services. 
Mainly collective negotiation between insurer 
and provider representatives approved by 
government. Cantonal authorities set prices if 
agreement cannot be reached. Pharmaceutical 
and laboratory prices set by the federal 
government. 
Changes in any of the 
above 
No. From 2011 pharmaceuticals demonstrating 
clinical added value and those that cannot be 
included in the reference pricing system will be 
subject to price negotiations between 
manufacturers/sickness funds a year after launch. 
Insurers and providers have more 
freedom to negotiate prices. This 
trend is expected to continue. 
No. 
Source: Survey responses 
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Table 19 Availability and take-up of purchasing tools, 2011 
Tools Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Vertical provider 
integration 
No No Yes; take-up low but 
growing. 
The future law on managed care, currently under discussion 
in Parliament, could ban vertical integration between insurer 
and providers. 
Selective contracting No Yes, but only in the context of integrated care 
contracts, therefore low take-up. 
Yes; take-up low but 
growing. 
Yes, but only for enrolees opting for managed-care contracts 
(30% of the population in 2008); however, only part of these 
contracts are genuinely based on selective contracting. 
Financial incentives for 
patients to use 
preferred providers 
No Yes; moderate take-up (GP contracts less 
popular than expected). 
Yes; take-up low but 
growing. 
Planned in future (15% to 20% co-insurance for ordinary 
coverage, 7.5% to 10% for plans with preferred providers and 
integrated care networks). 
Clinical guidelines / 
protocols 
Yes, collectively. Yes, possible within GP contracts and integrated 
care contracts; low take-up. 
Yes; moderate to high take-
up. 
Not explicitly. It is up to the physicians to use these tools to 
deal with eg capitation payment within managed-care 
contracts. 
Formularies for 
medicines 
Yes, collectively. Yes, possible within GP contracts and integrated 
care contracts; low take-up. 
Yes; moderate take-up. No. Pharmaceuticals included in the benefits package cannot 
be restricted through managed-care arrangements.  
Incentives for rational 
prescribing / dispensing 
of medicines 
No Directed at physicians: prescription limits; 
directed towards pharmacists: generic 
substitution unless ruled out; directed at patients: 
lower co-payments for drugs priced at least 30% 
below reference price. 
Financial incentives to 
pharmacists to encourage 
generic substitution. 
A higher co-insurance rate (20% rather than 10%) for brand 
drugs if a generic alternative is available. 
Disease management 
programmes 
Yes, collectively. Yes; high take-up (about 8% of SHI enrolees in 
2009). 
Yes; take-up low but 
growing. 
Not explicitly, but more leeway for their implementation 
included in forthcoming legislation on integrated care 
networks and in relation to the federal government’s e-health 
strategy.  
Utilisation review Yes, collectively, but only for 
very expensive services. 
Yes, collectively and routinely; individually only 
in integrated care contracts, low take up. 
Yes; moderate take-up. Yes, within managed-care arrangements. 
Waiting list 
management 
Not relevant. Not relevant. Yes; high take-up. Not relevant. 
Price negotiation No Yes, partial (eg GP-based gatekeeping or 
integrated care contracts); currently mainly with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, high take up 
(about 60% of drugs distributed under rebate 
contracts). 
Yes, partial; moderate take-
up.  
Yes, but only for enrolees opting for managed-care contracts. 
Performance-based 
payment of providers 
No Yes, but used only within integrated care 
contracts; low take up. 
Yes, partial; take-up low but 
growing. 
Yes, within managed-care arrangements. 
Public disclosure of 
performance indicators 
Yes, collectively, mainly for 
supplementary hospital costs 
Yes; mandatory for certain hospital indicators 
(but not very relevant for purchasing). 
Yes; moderate take-up but 
growing. 
Yes, in the hospital sector; modest results. 
Source: Survey responses 
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Since 2006, insurers in the Netherlands have had more freedom in contracting than 
their counterparts in the other countries. Selective contracting is now permitted for 
all forms of care and, while the government continues to set the prices of two-thirds 
of all hospital care, as well as maximum prices for GP services, there is slow 
movement towards greater price liberalisation. The Dutch government has recently 
proposed raising the proportion of hospital care subject to free pricing to 70% in 
2012 (Schut and van de Ven 2011). 
 
There are clear differences between Belgium and the three other countries in the 
range of tools available to enable insurers to secure value in purchasing. The more 
limited recourse to purchasing tools in Belgium reflects the absence of national 
policy emphasis on competition as a mechanism for improved purchasing, as well as 
a preference for sickness funds to operate collectively. Although this suggests 
Belgian insurers are at a disadvantage when it comes to strategic purchasing, insurers 
in the other countries do not make full use of the tools they have. There are several 
reasons for this. 
 
First, legal restrictions imposed on insurers may preclude widespread take-up of 
some tools. In Germany the use of selective contracting, sickness fund-specific 
clinical guidelines and prescription drug formularies is only possible in a few areas 
outside the collective contracting process (where patients opt for GP gatekeeping and 
providers opt for integrated-care contracts). A proposal by the red-green coalition 
government in the early 2000s to extend selective contracting to elective inpatient 
treatment was blocked by the states on the grounds that it would restrict their ability 
to plan hospital capacity. In Switzerland many purchasing tools are limited to 
managed-care plans, primarily to preserve free choice of provider for those who 
value it. The Swiss Parliament is discussing legislation to stimulate more managed 
care through a controversial proposal to introduce higher user charges (co-insurance 
of 20% rather than 10%) for those who do not opt for managed-care plans.47 
However, the proposal also includes a (controversial) ban on vertical integration of 
insurers and providers, which is intended to separate the management of integrated 
care networks from the management of health insurance. 
                                                 
47
 The two chambers disagree on the appropriate co-insurance rate. The National Council is in favour 
of a 20%-10% rate, whereas the Council of States would prefer a lower rate (15%-7.5%). 
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Second, insurers may be wary about alienating existing or potential enrolees by 
curbing choice of provider. Insurers in Germany and the Netherlands reveal a strong 
preference for offering enrolees financial incentives (lower cost sharing or lower 
premiums) to choose preferred provider networks or GP gatekeeping. Consumers 
also seem to favour wider choice of provider: GP contracts have not been as popular 
as expected in Germany, take-up of preferred provider networks in the Netherlands is 
low and only 30% of Swiss enrolees choose managed-care plans (Federal Office of 
Public Health 2008). 
 
Some analysts argue that Dutch insurers have been reluctant to de-select hospitals for 
fear of fuelling consumer perceptions that this sort of action is motivated by financial 
rather than quality considerations (Boonen and Schut 2011; Maarse and Paulus 
2011). Insurers also face resistance from regulators and providers. In 2010 a large 
Dutch insurer published hospital rankings for quality of breast cancer care on its 
website and announced it would no longer send breast cancer patients to hospitals 
that did not reach minimum volume thresholds for breast cancer treatment, a decision 
supported by patient groups (Sheldon 2010). The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate 
initially stated that all breast cancer treatment in the Netherlands met its standards for 
responsible care, while the Dutch Association of Surgeons suggested the insurer had 
used “incorrect standards”, but the decision was upheld by the courts (Sheldon 
2010). 
 
Third, national competition authorities may intervene to block the use of legitimate 
tools such as vertical integration in cases where it is seen to be anti-competitive. This 
happened in the Netherlands in 2009, when a group of local health care providers 
(including GPs) and the dominant regional insurer tried to take over a failing hospital 
(Maarse and Paulus 2011). Some members of parliament pressured the Minister of 
Health to prevent the takeover on the grounds that all parties involved would have a 
financial incentive to direct patients toward the hospital in question, which would 
restrict consumer choice. Conversely, residents expressed a desire for their local 
hospital to remain open since closure would also have limited their options (Maarse 
and Paulus 2011). 
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Fourth, some tools present technical challenges under certain circumstances, 
particularly selective contracting and price negotiation. As a result, insurers may lack 
the capacity to employ them or the transaction costs involved may be high. Selective 
contracting in Germany is unattractive partly due to the complexity of recalculating 
global payments to office-based physicians (Table 18) if some patients are treated 
under separate contracts, and partly because hospitals cannot be de-selected on a 
service-by-service basis (as in the Netherlands). 
 
Price negotiation is regarded as a key purchasing tool in the Netherlands. Since 2006, 
individual insurers have been encouraged to negotiate prices with individual 
hospitals for pre-defined services covering 10,000 Diagnostic Treatment 
Combinations (DTCs, case-based payments per episode of illness) equal to one third 
of hospital revenue in 2010. To help insurers cope with the magnitude of the task, the 
Dutch Insurers’ Association publishes an annual purchasing guide focusing on 200 of 
the most frequently used DTCs (Bal and Zuiderent-Jerak 2011).  
 
Finally, the difficulty of obtaining information about health care costs and quality 
limits systematic benchmarking, which in turn precludes fully informed decision 
making by insurers and consumers. There is some public disclosure of information 
about provider performance (mainly hospitals) in all four countries and government-
led efforts to improve data collection and disclosure in Germany (Busse et al 2009) 
and the Netherlands (Westert et al 2010). However, public disclosure is sometimes 
controversial (as in the Dutch case) and it may be that the lack of informative 
indicators based on reliable data will represent a significant barrier to improved 
purchasing for some time to come. 
 
 
Policy outcomes and implications 
 
Policy outcomes 
In the last 15 years policy makers in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland have introduced insurance market reforms to improve efficiency and 
slow rising health care costs. Reforms have involved making insurers bear financial 
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risk and giving people free choice of insurer to stimulate insurer competition. The 
introduction of financial responsibility for sickness funds in Belgium in 1995 was not 
intended to promote competition, but it has succeeded in its primary aim of ensuring 
a more level playing field for the sickness funds. A secondary aim was to encourage 
sickness funds to contain health care costs, and while there has been some progress 
in this area, there is little evidence of significant improvement. 
 
In Germany extending choice of insurer to the whole population in 1996 had two 
main aims: to foster convergence in contribution rates (an equity goal) and to 
encourage health care expenditure control and greater efficiency in the SHI system. 
The reform had some success in tackling equity concerns, not only by placing all 
employees on an equal footing in terms of insurer choice and contribution rate, but 
also by narrowing the range of contribution rates. Sickness funds’ administrative 
costs rose steadily after 1996 until their growth was capped by law in 2004, but at 
5.5% in 2008 they were still well below those of private insurers, at 14.4% (Federal 
Statistical Office 2010). Although this suggests the reform did not succeed in 
controlling administrative costs, a comparison of SHI with other forms of social 
insurance, where there is little or no competition (for example, the old-age pension 
and disability scheme), shows the sickness funds’ administrative structures are 
relatively streamlined. The large number of mergers among sickness funds since 
1996 (169 in 2010 versus 960 in 1995) also indicates the influence of market 
pressures in the SHI system (Busse 2011 in press). At the same, there is little 
evidence to suggest competition among sickness funds has led to lower rates of 
health care expenditure growth (contribution rates have risen from 13.6% in 2000 to 
15.5% in 2011) or achieved substantial and lasting efficiency gains (Busse 2011 in 
press). 
 
Insurer competition in the Netherlands – first introduced in 1991 and extended to the 
whole population in 2006 – aimed to encourage health insurers to operate more 
efficiently and control health care spending. The reforms have expanded choice for 
consumers, while market pressures have led to significant mergers (over 100 insurers 
in 1990 down to 26 in 2010) (Vektis 2010) and strong premium competition. The 
reforms have also put quality of care at the top of the political agenda. There are 
signs of greater use of information on quality by insurers, initially mainly to identify 
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hospitals with lower waiting times, but increasingly to de-select hospital services that 
do not meet minimum volume thresholds. However, insurers have generally been 
slow to take advantage of the range of purchasing tools at their disposal and, with the 
exception of the pharmaceutical sector,48 there is little evidence of improved 
expenditure control or efficiency gains. 
 
In Switzerland the effects of insurer competition on efficiency and cost control have 
been equally modest. Between 1998 and 2008 premiums grew by 4% on average 
annually and the cost of SHI-covered health services by 4.4%, in contrast to wages, 
which grew by only 1.4%. 
 
Policy implications 
At the beginning of the paper it was noted that insurer competition would only be 
effective if people are able to switch insurer easily and at low cost, competition is 
based on price and quality rather than risk selection and insurers have access to and 
use tools to enhance value. The paper’s analysis suggests that these assumptions do 
not always hold in the four countries under review, which may explain why 
insurance market reforms have not had the positive impact on health system 
performance proponents expected. 
 
Introducing risk equalisation schemes has been a priority for policy makers – for 
good reason, since risk selection erodes insurers’ incentives to operate efficiently. 
But in spite of the energy devoted to fine-tuning schemes and finding a balance 
between risk adjustment and risk sharing, no country has eliminated incentives to 
select risks. There is room for improvement, even in the countries with the most 
sophisticated formulas and especially in Switzerland, where incentives to select risks 
remain strong. The Swiss formula will be strengthened in 2012, but why Swiss 
policy on risk equalisation should consistently lag behind policy in other countries 
warrants further investigation. 
 
                                                 
48
 Pharmaceutical expenditure fell following a change in regulation in 2006 allowing insurers to 
negotiate lower prices with manufacturers (Schut and van de Ven 2011). 
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Consumer mobility has not received as much attention as risk equalisation. Extensive 
regulation to facilitate mobility (much of it predating the introduction of insurer 
competition) means that the cost of changing insurer is likely to be negligible for 
most people. As a result, policy makers may have interpreted relatively low 
switching rates as indicating consumer satisfaction. However, a small but growing 
body of evidence suggests consumer mobility is limited among older and less healthy 
individuals (that is, those likely to use health services on a regular basis). This ought 
to be a cause for concern, because if insurers feel these enrolees are unlikely to 
switch, they may not have sufficient incentive to provide them with high-quality 
care. 
 
Research identifies two possible obstacles to greater consumer mobility: increasingly 
close links between the sale of statutory and voluntary cover and choice overload. 
Tied sales of statutory and voluntary health insurance are prohibited in most 
countries but insurers have found ways of linking the two types of cover. While a 
mixture of regulation, risk adjustment and accepted norms seems to have prevented 
most insurers from using VHI to select risks for statutory health insurance, it has not 
allayed consumer fears about not being able to obtain adequate voluntary cover if 
they switch to a new insurer for statutory cover. This is a particular problem in the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, where VHI coverage is widespread. The Belgian 
solution (greater regulation of VHI) may not be attractive to policy makers 
elsewhere, particularly due to concerns about infringing EU competition rules. 
Nevertheless, the growing importance of VHI as an obstruction to consumer mobility 
requires some form of policy action. Better risk adjustment may help, alongside 
better information for consumers and closer scrutiny of the sales process. 
 
Policy attention should also focus on the potential for choice overload in the context 
of a trend towards growing product differentiation. Giving insurers scope to tailor 
benefits to suit individual preferences through greater choice of cost sharing and 
health services may be seen as facilitating price and quality competition. However, it 
is well established that product differentiation, even at the margin, lowers 
transparency (Office of Fair Trading 1997). This in turn increases transaction costs 
for consumers, particularly those who rely on regular access to health care, and can 
undermine competition. 
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Making sure insurers have and use tools to influence health care quality and costs is 
essential if competition is to improve health system performance. Insurers in 
Belgium do not have these tools, insurers in Germany and Switzerland have access to 
some tools, and insurers in the Netherlands have access to a wider range of tools but 
do not always use them. An essential assumption underpinning insurer competition is 
therefore absent or only partially upheld in all four countries. Many of these tools 
restrict consumer choice, affect provider autonomy and require data that are not 
readily available. Thus, cross-country variation in the availability and take-up of 
tools may be explained by differing degrees of willingness to curb the choices of 
important stakeholders. It may also reflect a broader uncertainty on the part of policy 
makers (including national competition authorities and courts) about the appropriate 
locus of competition – among insurers or among providers? – and about who is best 
placed to influence provider behaviour – insurers or health care users? International 
experience suggests health system efficiency is more likely to be served when 
purchasing is carried out by institutions as opposed to individuals (Figueras et al 
2005). Whether or not this is the case in practice, however, depends on the range and 
quality of information available, the balance of power between different actors and 
the incentives facing insurers, providers and users. 
 
In all four countries, commentators have argued for better information about health 
care quality and costs to facilitate systematic benchmarking. While there is no doubt 
that better information and benchmarking would bring benefits, they might not in 
themselves be sufficient to foster strategic purchasing. Rather, motivating and 
enabling insurers to enhance value through improved purchasing is likely to require 
action on multiple fronts, including removing perverse incentives to favour more 
expensive care over cheaper alternatives arising from weaknesses in provider 
payment methods or fragmented financing flows49; helping users to make more 
informed decisions about where and how to be treated (not just providing them with 
more information); working with providers to minimise unwarranted variation in 
care delivery and improve quality; and fostering public trust in insurers. 
 
                                                 
49
 In Switzerland, for example, insurers only finance half of all inpatient care costs and therefore have 
an incentive to refer enrolees to hospital even when cheaper outpatient alternatives are available. 
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Conclusions 
 
Health insurance market reforms intended to stimulate efficiency gains through 
improved purchasing have had mixed results in the four western European countries 
reviewed in this paper. Each country has put in place measures to enable insurer 
competition to achieve its goals, including extensive regulation to secure consumer 
mobility, lower insurers’ incentives to select risks and provide insurers with tools to 
enhance value. However, some of these measures have not been sufficiently 
effective. It is also difficult to establish a link between insurer competition and 
improved health system performance, partly due to the introduction of other changes 
alongside this particular set of reforms and partly due to not knowing what the 
counterfactual might have been. 
 
In spite of significant investment in risk equalisation, incentives for risk selection 
remain and there is scope for further fine-tuning of risk adjustment and risk sharing 
mechanisms. Consumer mobility is still not seen equally in all groups and is lower 
among older and chronically ill people, possibly due to close interaction between 
statutory and voluntary coverage. This lowers insurers’ incentives to make statutory 
cover attractive to high-risk enrolees. Better risk adjustment has a role to play in 
facilitating mobility for older and less healthy people, but policy makers should also 
pay attention to the way in which insurers link the sale of statutory and voluntary 
health insurance and do more to allay consumer fears about losing voluntary cover if 
they switch to another insurer for statutory cover. Although the trend towards 
product differentiation may be an indication of responsiveness to consumer 
preferences, it can also lower the transparency needed for people to make informed 
choices. Finally, while insurers in some of the countries have increasing access to 
tools to enhance value, they may be prevented from using them for a range of 
reasons. In addition to data constraints, perceived and real resistance (including legal 
challenge) to the use of some tools from enrolees, providers, regulators and 
politicians seems to be a key issue. 
 
Developments in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland suggest that 
the instrumental value of insurer competition as a means of improving health system 
performance rests on multiple assumptions that can only be upheld through 
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frequently complex interventions often requiring elusive data. Making it work 
therefore requires action on many fronts, particularly to ensure incentives are aligned 
across the health system, and greater awareness of the political nature of some 
barriers to success. 
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Appendix 
 
Questionnaire for Study 1 
 
Private health insurance in the European Union 
 
This exercise has two aims: 
The first is to provide a descriptive overview of: 
 market role: the role private health insurance (PHI) plays in the health system and 
its relationship to the statutory or publicly-financed system/scheme 
 market performance: the size of the PHI market 
 market structure: the nature of those who buy and sell PHI and their relations 
with providers 
 market conduct: the way in which the PHI market operates 
 public policy towards PHI 
 
We also aim to provide information on trends over time, where available. 
 
The second is to attempt some evaluation of the performance of the PHI market 
against a set of health financing policy goals developed by the World Health 
Organisation (see below for details), both ‘within’ the market and in terms of its 
impact on the wider health system. 
 
Please note: 
We define private health insurance (PHI) as health insurance that is taken up at the 
discretion of individuals or employers on behalf of individuals. It can be provided by 
public and quasi-public bodies and by for-profit (commercial) and non-profit 
organisations. 
 
Please indicate all sources of information and provide a list of references. Please also 
indicate where there is no available information with which to answer a particular 
question. 
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You may not be able to address all the questions listed below; some may not be 
relevant to the situation in your country. 
 
 
Descriptive overview 
 
Market role 
 Based on the classification in Table 1, please describe the role(s) played by PHI. 
 Indicate where the market combines one or more roles. How well defined are the 
boundaries between different types of PHI? 
 Indicate if roles have changed over time (eg if there was a substitutive market but 
it no longer exists due to changes in the eligibility criteria for statutory coverage, 
as in the Netherlands in 2006; or if a supplementary or other type of market has 
recently developed). 
 Who is eligible to purchase different types of PHI? 
 
 
Market performance 
 
In this section and the following sections, please remember to distinguish between 
different types of PHI (where possible). 
 
Levels of population coverage 
1. How many people are covered by each type of PHI (in numbers and as a % of the 
population)? 
2. How have levels of population coverage changed over time (the last 10-15 
years)? For which types of PHI? If possible, provide time series data on levels of 
population coverage. 
 
Contribution to private and total expenditure on health care 
3. Comment on the data provided in Table 2, indicating how they differ from 
national data. Please provide more recent national data (for 2006 and 2007) if 
they are available. 
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Barriers to market development 
4. This will not apply to all countries. Where levels of out of pocket payments are 
relatively high, but the market for PHI is very small, please indicate why, in your 
view the market has not developed further. If high out of pockets are due to 
statutory cost sharing, it may be because insurers are reluctant to offer 
complementary cover of user charges (due to fears about adverse selection etc). If 
direct out of pocket payments to providers are high, can the low growth of PHI 
be attributed to lack of affordability, lack of trust in third party payers, lack of 
trust in insurance mechanisms more generally, the existence of informal 
payments, lack of transparency in the statutory benefits package – or other 
factors? 
 
 
Market structure 
 
Buyer characteristics 
5. Describe the characteristics of those who subscribe to PHI (eg socio-economic 
status, educational level, health status, gender, age, urban-rural mix etc) and any 
changes over time. 
6. What drives demand for PHI? Is there any information (eg from surveys) to 
suggest why people subscribe to PHI? 
7. What proportion of each type of PHI is purchased by individual subscribers and 
what proportion is purchased by groups (usually employment-based groups)? 
Have there been changes in the ratio of individual to group subscribers over 
time? 
 
Seller characteristics 
8. What type of insurers operate in the PHI market (eg statutory health insurance 
(sickness) funds, mutual associations, provident associations, for-profit 
organisations)? Has there been any change in the market share of non-profit vs 
for-profit (commercial) insurers over time? 
9. How many insurers operate in the PHI market? Indicate what type of insurer. Has 
the number of insurers operating in the PHI market changed over time? 
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10. What share of the PHI market is held by the three largest insurers (market 
concentration)? Has this changed over time? 
11. What is the ratio of specialist health insurers (ie insurers that specialise in health 
and do not engage in other insurance activity) to non-specialist insurers (insurers 
that also engage in other insurance activity eg life insurance)? 
12. To what extent is PHI sold by insurers/funds that also offer statutory/social health 
insurance? 
13. To what extent is PHI sold in combination with life insurance? 
14. What share of the private insurance market is taken up by PHI? 
 
 
Market conduct 
 
Please also clearly indicate where there are differences in conduct between non-profit 
insurers (eg mutual associations) and for-profit (commercial) insurers. 
 
Benefits 
15. Describe the range of benefits covered by each type of PHI. 
16. Do subscribers receive benefits in cash or in kind (ie as health services)? 
17. What types of benefits are usually excluded from PHI cover (eg pre-existing 
conditions, chronic illnesses such as diabetes, normal child birth, drugs for 
treatment of cancer etc)? 
18. Are insurers required to offer a minimum level of benefits or a standardised 
benefits package? 
19. To what extent do insurers offer ‘tailor-made’ cover (ie cover adapted to suit a 
particular individual’s requirements)? 
20. Are there any restrictions on what insurers are permitted to cover? 
21. Do insurers offer subscribers financial incentives to use publicly-financed 
services rather than privately-provided care? For example, in the UK some 
insurers offer cash lump sums or no claims bonuses to subscribers who choose to 
be treated in an NHS hospital (paid for by the NHS) rather than in the private 
sector (paid for by PHI). 
22. Do insurers cover services not covered by the statutory health system? 
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23. To what extent is it possible for subscribers to ‘combine’ public and private 
funding streams? For example, would a cancer patient undergoing publicly-
financed treatment be able to use PHI to pay for a cancer drug that was not 
reimbursed by the statutory scheme? Or would s/he be able to pay out of pocket 
for the drug to be administered as part of otherwise publicly-financed treatment? 
24. In addition to cover for medical expenses, in some EU member states PHI also 
provides cover for the following: loss of earnings, cash benefits, long-term care, 
other (please specify). Indicate the extent to which these are covered by PHI (ie 
the number/proportion of people they cover and/or their share of the PHI market). 
 
Setting premiums 
25. How do insurers set premiums for each type of PHI? Are premiums community 
rated (the same for all subscribers to a particular insurer), risk rated (based on 
individual risk factors) or experience rated (adjusted based on the claims history 
of an individual or group)? 
26. What variables are used for risk rating/medical underwriting (eg age, sex, 
medical history, family history of disease, results of genetic tests etc)? Are 
potential subscribers required to undergo medical examinations/genetic tests? 
27. To what extent does moratorium underwriting take place (this is a system 
whereby individuals do not have to give any health-related information but are 
not covered for pre-existing conditions until a specified symptom- or treatment-
free period after their policy has started)? 
28. Is there a system of risk equalisation or risk adjustment among insurers in place 
(as in Ireland, for example)? If so, what are its objectives and how does it 
operate? 
29. Is there any evidence of insurers engaging in risk selection (‘cream skimming’ eg 
by attempting to attract low risks and deter high risks)? With what consequences? 
 
Policy conditions 
30. Is PHI available to anybody? If not, which groups are ineligible to purchase PHI 
(eg people aged 65+, disabled people etc)? 
31. Can insurers reject applications for cover? 
32. What types of PHI contract are available (eg annual or life)? 
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33. Does the type of contract available vary with age or sex or any other personal 
characteristic? 
34. Do premiums rise with age? 
35. To what extent can/do insurers exclude pre-existing conditions from cover? 
36. To what extent can/do insurers impose waiting periods? 
37. Do policies cover individuals only or do some policies cover dependants as well 
(at no extra cost)? 
38. To what extent is group-purchased PHI paid for by employers/employees? 
39. To what extent does group-purchased PHI cover family members/dependants? 
40. Does group-purchased PHI cover stop when the employee retires? 
 
The price of premiums 
41. Have premiums risen or fallen in the last 10 years? If so, by how much? Can you 
identify factors that account for rises/falls in premiums?  
42. In your view, are premiums competitively priced? 
43. If possible, please give an example of the cost in national currency of a ‘typical’ 
policy for a 25 year old man, a 35 year old woman and a 50 year old man. Please 
indicate if the cost covers dependants or not. 
  
Subscriber choice 
44. What number of products can subscribers choose from (eg from the three largest 
insurers)? 
45. To what extent do insurers attempt to restrict subscriber choice of provider (eg by 
using ‘preferred provider networks’ etc)? 
46. To what extent are individuals able to switch from one insurer to another and 
what are the costs involved in switching (if any)? 
47. To what extent is the ‘portability’ of benefits an issue (this is most likely to be an 
issue in substitutive markets such as Germany or in employment-based markets 
such as the US)? 
 
Subscriber information 
48. To what extent do consumers have access to clear (possibly centralised) 
information about the price and policy conditions of different PHI products? 
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49. How easily can consumers compare PHI products in terms of value for money 
(eg how many premium options are offered by one insurer)? 
50. Are there any national reports (eg by consumer associations or competition 
authorities) about subscriber access to information and consumer protection more 
broadly? Have any concerns for consumer protection been raised? 
 
Subscriber cost sharing 
51. Under PHI, are subscribers required to pay part of the costs of the health services 
they use? If so, in what form (please refer to Table 4)? 
52. Is there any ceiling on subscriber cost sharing (eg an annual out of pocket 
maximum)? 
  
Relations with providers 
53. In your view, to what extent do insurers engage in ‘strategic purchasing’ or do 
they simply reimburse a) providers or b) subscribers? 
54. Are insurers permitted to contract selectively with providers? If so, to what extent 
does this take place in practice? 
55. To what extent are insurers ‘vertically integrated’ with providers? For example, 
do insurers enter into exclusive agreements with certain providers, which means 
that their subscribers can only use those providers? Some insurers in the UK and 
Spain have their own hospitals and therefore combine insurance with provision. 
56. How do insurers pay providers (eg fee for service, capitation, salaries)? Have 
there been any changes in payment methods in the last 10 years (eg from fee for 
service to capitation etc)? 
57. Who defines provider fees? Do insurers negotiate prices with providers or are 
insurers simply ‘price takers’ (ie they accept the fees set by providers 
themselves)? 
58. Are the fees insurers pay providers higher than the fees the same providers get 
from the statutory scheme? 
59. Do insurers have incentives to lower/control health care and operating costs? If 
so, how do they attempt this (eg through choice of provider payment method, by 
requiring GP referral to outpatient or inpatient specialist care, through use of 
preferred provider networks, through utilisation review (providers), by requiring 
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patients to obtain prior authorisation (for expensive procedures only or for all 
care) etc)? 
60. From whom do insurers ‘purchase’ services? From private hospitals and clinics? 
From public providers? To what extent do insurers make use of private beds in 
public hospitals? 
61. Are doctors permitted to work in both the public and the private sector? To what 
extent does this take place in practice? How does it affect the treatment of 
publicly-financed patients (eg by creating or exacerbating waiting times)? Do 
doctors have financial incentives (eg different fee schedules for public and 
private patients) to treat PHI patients differently (eg to treat or refer them more 
quickly or give them better treatment)? Is there any evidence to suggest that PHI 
patients are treated more favourably than publicly-financed patients? 
 
Administrative costs and claims ratios 
62. What is the annual turnover of insurers (total premium income)? 
63. How much do insurers spend on administration (including advertising and 
marketing) as a proportion of premium income? Have these costs changed over 
time? If so, why? 
64. To what extent do insurers have incentives to minimise administrative costs? 
65. Can you give a comparison of the administrative costs of insurers and 
administrative costs in the statutory health system? 
66. Give an indication of insurers’ claims ratios (this is the ratio of benefits paid to 
premium income). 
 
 
Public policy towards PHI 
 
Relationship with the statutory health system 
67. Describe any changes in the rules and arrangements of the statutory system that 
may have affected the market for PHI (eg attempts to shift certain benefits from 
public to private coverage, attempts to exclude or include some groups from 
statutory coverage etc)? 
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68. Are there any debates about the role and development of PHI? If yes, what is the 
focus of debates? Who is engaged in these debates (eg insurers, providers, patient 
groups, media, politicians, the public etc)? 
69. In your view, how is the market for PHI likely to develop in future? 
70. Can you comment on ways in which the existence of PHI affects the wider health 
system? 
 
National regulatory framework 
71. What is the legislative framework for PHI? 
72. Who is responsible for regulating the market for PHI (eg government department, 
PHI-specific regulatory body, insurance-specific regulatory body, financial 
services regulatory body etc)? 
73. What is regulated? Regulations may apply to the following (although this list is 
not exhaustive): the nature and/or number of products on offer, requirements to 
provide minimum and/or standardised benefits, requirements to participate in a 
system of risk equalisation/risk adjustment, rules concerning premium setting and 
prices, rules concerning policy conditions, solvency, advertising, consumer 
information, complaints procedures. Describe existing regulations and any 
changes in regulation over time. 
74. To what extent has the national regulatory framework (including tax treatment; 
see below) been controversial? Describe any court cases concerning PHI and its 
regulation. 
 
Tax issues 
75. Describe any tax incentives or disincentives (with levels and dates of 
introduction/abolition) to individuals and corporations to encourage the take up 
of PHI or particular types of PHI. Have there been any changes over time? To 
what extent do tax incentives contribute to demand for PHI? 
76. Does tax treatment differ according to an insurer’s corporate status (eg for-profit 
insurers have to pay premium tax but mutual associations or non-profits do not)? 
 
European Union regulatory framework 
77. In what way has the European Commission’s Third Non Life Insurance Directive 
affected the market for PHI? 
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78. Describe any regulatory changes introduced as a result of the Directive. 
79. Describe any national or EU-level court cases involving the Directive or EU 
competition rules (eg on state aid etc). 
 
 
Evaluation 
 
The study refers to a set of financing policy goals developed by WHO based on the 
health system performance goals established in The World Health Report 2000 
(WHO 2000; WHO Regional Office for Europe 2006). The goals are as follows: 
 promoting universal protection against the financial risks associated with ill 
health; financial protection aims to ensure that people do not become poor as a 
result of using health care 
 promoting a more equitable distribution of the burden of financing the health 
system; equity in finance requires richer people to pay more for health care, as a 
proportion of their income, than poorer people 
 promoting equitable use and provision of services; equity of access to health care 
based on need rather than ability to pay 
 improving the transparency and accountability of the system; for example, 
ensuring that the entitlements and obligations of the population are well 
understood by all, addressing the issue of informal payments where relevant, 
auditing institutions and monitoring and reporting on performance 
 rewarding good quality care and providing incentives for efficiency in service 
organisation and delivery 
 promoting administrative efficiency by minimising duplication of responsibility 
for administering the health financing system and minimising costs that do not 
contribute to achieving the goals stated above 
 
80. To what extent does PHI contribute to these goals: a) within the market itself and 
b) in terms of its impact on the wider health system? Please refer to Table 5 for 
examples. Base your evaluation on evidence where it is available. Where this is 
lacking, please give your own view (but indicate that it is your own view). 
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81. Please discuss any further issues relevant to PHI that have not already been 
covered. 
 
Table A1 Market roles of private health insurance 
Market role Driver of market 
development 
Nature of cover Examples 
Substitutive Public system 
inclusiveness (% of the 
population covered) 
Covers people excluded from 
or allowed to opt out of the 
public system 
Germany since 
1970, the 
Netherlands prior 
to 2006, Chile 
Complementary 
(services) 
Scope of benefits 
covered by the public 
system 
Covers services excluded 
from the public system (eg 
dental care, outpatient 
prescription drugs, 
complementary and 
alternative treatment etc) 
Many EU member 
states, Canada 
Complementary 
(user charges) 
Depth of public coverage 
(% of the benefit cost 
met by the public system) 
Covers statutory cost sharing 
(user charges) 
France, Denmark, 
Slovenia, Ireland 
Supplementary Consumer satisfaction 
(perceptions about the 
quality of publicly-
financed care) 
Covers faster access or 
access to private sector care 
or enhanced consumer choice 
(of amenities, of providers) 
The United 
Kingdom, Ireland 
and most EU 
member states 
Source: Adapted from Foubister et al (2006)  
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Table A2 PHI as a proportion of private expenditure on health and total expenditure on health, 1996-2005 
Country Data 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
AUT PEH as % of TEH 29.6 24.5 24.3 23.9 24.1 24.3 24.6 24.7 24.4 24.3 
 
PHI as % of PEH 19.9 22.7 21.5 20.5 19.4 19.1 19.6 19.7 21.0 21.3 
 
PHI as % of TEH 5.9 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 
BEL PEH as % of TEH 21.6 26.1 26.7 27.9 28.6 28.7 29.2 28.3 27.3 27.6 
 
PHI as % of PEH 8.5 8.7 10.3 11.6 12.1 12.2 12.1 12.0 12.0 12.1 
 
PHI as % of TEH 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 
BGR PEH as % of TEH 30.9 29.4 32.1 34.6 40.6 43.9 40.3 37.9 42.4 42.5 
 
PHI as % of PEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
CYP PEH as % of TEH 66.4 65.5 58.9 57.3 58.4 57.7 55.1 55.3 55.7 56.5 
 
PHI as % of PEH 2.6 3.6 4.9 4.7 4.7 4.4 4.3 6.3 5.4 7.6 
 
PHI as % of TEH 1.7 2.4 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 3.5 3.0 4.3 
CZE PEH as % of TEH 9.3 9.7 9.6 9.5 9.7 10.2 9.5 10.2 10.8 11.4 
 
PHI as % of PEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.2 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
DNK PEH as % of TEH 17.6 17.7 18.0 17.8 17.6 17.3 17.1 15.8 15.7 15.9 
 
PHI as % of PEH 7.7 7.9 8.0 9.6 9.0 8.0 7.2 9.4 9.8 9.5 
 
PHI as % of TEH 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 
EST PEH as % of TEH 11.6 10.8 13.7 19.0 22.5 21.4 22.9 22.9 24.0 23.1 
 
PHI as % of PEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.3 0.3 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.1 0.1 
FIN PEH as % of TEH 24.2 23.9 23.7 24.7 24.9 24.1 23.7 23.8 22.8 22.2 
 
PHI as % of PEH 9.9 11.0 11.1 10.8 10.6 10.4 10.1 10.1 10.3 10.2 
 
PHI as % of TEH 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 
FRA PEH as % of TEH 21.6 21.4 21.4 21.6 21.7 21.7 21.4 20.6 20.6 21.5 
 
PHI as % of PEH 49.3 49.7 50.5 49.9 49.7 49.7 50.2 60.6 61.3 62.0 
 
PHI as % of TEH 10.6 10.6 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.7 12.5 12.6 13.4 
DEU PEH as % of TEH 17.8 19.2 19.9 20.2 20.3 20.7 20.8 21.3 23.1 23.1 
 
PHI as % of PEH 42.1 41.6 40.3 40.5 40.7 40.4 41.0 41.0 39.1 39.8 
 
PHI as % of TEH 7.5 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.7 9.0 9.2 
GRC PEH as % of TEH 47.0 47.2 47.9 46.6 55.8 52.6 53.0 53.6 55.4 57.2 
 
PHI as % of PEH 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.0 2.8 
 
PHI as % of TEH 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 
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Table A2 PHI as a proportion of private expenditure on health and total expenditure on health, 1996-2005 
Country Data 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
HUN PEH as % of TEH 19.2 19.3 25.2 27.6 29.3 31.0 29.8 28.1 28.7 29.1 
 
PHI as % of PEH n/a n/a 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.3 2.1 3.9 3.7 
 
PHI as % of TEH n/a n/a 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.1 
IRL PEH as % of TEH 28.8 26.3 26.5 27.3 27.1 26.4 24.4 23.3 21.8 22.0 
 
PHI as % of PEH 31.8 32.6 31.4 27.3 26.4 24.3 26.3 28.0 29.5 31.7 
 
PHI as % of TEH 9.1 8.6 8.3 7.4 7.2 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.4 7.0 
ITA PEH as % of TEH 29.4 29.2 29.6 29.3 27.5 25.4 25.5 25.3 24.2 23.4 
 
PHI as % of PEH 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.9 
 
PHI as % of TEH 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
LVA PEH as % of TEH 42.2 44.2 40.7 41.7 46.1 49.8 48.2 47.5 43.4 47.4 
 
PHI as % of PEH 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.8 3.2 4.7 5.6 3.2 1.7 1.7 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.5 2.3 2.7 1.5 0.7 0.8 
LTU PEH as % of TEH 29.7 31.0 24.0 25.1 30.3 27.4 25.1 24.0 32.5 32.7 
 
PHI as % of PEH 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.1 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 
LUX PEH as % of TEH 7.2 7.5 7.6 10.2 10.7 10.2 9.7 9.4 9.6 9.2 
 
PHI as % of PEH n/a n/a n/a 13.6 10.1 9.0 8.9 18.2 17.6 17.6 
 
PHI as % of TEH n/a n/a n/a 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 
MLT PEH as % of TEH 29.3 30.2 27.8 28.0 25.8 26.9 23.9 23.9 23.9 21.9 
 
PHI as % of PEH 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.7 5.1 7.3 9.8 
 
PHI as % of TEH 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.8 2.1 
NLD PEH as % of TEH 33.8 32.2 35.9 37.3 36.9 37.2 37.5 31.8 32.8 34.3 
 
PHI as % of PEH 57.7 59.1 45.6 44.5 43.0 43.6 45.6 56.0 58.0 58.5 
 
PHI as % of TEH 19.5 19.0 16.4 16.6 15.9 16.2 17.1 17.8 19.0 20.1 
POL PEH as % of TEH 26.6 28.0 34.6 28.9 30.0 28.1 28.8 30.0 31.4 30.6 
 
PHI as % of PEH 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
PRT PEH as % of TEH 34.7 34.3 32.9 32.4 27.5 28.5 27.8 26.6 28.4 27.3 
 
PHI as % of PEH 4.0 4.4 4.7 4.3 11.1 11.3 13.2 15.6 15.9 13.8 
 
PHI as % of TEH 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 3.1 3.2 3.7 4.1 4.5 3.8 
ROU PEH as % of TEH 33.5 30.6 37.9 35.0 32.7 34.2 34.8 20.5 28.5 24.7 
 
PHI as % of PEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 9.4 18.2 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 2.7 4.5 
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Table A2 PHI as a proportion of private expenditure on health and total expenditure on health, 1996-2005 
Country Data 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
SVK PEH as % of TEH 11.3 14.7 14.3 15.8 16.7 17.8 17.5 22.4 26.2 27.0 
 
PHI as % of PEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SVN PEH as % of TEH 22.2 20.8 24.3 24.5 22.2 23.2 23.2 25.2 24.4 24.7 
 
PHI as % of PEH 55.3 51.2 55.6 60.7 61.4 58.3 58.8 49.5 51.7 51.3 
 
PHI as % of TEH 12.3 10.7 13.5 14.8 13.6 13.5 13.7 12.5 12.6 12.7 
ESP PEH as % of TEH 27.6 27.5 27.8 28.0 28.4 28.8 28.7 29.7 29.1 28.6 
 
PHI as % of PEH 12.8 12.8 13.1 13.4 13.7 13.9 14.3 18.3 19.4 19.2 
 
PHI as % of TEH 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 5.4 5.7 5.5 
SWE PEH as % of TEH 13.1 14.2 14.2 14.3 15.1 15.1 14.9 14.6 15.4 15.4 
 
PHI as % of PEH n/a n/a n/a 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.4 2.1 1.8 2.0 
 
PHI as % of TEH n/a n/a n/a 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
GBR PEH as % of TEH 17.1 19.6 19.6 19.4 19.1 17.0 16.6 14.4 13.7 12.9 
 
PHI as % of PEH 19.2 17.2 17.4 16.8 16.7 8.0 8.0 9.0 8.2 7.9 
 
PHI as % of TEH 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 
ISL PEH as % of TEH 16.7 17.9 18.8 16.9 18.0 18.1 17.3 17.5 17.6 17.5 
 
PHI as % of PEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NOR PEH as % of TEH 15.8 18.7 17.8 17.4 17.5 16.4 16.5 16.3 16.4 16.4 
 
PHI as % of PEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
PHI as % of TEH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
USA PEH as % of TEH 54.6 54.9 56.0 56.5 56.3 55.4 55.3 55.5 55.3 54.9 
 
PHI as % of PEH 61.3 60.7 60.6 61.4 62.7 64.2 65.2 65.8 66.4 66.6 
 
PHI as % of TEH 33.5 33.4 33.9 34.7 35.3 35.6 36.1 36.5 36.7 36.6 
Source: WHO (2007) http://www.who.int/nha/country/en/#L accessed 4 December 2007 
Note: PEH = private expenditure on health; PHI = private health insurance; TEH = total expenditure on health; n/a = estimates not available 
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Table A3 Data sources for Table 2 
Country Data source 
AUT OECD HD 2007 
BEL 2003 SHA JQ, else WHO based on Previous OECD HD versions. Projections based on PC. Estimated as share of HHC 
BGR 2001 draft NHA Report, 2003 claims Stat Yearbook T 27, 2003 JQ. Ratio of average HE/total Exp applied to PC excluding reimbursement 
CYP Statistical Service. Health & Hospital Statistics, T V 1999-2002, 2003-04 JQ. 2005 projection based on HHC 
CZE OECD HD 2007 
DNK OECD HD 2007 
EST Min of Social Affairs HealthExpend_add2_2003.xls and HealthExpend_1999-2003.xls. 2004 projected with share to HHC 
FIN OECD HD 2007 
FRA OECD HD 2007 
DEU OECD HD 2007 
GRC OECD HD 2006 (2000-2004) 1998-99: OECD HD 1998, 2005 projection based on HHC 
HUN 1998-2002 OECD HD 2006, 2003-5 JQ 
IRL OECD HD 2007 
ITA OECD HD 2007 
LVA http://data.csb.lv/EN/Dialog/Saveshow.asp. Not included values for NGOs and Firms (additional to health insurance) 
LTU 2002-2003 MoH HA draft report, 1996-2001 & 2004-5 projection based on PC. 1996-2001 Ratio applied to HHC 
LUX OECD HD 2006, 2005 projection based on ratio to PC 
MLT 1993-98 NA 50% claims T6, 1999-2002 5% of "other spending" of higher income groups HHS NSO Pov & Soc Ineq T1, 2003-2005 projections based on 
growth of financial institutions. 93-99 estimated to be 50% of Life insurance claims NA T6. 99-2002 Estimated to be 5% of "other spending" of higher income 
groups in HHS according NSO Poverty and social inequality T1, 2003-05 projected through Annual Report CB T 3.9. 
NLD OECD HD 2006, 2003-04 JQ, validation to WHR 2007 
POL OECD HD 2007 
PRT OECD HD 2007 
ROU  2003-5 JQ 
SVK OECD HD 2006, 2002-04 JQ, 2005 projection based on HHC 
SVN Stat Yearbook T 30 adjusted by MoH, Revisions supplied by MoH with CSO data, 2003-04 HA data. Revisions supplied by MoH with CSO data 
ESP OECD HD 2007 
SWE WHO based on 1999-2004 http://www.forsakringsforbundet.com/common/browse.asp?id=3643, 2004 CBS, 2005 estimated as 11.5% growth referred in the 
same source 
GBR OECD HD 2006, else: WHO based on private spending. Estimates based on HHC in NA 
ISL OECD HD 2007 
NOR OECD HD 2007 
USA OECD HD 2007 
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Table A4 Direct and indirect forms of cost sharing 
Form Definition 
Direct  
Co-payment The user pays a fixed fee (flat rate) per item or service. 
Co-insurance The user pays a fixed proportion of the total cost, with the insurer 
paying the remaining proportion. 
Deductible The user bears a fixed quantity of the costs, with any excess borne 
by the insurer; deductibles can apply to specific cases or to a period 
of time. 
Indirect  
Reference pricing A reference price refers to the maximum price for a group of equal 
or similar drugs that the insurer will reimburse the user. If the user 
chooses a drug that costs more than the reference price, he or she 
must pay the difference. 
Balance billing The user pays the difference between the maximum reimbursement 
rate and the fee charged by the provider (where providers are 
allowed to charge above the official reimbursement rate). 
No claims bonus The insurer rewards users who do not make a claim in a given year. 
Differential charges  
Multi-tier formularies Typically, these contain two or three tiers. The first tier consists of 
generic drugs, which have the lowest co-payment. The second and 
third tiers generally comprise brand-name drugs, which can be split 
into preferred and non-preferred drugs (where non-preferred drugs 
are the most expensive in the tier). Multi-tier formularies are most 
commonly used in the United States. 
Source: Adapted from Thomson and Mossialos (2004) 
 
  228 
Table A5 PHI impact on health financing policy goals 
Policy goal Within the market Impact on the wider health system 
Financial 
protection 
Most relevant where PHI is a 
person’s only source of 
health care ‘cover’ (ie 
substitutive PHI). Financial 
protection can be undermined 
by age limits, benefit limits, 
exclusion of pre-existing 
conditions and cost sharing. 
PHI may enhance financial protection if the 
statutory system does not offer universal 
coverage or if the depth and scope of statutory 
coverage are limited. But it may also hinder 
efforts to expand statutory coverage. 
Supplementary PHI is least likely to contribute to 
financial protection (within the market and in the 
health system as a whole). 
Equity in finance Are there any studies of this 
for your country? 
International analysis shows 
that PHI can be progressive 
due to the high proportion of 
richer people buying PHI, but 
tends to be regressive where 
it is the ‘main’ means of 
obtaining coverage (as in the 
US) and where it covers a 
large proportion of the 
population (Wagstaff et al 
1999). 
Again, depends on the role PHI plays, but likely 
to lower equity in finance in the health system as 
a whole where richer groups are allowed to opt 
out or are excluded from statutory cover 
(substitutive PHI) and where complementary 
PHI covers user charges. 
Equity of access To what extent do aspects of 
market conduct lower equity 
of access to PHI (eg premium 
setting, policy conditions 
etc)? 
To what extent does the existence of PHI lower 
equity of access in the health system as a whole? 
Do privately-insured people have faster or better 
access to health care (or some types of care eg 
specialist care (van Doorslaer et al 2006)? How 
does PHI affect the allocation of public resources 
(eg if doctors have incentives to prioritise 
privately-insured patients or the latter use beds in 
public hospitals etc)? 
Transparency 
and 
accountability 
How transparent is the PHI 
market? Who collects data on 
the PHI market and how 
accessible is it? Are 
consumers adequately 
informed and protected? 
To what extent does the existence of PHI 
encourage or lower transparency and 
accountability in the wider health system? Do 
private insurers have higher standards (eg where 
informal payments are concerned)? What is their 
contribution to policy debates and processes (eg 
lobbying)? 
Rewarding good 
quality care 
To what extent do private 
insurers try to reward good 
quality of care? 
To what extent does this exceed, match or fall 
short of attempts to reward good quality care in 
the statutory health system? 
Providing 
incentives for 
efficiency 
To what extent do private 
insurers try to ensure 
efficiency in service 
organisation and delivery? 
To what extent does this exceed, match or fall 
short of efforts made in the statutory health 
system? 
Administrative 
efficiency 
How do the administrative costs of private insurers compare to those of the 
statutory health system? To what extent are higher administrative costs justified 
by innovation in rewarding quality / ensuring efficiency etc? 
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Questionnaire for Study 4 
 
Can insurer competition improve health system performance? Evidence from 
western Europe 
 
Introduction: rationale for insurer choice and competition 
 When was insurer choice and competition introduced/extended and why? 
 What were the expected outcomes? 
 
Overview: health insurance organisation and regulation 
The largely descriptive information in this section can be presented in the form of 
comparative tables. 
 
Table A1 Regulation of coverage 
Coverage breadth (universality)  
What is the basis for entitlement to statutory health insurance?  
What % of the population is not covered?  
What are the characteristics of the ‘uninsured’?  
Coverage scope (benefits)  
What health services does statutory health insurance cover?  
Who defines the statutory benefits package?  
Changes in any of the above?  
 
Coverage depth 
 who sets user charges policy? 
 have there been any significant changes in user charges policy? 
 
Table A2 Regulation of collection 
Who sets contribution rates?  
Who collects contributions?  
Who pays contributions (eg which groups of people)?  
What is the balance between employee and employer contributions?  
Are contributions standard across the population?  
Is there a ceiling on contributions?  
What is the balance between wage/income-related contributions and flat-rate 
premiums? 
 
What is the balance between compulsory contributions/premiums and general tax 
revenues? 
 
Trends in premium growth (absolute / as % of household income); compare to 
growth in worker earnings 
 
Changes in any of the above?  
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Table A3 Regulation of pooling 
How are statutory health insurance revenues pooled?  
Who sets the formula for allocating resources to insurers?  
what proportion of insurer revenue is subject to risk adjustment?  
Is there outlier risk sharing above a threshold / up to a ceiling (retrospective 
adjustment)? 
 
What risk factors are used in risk adjustment? Is morbidity included?  
Changes in any of the above?  
 
Table A4 Insurer market structure 
What is the legal/profit status of insurers?  
If profit status varies, what is the balance between for-profit and non-profit?  
If profits are allowed, are there any controls on profit margins?  
How many insurers are there?  
What is the market share of the largest three insurers?  
Can insurers who sell statutory health insurance also sell voluntary cover?  
Who monitors insurer competition?  
Changes in any of the above?  
 
Table A5 Regulation of purchasing 
Who regulates purchaser-provider relations?  
Describe the main characteristics of purchaser-provider relations  
Are there caps on insurer operating/administrative costs?  
% of total revenue spent on health care (claims ratio)  
% of total revenue spent on administration (non-health care costs)?  
Who determines how providers are paid?  
Who sets health service prices?  
Changes in any of the above?  
 
Table A6 Provider payment 
Provider Payment methods 
GPs / primary care providers  
Office-based specialists  
Hospital doctors  
Hospitals  
Other  
Changes in any of the above over time?  
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Ensuring financial protection and (equitable) access to health care 
Table A7 Financial protection and access: steps taken to ensure access to health 
insurance and health care 
Open enrolment Yes / No 
Lifetime cover (guaranteed renewal) Yes / No 
Prohibition of exclusion of pre-existing conditions Yes / No 
Prohibition of risk or experience premium rating Yes / No 
Premium subsidies (how much and for whom) Describe (see below) 
Portability (between jobs, regions etc) Yes / No 
Risk equalisation Yes / No 
Exemptions from / caps on cost sharing Yes / No (describe in 
Tables 2-3) 
Provisions for the uninsured Describe (see below) 
Other  
Note: if any of these steps have been introduced relatively recently, please say when introduced and 
why 
 
Please describe in more detail how the premium subsidies work, who determines 
them, how they are administered, who benefits from them (characteristics and % of 
total insured), any issues/challenges arising etc. 
 
Please describe in more detail provision for the uninsured eg whether they have any 
entitlement to health care, any issues/challenges arising etc. 
 
How effective are all of these steps in securing financial protection and ensuring 
(equitable) access? Is there any evidence of inequitable access to health 
insurance/health services? To what extent are financial protection/access public 
policy concerns? 
 
Choice for users 
Table A8 Choice for users 
Choice regarding: Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Insurance status     
Range of benefits     
Benefit modality     
Level of pre-paid contribution     
Degree of cost sharing     
Insurers     
Providers     
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Is health insurance compulsory (and for whom)? If there is an ‘individual mandate’ 
in place, how does it work and what are the penalties for non-compliance? Are 
penalties enforced? What are the characteristics of the uninsured? 
 
Choice of insurer: How often can people switch insurer? What proportion of the 
insured switch? What are the characteristics of switchers vs non-switchers? 
 
Why would someone switch insurer ie what are the parameters for insurer 
competition (eg extent of differentiation between them, see next paragraph) and how 
strong are incentives to switch insurer? Are there significant price/quality differences 
between insurers? Do individuals/employers benefit from lower premiums? Is there 
any evidence on why people do actually switch insurer? 
 
Do people have choices about how much they pay for statutory health services eg 
level of contributions/premiums, choice of deductible level, reduced cost sharing for 
opting for vertically-integrated insurers or preferred provider networks, benefit 
modality (cash reimbursement vs benefits in kind) etc? 
 
Can people opt for voluntary health insurance (VHI)? What does VHI cover? What 
% of the population are covered by it? Does it prevent people from switching insurer 
for the statutory package of benefits? 
 
Do people have access to comparative information about contribution or premium 
levels / benefits / cost sharing requirements / insurer quality / provider quality? If so, 
who provides this information? What sort of information is available? How good is 
it? Is there any evidence about its use? 
 
Incentives for insurers: minimising risk selection and ensuring value for money 
(quality and cost control) 
 
What steps are taken to maximise insurers’ incentives to compete on price and 
quality and to minimise their incentives to select risks, and with what effect? 
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If VHI is sold by insurers providing statutory coverage, does it provide opportunities 
for risk selection in statutory coverage? 
 
What leverage do insurers have over providers? Please describe the tools/levers 
insurers have to ensure quality and efficiency in the delivery of health care and 
discuss the extent to which they use them. Please mention any proposals to increase 
insurer leverage. 
 
Table A9 Insurer purchasing tools/levers 
Tool / lever Permitted 
(Y/N) 
Use / take up: low / moderate / 
high (and quantify if possible) 
Selective contracting   
Financial incentives (eg through cost sharing) for 
patients to use preferred providers 
  
Price negotiation   
Vertical integration   
Clinical guidelines / protocols   
Disease management programmes   
Utilisation review   
Formularies   
Performance-based payment of providers   
Public disclosure of performance indicators   
Waiting list management / targets   
Other   
Note: if take up is low, please say why 
 
Do insurers have access to comparative information about the quality and costs of 
different providers? If so, who provides it? What are the barriers to improved 
purchasing? Examples might include: insufficient or poor quality information for 
insurers, inadequate incentives for insurers (eg due to poor risk adjustment, inability 
to differentiate themselves, low switching), tension between wanting to exert 
leverage over providers and the need to promote user choice of provider, political 
interference etc. 
 
Outcomes and challenges 
 To what extent have policy expectations about insurer competition been met? 
 If expectations have not been met, why not? 
 What are the key policy challenges? 
 Please summarise the benefits and costs of health insurance choice and 
competition in your country. 
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